Social Conflict and a Migrant Youth Bulge in Urban Sub-Saharan Africa - PDF document

Social Conflict and a Migrant Youth Bulge in Urban Sub-Saharan Africa Ashira Menashe-Oren ABSTRACT Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region of the world with the greatest expected future population growth and where urbanisation is expected to increase the most in the coming decades. This has raised legitimate concerns about the potential role of large cohorts of young men contributing to social unrest and conflict. Prior work has ignored the distinction between youth bulges arising from natural increase as compared to rural-to-urban migration. This paper uses a novel approach to distinguish these factors in SSA between 1990 and 2014 and to examine the specific effects of a migrant youth bulge on the likelihood of social conflict in urban SSA. Empirical analysis suggests that a migrant youth bulge (YB) does not increase the probability of urban violence. However migrant YBs may lead to an increased frequency of urban social conflict, specifically relating to ethnicity-religion and elections. An overall disassociation between urban social conflict and migrant YBs suggests that concerns over the role of large cohorts of young men in violent conflict may be unwarranted.

INTRODUCTION Empirical analysis on the effect of youth bulges on intra-state conflict, particularly in urban settings, has led to mixed results. Some findings have shown that male YBs are not associated with social disorder in cities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Urdal and Hoelscher 2009). Likewise, increasing urban population pressure does not lead to a higher risk of social disorder (Buhaug and Urdal 2013). Other findings indicate that riots are more likely where YBs coincide with greater levels of urban inequality (Urdal 2008). The argument in this paper is that urban YBs can be produced by either combinations of fertility and mortality during the demographic transition or by large flows of rural-to-urban migrants. This paper questions whether the composition of youth bulges is an important factor which has previously been ignored, building on research on the role of urban growth as well as YBs in social disorder and violent conflict (Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Cincotta et al. 2003; Urdal 2008; Urdal and Hoelscher 2009). Principally, if the urban youth bulge is comprised of a large proportion of rural-to- urban migrants would we see increased conflict? Causes of Conflict The causes of intra-state conflict range from poverty and institutionally weak countries to ethnic identification and fractionalisation (Bhavnani and Miodownik 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Esteban et al. 2012; Fearon and Laitin 2003, 2011). Civil conflict is also affected by geography and location and resource scarcity (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Buhaug and Rød 2006; Cincotta et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Evidence of a neo-Malthusian link between environmental destruction accompanied by population growth and conflict is mixed (Buhaug and Urdal 2013; Gleditsch and Urdal 2002; Urdal 2008). However, population is an important factor that interacts and overlaps with other causes of conflict (Goldstone 2002). A particular population phenomenon, a youth bulge, has been found to affect the likelihood of civil conflict (Cincotta et al. 2003; Goldstone 2002; Mesquida and Wiener 1999; Staveteig 2005; Urdal 2

2008; Urdal and Hoelscher 2009; Yair and Miodownik 2014). Two particular methods have been most commonly used to operationalize the YB. One is as the proportion of young adults in a population, often measured as the number of 15 to 24 year olds of the total adult population. The other is a YB as a relative cohort, where large relative cohorts make it easier for conflicts to erupt (Staveteig 2005). Described as an incendiary factor of the Arab Spring (Hvistendahl 2011), the YB is an enabling factor to violent conflict. The focus on young adults is based on a diverse literature claiming that young adults are relatively easily mobilised, with fewer responsibilities to families and careers – frequently not yet married and not fully integrated into the job market (Mesquida and Wiener 1999). The opportunity costs for political violence are low, especially amongst large cohorts (Macunovich 2000). According to Easterlin’s relative cohort size hypothesi s, when a relatively large cohort comes of age economic frustrations emerge- from strains on the education system, unemployment and reduced wages. This may in turn enable political instability and armed conflict (Staveteig 2005). With high unemployment and lack of opportunities, especially in the formal work sector, the alternative costs to engaging in violent action are low (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Turning to civil conflict can also be considered a legitimate way to redress perceived economic, political and social inequalities when there is little to lose. Young adults may be alienated and marginalised (Sommers 2010), politically excluded or with unmet expectations. Deprived youth may aspire for something better and thus be motivated to take action (Pinard 2011). Notably, when referring to a youth bulge, it is most often a male YB. Proportionately large male youth cohorts have been found to have a significant effect on regime type and change, with democracies more likely to collapse (Weber 2013). Similarly, male youth bulges affect the frequency and severity of conflicts (Mesquida and Wiener 1999). Men are more susceptible to violence from a behavioural ecology perspective, as they strive for mate acquisition (Mesquida and Wiener 1999), and have greater taste for risk (Wilson and Daly 1985). This is also evident by the accident hump in male 3

mortality profiles by age where young adult men have higher mortality rates (Hannerz 2001). Furthermore, skewed sex ratios (a high proportion of men to women in a population) may pose a security threat with vast implications on marriage markets, drug use, crime and prostitution (den Boer and Hudson 2004; Dyson 2012). Migration and Urban Youth Bulges Urbanisation is a result of the demographic processes of mortality, fertility and migration. Some studies show that the primary component of urbanisation is urban natural increase (Preston 1979), while many find that urban growth is predominantly due to rural-to-urban migration (Keyfitz 1980; Rogers 1982). Urban age structures tend to be concentrated in the production and reproduction ages during earlier stages of the demographic transition. The age selectivity of rural-to-urban migration which occurs disproportionately amongst the young (Montgomery, 2003), and particularly amongst males, reinforces an urban youth bulge. The proportion of young migrants in the urban population may be fundamental to understanding the effect of an urban YB on social unrest for a number of reasons. Firstly, migration may shift the ethnic composition of urban populations and promote conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2011; Goldstone 2002). The heterogeneity of urban areas can be a source of instability, when several ethnic, religious or regional groups are in close social contact (Cincotta et al. 2003). Secondly, associated with urban growth, the job market and economy may struggle to keep up with incoming migrants (Goldstone 2002). A surge of young workers contributes to under employment and low wages. Also, coming from rural areas, migrants are less educated than their urban counterparts (Sahn and Stifel 2002), making it harder for them to find opportunities in the formal sector of the economy. Migrants are thus more likely to experience economic marginalisation and relative deprivation (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1995). Low paid migrants are peripheralised through market relations and excluded from different segments of society (Cook 2015). Thirdly, migrants may feel alienation and marginalisation in cities (Cook 2015), finding it hard to adjust socially and psychologically (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1995). Finally, by 4