Extract from Chapter C1.pdf Chapter C1 General terms and conditions of contract section 44.2 Pay and working conditions (...) In areas covered by regulations on the general application of collective agreements , the contractor must provide pay and working conditions in accordance with applicable regulations. In areas not covered by regulations on the general application of collective agreements, the contractor must provide pay and working conditions in accordance with applicable national collective agreements for the relevant industry. The contractor must also comply with requirements regarding pay and working conditions stipulated by applicable acts and regulations, including the Working Environment Act. In this context, pay and working conditions mean provisions about minimum working hours, pay, including overtime supplements, shift and rotation supplements and inconvenience allowances, and payment of expenses for travel, subsistence and accommodation, wherever such provisions are stipulated by the collective agreement.
Sanctions (contract provisions C1) If these provisions are breached, the construction client may withhold up to 10 per cent of the contract price, or an amount equivalent to twice the employer's estimated savings, until it has been documented that the situation has been remedied for the entire period of the contract. If documentation is not provided, or if the situation is not remedied by the due date for the contractor's final invoice, the amount withheld will be deducted from the contractor's claim for remuneration. Any amount withheld in accordance with this provision will not prevent the construction client from cancelling the contract in accordance with point 29.
RISIKOKARTLEGGING LØNNS- OG ARBEIDSVILKÅR Leverandør: Kontrakt: Deltakere ved kartelggingen: Dato: Saksnummer: Markering for "Ja" og "Vet ikke" øker VURDERING av innhentet Nei Vet ikke Ja sannsynligheten for informasjon brudd ( Denne kolonnen fylles automatisk ut) Kjenner dere til negative erfaringer med leverandøren? Er bedriften en utenlandsk virksomhet? Er det krysset av for punkt 2 eller 3 i spm. 1a) fra egenrapporteringen? Skal det benyttes ufaglært, innleid, midlertidig eller utenlandsk arbeidskraft for oppdraget? Planlegges det med arbeidstid utover normal arbeidstid på 9 timer i løpet av 24 timer og 40 timer i uka? Mangler det gyldige avtaler om gjennomsnittsbergening etter AML 10-5? Er arbeidstagerne tilreisende til anlegget og er det aktuelt med dekning av utgifter ved reise, kost og losji? Er det underentreprenører? Er det oppgitt lite kjente eller ukjente underleverandører for oppdraget? Er det mangler/ avvik ved bestemmelsene om lønns- og arbeidsvilkår mellom leverandør og underleverandør? Er det mangler ved informasjon gitt om leverandørs oppfølging av lønns- og arbeidsvilkår hos sine underleverandører? Er mer enn halvparten av kolonnene til sammen rød og gul? Hvis ja, viser det til videre kontroll.
Thank you for your attention! vigdis.bjorlo@jbv.no Tel. +47 46620546
Earthing in railway installations Jernbaneverket Technical Railway Technology Øyvind Stensby, 5 February 2016
̶ ̶ Outline of this presentation • Introduction to electrified railways and the various overhead contact line systems • Legislation – Acts, regulations, TSIs and standards • Some important regulatory requirements • Hazard identification – what particular factors do we have to deal with on electrified railways? We list 7 situations • Review of hazards 1 – 7 1 – 3 slides for each hazard • Brief description of the interface between the railway's return circuit and the network companies' earthing systems • New Technical Regulations
Electrified railways
Electrified railways – Running rails • Return route for current from trains • Reference potential for equalisations • Earth electrode • Train detection • Rails must also have certain mechanical properties in order to withstand the forces exerted by trains.
Overhead contact line systems Simple overhead contact line system Draining transformer system with return in running rails
More overhead contact line systems Draining transformer with return-current conductor Autotransformer system with PL, NL and segmented overhead contact line system
What governs us? • Act relating to the inspection of electrical appliances and equipment (Electrical Inspection Act) • Act on the establishment and operation of railways, including tramways, underground railways and suburban railways, etc. (Railways Act) Laws: • Regulations relating to electrical supply installations (FEF) • Regulations relating to low voltage electrical installations (FEL) • Regulations relating to interoperability of the railway system (Interoperability Regulations) Regulations • Technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) • NEK 900 (EN 50122-1) • NEK 440 Standards • NEK 400 • NNRA (Norwegian National Rail Administration): Technical Regulations Company requirements
An important regulatory requirement Section 8-6 of FEF Systems must be designed to ensure that available differences in potential, touch voltage, earth leakage current and current in earthing conductors do not represent a risk of personal injury or damage to equipment or material.
Hazard identification Identification Type Description Hazard 1 Touch hazard Insulation failure in traction power supply installation Overhead contact line system may come into contact with Hazard 2 Touch hazard conductive components and cause them to become energised The pantograph on a train may come into contact with conductive Hazard 3 Touch hazard components and cause them to become energised Loads and short circuits may create a difference in potential Hazard 4 Touch hazard between the return circuit and the surrounding area Damage to Return current and short-circuit current may pass through Hazard 5 equipment conductors that are connected in parallel with the return circuit Operational Hazard 6 disruption; Fault in train detection railway accident Damage to Hazard 7 Lightning current equipment
Hazard 1: Insulation failure in traction power supply This hazard is managed by equalising all exposed conductive components to the return circuit. All short circuits occurring as a result of the insulation failure will then go directly to the return circuit: • touch voltage is minimised • fault is detected by the protection equipment and results in (almost) immediate disconnection of the fault.
Hazards 2 and 3: Overhead contact line and live pantograph in contact with conductive components EN 50122-1: 'overhead contact line zone': the risk zone into which the overhead contact line can fall 'pantograph zone': the risk zone into which a live pantograph can stray in the event of a fault
Hazards 2 and 3: Conductive components in the 'overhead contact line zone' and in the 'pantograph zone' Conductive components that are in the 'overhead contact line zone' and the 'pantograph zone' must be protected so as to prevent any danger to people from energisations resulting from fallen overhead contact line or pantographs. Normal protection: Equalisation to return circuit Where this is not practical, other measures may be considered instead: • Barriers • Protective screen connected to return circuit • Locating out of range • Restricting access
Hazard 4: Increase in potential in return circuit
Hazard 4 – Increase in potential in return circuit Available permitted touch voltage is stipulated in NEK 900: Duration up to 5 minutes: 65 V Duration up to 0.3 seconds: 480 V Duration up to 0.1 seconds: 785 V This can be managed by: • demonstrating that touch voltage arising from potential increase in the return circuit does not exceed the requirements (calculations, measurements) • implementing measures to limit the danger arising from voltage increase in the return circuit
Hazard 4 Protection against return potential • Use of equalisations • Use of barriers • Insulating standing surface from earth (e.g. dry gravel) • Locating outside range • Locating conductive components connected to the return circuit at arm's length from other conductive components • Use of access control (trained personnel) • Reduction of return potential by improving earth connections
Hazard 4 – About earth electrodes Running rails are extremely good earth connections in themselves. As a worst-case scenario, the following resistances have been calculated: Frequency Impedance Impedance (3 km) Hz ohm ohm 16.7 2.5 35 50 4.0 35 Elements such as mast foundations that have been connected reduce resistance even further Extra earth electrodes will only affect the resistance against true earth to a limited degree • It is not usually expedient to have extra earth electrodes
Hazard 5 Current in conductors parallel to the return circuit Thermal heating as a consequence of current in lineside conductive components Hazards resulting from a voltage • Fences and crash barriers difference at segmentation points or from • Handrails disconnection must be assessed. • Water pipes and district heating pipes • Cable guards • Earthing conductors and neutral conductors for low-voltage network If the component has been designed to take the current, this can be equalised to the return circuit at several points. If the component has not been designed to take the current, there must be segmentation between each connection point.
Hazard 5 – current in lineside conductive components – cable guards
Hazard 5 – current in lineside conductive components – low-voltage network
̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ Hazard 6 Disruption to train detection Train detection systems used by Jernbaneverket: • Axle counters • Track circuits Double-insulated 95/105 Hz Single-insulated 95/105 Hz TI 21 audio-frequency track circuit (2 – 4 kHz) FTG-S audio-frequency track circuit (4 – 17 kHz) Level crossings: 10/50 kHz
Hazard 6 – track circuits – double-insulated 95/105 Hz Possible solutions: Equalisation via filter impedance • Use of lineside earthing conductors • Equalisation via voltage limiting devices (VLD, NEK 900) • Insulation of equalised components from earth •
Hazard 6 – track circuits Earthing system and return current must not be configured so that a rail fracture can result in a safety failure. This is a hazard if a rail fracture occurs in stations, and for this reason Jernbaneverket is preparing separate requirements for the design of return circuits in stations. The example is one of three permitted principle solutions for stations with double-insulated track circuits.
̶ ̶ Hazard 7: Lightning current Lightning current is diverted to the return circuit via surge arresters This leads to a high increase in potential, and can break down the insulation in cables and conductors and start fires. • Signalling systems are vulnerable Measures to improve the immunity of vulnerable systems: • use of isolation transformers for conductors connected to running rails • length limits for cables connected to running rails • potential equalisation of cable guards and equipment for running rails Measures to reduce emissions from surge arresters: • install impulse electrodes at surge arresters • connect surge arresters to return circuit via a large high-frequency impedance: filter impedance expedient configuration and connections
̶ ̶ Interface between return circuit and network company earthing system When components are connected, the following hazards may arise: • Hazard 4: The potential from the return circuit can be transferred to the network company's earthing system. This hazard is normally manageable • Hazard 5: Where there are connections in several locations between the network company's earthing system and return circuit, the return current will go through the earthing system. This hazard is manageable by ensuring that the design of the earthing conductors is adequate The most practical solution is often to separate the return circuit from the network company's earthing system, but: • Connection is permitted provided that agreement has been reached with the relevant network company about how to handle the hazard (NEK 900)
New Technical Regulations Jernbaneverket's Technical Regulations for earthing contain requirements on how to handle the particular challenges posed by earthing on railway installations. A complete revision of the Regulations has been published: https://trv.jbv.no/wiki/Felles_elektro/Prosjektering_og_bygging/Jording_og_utjevning
̶ Technical Regulations – what's new? • Focus on hazards and risk assessments • Less focus on specific methods • Measures are to be used only if they are needed to manage the hazards. The use of measures must be justified This means: • Fewer earth connections and equalising connections than before • More use of alternative protective measures • Less focus on 'checking' where the return current goes It also means: • Greater need to calculate available voltage differences on specific sections • More use of NEK 900 and NEK 440 Calculation assumptions are specified in the standards
̶ Risk assessment Regulations relating to electrical supply installations, section 2-2: A risk assessment shall be carried out in order to identify risks in, and in relation to, the electrical installation. The risk assessment shall then be used as a basis for the choice of solution to address these risks. This shall be documented. • Jernbaneverket therefore expects all solutions chosen for projects to be on the basis of a documented risk assessment. • Choosing solutions in accordance with selected standards and the Technical Regulations is regarded as a sufficient risk assessment. Where standards and the Technical Regulations indicate a number of solutions, the reason behind the choice must be documented
Thank you for your attention
The InterCity Project 2016-02-05
InterCity – order NTP 2014-23 Double track by • 2024 to Tønsberg, Hamar and Seut (Fredrikstad) • 2026 to Sarpsborg By 2026 there will also be one line section south of Tønsberg and one section north of Hamar, costing NOK 2 billion Planned completion by 2030
Focus on efficient planning and uniform solutions Consultancy contracts include • all-inclusive deliveries (public plans, all technical disciplines) • longer sections • options for later phases
Concept document 1. Future-oriented infrastructure: ensures that infrastructure projects allow for planned future train services. 2. Includes all functions essential to train operations, stabling, operation and maintenance. 3. Uniform solutions on all IC sections with more standardisation. 4. Achieves targets. 5. Streamlines progress on the IC project. Approved Sept. 2015 4
Technical Design Basis The purpose of the Technical Design Basis for the InterCity Project is to: Propose uniform solutions for InterCity line sections that will improve standardisation Consider quality, safety and service life Propose cost-efficient solutions Select the right solutions in relation to the functions we need Streamline progress on the IC project Status Revision 02 approved in November 2015. 5
IC status Energy supply Overhead contact line system • Autotransformer system with segmented overhead contact line system • Autotransformers will be located in places where they can service completed sections, thereby avoiding temporary autotransformers • In general, system 25 will be constructed (system 20 if necessary but the overhead contact line system will not restrict speed
IC status Energy supply Infrastructure supply Dedicated lineside distribution • network on 22 kV (report in preparation) Feed at available voltage level • (normally 11 kV or 22 kV) Substations as required • Low-voltage system as necessary • (230V IT or 230/400V TN, to be evaluated by section)
InterCity – quantities New section planning from 14 – 17, construction from 17 93 km double track by 2024 to • Hamar 44 km • • Tønsberg 23 km Seut (north of Fredrikstad) 25 km • 55 km double track by 2027 to • Dovre Line section 28 km • Vestfold Line section 11 km • • Sarpsborg 16 km 90 km double track by 2030 to • Lillehammer 25 km • Skien 38 km • Halden 26 km •
The InterCity project is planning 230 km of double-track railway and 21 new stations 9
The Follo Line Contract to be signed for the construction of the technical railway system at Klypen (approach to Oslo Central Station) in 2016, construction 2018 – 21 Comprises Overhead contact line with AT feeders • 22 kV electrical supply installation • This will most likely be an Engineering, Procurement and Construction contract (EPC)
Information about InterCity Website www.jernbaneverket.no/intercity Follow us on Facebook Jernbaneverket: InterCity
Introduction to the Arna – Bergen project Arna – Bergen development (UAB)
ORGANISATION • Construction client organisation UAB (Arna – Bergen development) • Reporting to Construction Projects East Major Projects • Construction client organisation 45 people • Location: Nygårdstangen in Bergen city centre and Arna
SCOPE OF PROJECT • Arna – Fløen 960242 • Bergen Station – Fløen 960128 Double track Arna – Bergen Station New Ulriken Tunnel (7.8 km) Arna Station upgrade Technical railway infrastructure Infrastructure in current Ulriken Tunnel New signalling system Infrastructure in Fløen
STATUS OF ONGOING WORK • UUT 21 contract New Ulriken Tunnel in progress Tunnel boring with TBM in progress JVSS Skanska Strabag • Preparatory contract UBF 32 Preparatory work (Bergen – Fløen) out for pricing Work to start at end of March 2016 • Preparatory contract UUT 15 Preparatory work Arna to be sent out in March 2016 Work to start at end of August 2016
STATUS • Bergen – Fløen to undergo KS2 quality-control process • The project team is working on the planning, design and contract strategy
CURRENT BERGEN – ARNA SYSTEM • Overhead contact line system of varying age and quality • Overhead contact line system at Bergen Station is complex (multiple junctions/tracks, connections) The oldest system is from the 1950s, partially modernised in the 1990s. • Developed gradually • Complex configuration • Old train heating posts from the 1950s (fed from the overhead contact line system) • Point heaters • The signalling system's relay system, built in 1972, is in the attic at Bergen Station (and in the cellar in Arna Station). • Lighting system for the station area • Earthing system
SCOPE OF WORK BERGEN – FLØEN Development and modification of the overhead contact line system (not everything is to be replaced), System 20 3 high-voltage transformers Bergen, fed from BKK Train heating posts (x 10) Point heaters Upgrade of lighting system Upgrade of earthing installation Interlocking system Telecom system Upgrade of technical building, Fløen New technical building, Bergen Station
SCOPE OF WORK ARNA – FLØEN Approx. 11 km of new overhead contact line system, System 20 Modifications to overhead contact line system, Arna Station No AT to be constructed (exemption from Technical Regulations) Point heaters New lighting system Upgrade of earthing installation Interlocking system 10 technical buildings (1 in the station, 9 in cross- cut between old and new tunnels) Telecom system Interface with Arna converter station (power supply to overhead contact line)
SCHEDULE • Works: Bergen – Fløen To take place 2017 – 2021 Arna – Fløen To take place 2017 – 2021 • Procurements, estimated issue dates, respectively: End 2016 / early 2017 and End 2017 / early 2018 Planning separate Market Day in Bergen when these have been finalised
STATUS • The project (Arna – Fløen & Bergen – Fløen) is to undergo the KS2 quality-assurance process • Future progress on the project depends on political decisions and whether the project is included in the 2017 national budget • Final decisions have not been made with regard to the procurement schedule and division into contracts.
CONTACT • Stian Ekornaas • Head of strategy and contracts • Arna – Bergen development • Tel. +47 94501346 • stian.ekornaas@jbv.no
Sandbukta-Moss – Såstad List of projects in the 2016 – 2023 period 2016-02-05
Sandbukta – Moss – Såstad (SMS) • Temporary Operational Phase 10.00: re- routing existing track closer to the sea, to provide more space for new station at Moss. • Main works. • New double track 10.4 km • 2 tunnels totalling approx. 4 km • 4 evacuation tunnels • New station at Moss
Electrical power investments: 960168 Sandbukta – Moss – Såstad 2016 – 2023
SMS Pre-construction work Temporary Operational Phase. • Overhead contact line system temporary tracks (2 tracks of approx. 950 m) • Point heating (7 points) • Site lighting • Re-routing existing cable system
SMS Moss Station Phase 00.90 connecting temporary track prior to Phase 10.00.
̶ ̶ SMS Main works prior to Phase 20.00 Overhead contact line system: • Overhead contact line system with autotransformer to be constructed on 10.4 km double- track line. 4 tracks for platforms at new Moss Station. 3 tracks at Såstadskogen. • 6 x autotransformers 2 at Smørbekk converter (km 50.500). 2 at Moss Station (km 60.200). 2 at km 70.500. • New autotransformer feeder on spires between Smørbekk converter (km 50.500) and Sandbukta plot boundary (km 56.370). Energy (22 kV and low voltage) • 22 kV cable system along 10.4 km new line 10 x substations with 22 kV switchgear and transformer 22 kV/0.4 kV. 2 of the substations will have feeds from network owner (Hafslund) Mosseporten km 56.650 transformer 11/22 kV and Såstadskogen km 64.600 transformer 17/22 kV. With associated high-voltage meter system and interface with network owner.
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