Session 1. Well-Being General 1.2 Consequentialism and Utilitarianism Consequentialism is a theory of right action. In a simple version, it claims This course has three aims: Consequentialism . An action is right if and only if it leads to the 1. a methodological one: to deepen your knowledge of how philo- best consequences. sophical arguments work, and how to make your own argu- ments (and write them down effectively in essay form); This leaves open what the best consequences are. They could be independent 2. a substantive one: to teach you some of the main debates in of what makes our lives go best. But we can combine consequentialism with moral philosophy; and Welfarism . The only thing which makes states of affairs good is 3. an exegetical one: to make you acquainted with J. S. Mill’s phi- well-being—that is, how things are going for people. losophy, and how one closely reads a historical text. The combination of consequentialism and welfarism is usually called This course will accompany small-scale tutorials. The aim is to discuss the big issues together, so that we can focus on more detailed questions in tutorials. Utilitarianism . An action is right if and only if it maximises aggre- They do not replace the faculty lectures on the same topic, to which you gate well-being. should also go. Give an example of a non-consequentialist claim. Give an example of a consequentialist view which is not welfarist. 1 Terminology What’s appealing about welfarism/utilitarianism? 1.1 Basic Ethical Categories Advice on Writing . Defining central concepts in a brief sentence is a useful We can distinguish three questions in ethics (amongst others): technique for your essays (though you cannot define every concept). 1. theory of well-being : what makes someone’s life go best (for 2 Well-Being them)? 2. theory of the good (axiology): what makes a state of affairs good? 3. theory of right action : what is the right (permissible) thing to do? 2.1 The Concept Different words: well-being, welfare, utility, happiness, the good life, eudai- These are distinctions which are not always made in pre-philosophical ap- monia (“human flourishing”), prudential value, what is good for someone, proaches to moral questions. subjective goodness, subjective well-being, quality of life, … Give examples of the difference between (2) and (3). Do these refer to the same concept? Discuss possible differences between Advice on Writing . In your essays, avoid writing that something is “ethical”, them. “moral”, “morally problematic” etc. Instead, use the more precise philosophical Are some of these words ambiguous or vague? vocabulary (right, permissible, good, etc.). Which concept is the philosophically most interesting? 1
As moral philosophers, we are interested in what is ultimately valuable. So we 3 Hedonism are interested in, as Parfit puts in, what makes someone’s life go best . It makes con- ceptual sense, for example, to say that “happiness is overrated” and not the 3.1 Intro only thing which makes a life go best. Hedonism is a mental state theory. It claims that well-being is having certain What, if not happiness, can make our lives go best? pleasurable mental states. Different kinds of hedonism will single out differ- When economists talk about “utility”, what do they mean? ent kinds of mental states. On crude hedonism , those mental states are only bod- ily pleasures; but this seems a rather implausible theory. Advice on Writing . When you write an essay, choose one of the above labels and stick to it. (The most common is well-being.) Avoid the label “utility” out- 3.2 Mill’s Hedonism side clearly defined contexts. Mill appears to use “utility”, “happiness” and “pleasure and the absence of pain” interchangeably. (If there is a passage where he distinguishes them 2.2 Main Theories (Parfit) more clearly that would be interesting to know!) On the basis of Parfit’s article, we can distinguish three broad families of the- Mill gives a clear enough definition at the beginning of sec. 2: ories. Each of these identifies well-being with a different feature: By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by Mental States . Well-being is having certain mental states (and/or unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (U 2.2) the absence of others). (Crisp makes an interesting distinction between hedonism and “full” hedon- Desire Fulfilment . Well-being is the fulfilment of certain desires ism [p. 26-7]—but I’ll set this distinction aside.) (or preferences) we have. Objective List . Well-being is the presence of certain objective 3.3 Higher and Lower Pleasures (Green) goods to the individual. On “one-dimensional” hedonism, the amount of well-being some activity We can imagine a mix of theories. Kagan: well-being is enjoying the (objec- provides is merely a function of the quantity (duration, intensity, etc.) of the tively) Good. pleasure provided by it. That was Bentham’s view. Give examples where two of these views give different results. Mill thinks the one-dimensional view is one of the most important shortcom- What are paradigm cases where these views do well? Where do they do ings of Bentham. (See quote 4 in the appendix.) On Mill’s two-dimensional badly? hedonism, pleasures have both quantity and quality . Can you still be a hedonist while making this distinction? Advice on Writing . Contrasting a theory with its alternatives can be a good way to clarify its implications; at the same time, ensure that you do not “get lost” in How is quality to be weighed against quantity? Reconstruct Green’s argument against Mill’s distinction. describing competitors too much. 2
2. “Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally 3.4 Three Claims about Higher/Lower Pleasures acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and en- Following West (2003, p. 53), we can identify three claims that Mill makes: joying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner 1) there is a difference between quantity and quality of pleasures, of existence which employs their higher faculties.” (U 2.6) both of which matter to the desirability of that pleasure 3. The Impartial Observer Test : “Of two pleasures, if there be one to 2) pleasures with greater quality enjoy (“lexical”) priority over which all or almost all who have experience of both give a de- pleasures with lower quality, no matter their respective quanti- cided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obliga- ties. tion to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of 3) pleasures associated with the intellect, and other recognisably the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with human capacities, are greater in quality. both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of These claims are independent. discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the Advice on Writing . Separating a complicated position into several subtheses is other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified another very powerful device. This allows criticising them independently. in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of 3.5 Experience Machine (Nozick) small account.” (U 2.5) 4. Bentham’s shortcomings : “Knowing so little of human feelings, This is a famous objection by Robert Nozick. Imagine you’re Neo in the Ma- [Bentham] knew still less of the influences by which those trix (before taking the red pill). All your experiences are fake. There is a feelings are formed: all the more subtle workings both of the strong intuitive push to think that you’re not having the best life. Your life mind upon itself, and of external things upon the mind, es- would be better if you had real, but less pleasurable experiences. caped him; and no one, probably, who, in a highly instructed Can you think of a more realistic case which also drives home the point? age, ever attempted to give a rule to all human conduct, set Is the experience machine a problem for the other theories of well-being out with a more limited conception either of the agencies by we considered? which human conduct is, or of those by which it should be, What should the hedonist reply? influenced. […] Man is conceived by Bentham as a being sus- ceptible of pleasures and pains, and governed in all his con- Quotes from Mill duct partly by the different modifications of self-interest, and the passions commonly classed as selfish, partly by sympa- 1. Happiness and human faculties : “Human beings have faculties thies, or occasionally antipathies, towards other beings. And more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made here Bentham's conception of human nature stops. […] Man conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing does not include their gratification. […] there is no known spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleas- conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence, ures of the intellect; of the feelings and imagination, and of without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to his own inward consciousness.” (Mill, On Bentham ) those of mere sensation.” (U 2.4) 3
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