I .' . zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Combatant - PDF document

I .' . zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Combatant zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I' Logistics Command & Control Professor David Schrady Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California L .

I zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Logistics Command & Control zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Logistics Command zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 8s Control zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA While warlighting n d s zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Joint Doctrine says that zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Q available zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 'to exerdse control at the sfrafq'c o p e m f b d zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA levels ofwar, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I set logistics requirements. logistics capabilities will limit wdghting potential and the counes of action Geld commanden' t o and tadid commanders must Logistics is frequently thought of as also d e control ouer lopistics' adminhtrative rather than operational and tactical. Conlrol requires information and logistica is not in any commander's Command &Control sy3tem. However. running out of bullets or gas is terribly operational. Dominant awareness is a watchword. but it doesn't yet include logistics awareneJs. Look at OuUWar for the kinds of logistics information and capabilities needed. bB ackground Logistics is normally ignored absent actual 1980s: Procurement of stealth and smart conflict. weapons, fast sealift ships, and preposition ships Vietnam codlict begins with logistics planning factors left over from WWII and All have impact in'Gulf War Korea. However. G u l f War begins with logistics 1970s: All Volunteer Force and R&D on planning factors left over from Vietnam cruise missiles, smart weapons. stealth. I I fly in. fust USAF By 8 AugusL. fust 82nd Airborne ~roops Kuwait and UAE have depressed oil prices by overproducing. fighters arrive, Eisenhower battle group in Red Sea and O P E fails to control. Iraq has big debt. Independence battle group in Gulf of Oman. Late June Iraq threatens overproducers. Iraq issues new heats The US. has no infrastructure in the region, no bases, no on 17 July. A week later. Iraq deploys forces on Kuwaiti facilities. There is also no OPLAN. border. The U.S. wages words and watches. I 'Ihe Joint Force Commander, Gen. Schwarzkopf. wants Iraq invades Kuwait on 2 August. forces deployed immediately. no priorities assigned. On 6 August, President Bush announces that U.S. forces will defend Saudi Arabia.

I zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Summer 1990 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA it to zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Doctrine says, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA in a timely manner thme zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA must be able to zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I General Schwarzkopf decides he must have forccs ahead Gen. Schwarzkopf began by seuing a requirement for 30 of their combat snvice support. days of suppiy (DOS) in theater and, as is his call, upped DOS. 60 col1 Commanders forward asseh needed to initiate and The footprint of 60 DOS was later seen as a liability and has been a principal factor motivating Focused sustnin war. " Logistics. Over the Fall. the operation grows from the defense of Saudi Arabia to include the liberation of Kuwait and 60 DOS was a brute force response to the lack of tools involvcs more than half a million US. and Coalition for sustainment planning. forces. .I 1 8 Deployment Problems @ Deployment Problems I I I Forces flowed into theater but they didn't know JOPES could not track partially deployed units and where they were going. therefore unit closure. Stuff flowed into theater addressed to "Desert Shield." Asset visibility was lost the moment anything entered the transportation system. The TPFDD was frozen and JOPES was turned off Planning was done with pencil. Everything was Airlift computer model could not indicate bottlenecks. priority one. A b m t a plan. mobility capability was h e de facto While there was supposed to be a plan for flowing forces mobility requircmcnt. and stuff into theater (OPLAN and TPFDD). there was not even recognition of the need for a plan for distribution within theater. I@< @ ; CSS Problems CSS Problems I LTG Pagonis said he was the single and authoritive Ordnance inventory information was bad for the Navy and Air Force. logistics point of contact for the Joint Force Commander. SALTS had to zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA He rarely had info on USAF. USMC, USN or Coalition Marina lacked trucks, tankers (bowsns). and heavy I equipment transporters. forces. The daily logistics summaries for CMCENT enumerated COMNAVLOGJAM in Bahrain never knew the flights arrived yesterday and to-date, ditto ships. ditto location of the forccs they were supporting. personnel and pallets. Ordnance was reported in terms of tons or truckloads rather than what is was and who it be invented by the Navy Supply Corps belonged t o . to circumvent the overloaded and non-responsive I Having dictatcd a requirement for 60 DOS, there was no Navy mcssage system. reporting of its progrcss or attainability. I. I

zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Logistics Post-Gulf zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA ) ? $ k.3 W a r Focused Logistics Initiatives &.I ~ zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I I I ~~~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~ Recognition of deployment as the fust obstacle to Logistics not forgotten after the Gulf War because: including logistics. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA dYectivc combat operations. There were serious problems to bc fixed. Asset visibility and in-transit visibility The Revolution in Military Affairs should impact Movement away from a supply (inventory>bascd logistics too. logistics system to a transportation-based system. Budget lcvels require more with less in everything Needed zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Joint Reception. Staging. Onward Movement and Integration ( I R S O I ) . Focusedhgish’cs was one of the four new Theater Distribution. operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010. IRSOI and Theater Distribution are described as zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Focused Logistics Initiatives . Tools . @ C Global Combat Support System (GCSS) is a kluge of available zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA t ~ n ~ r ~ of The Joint Force Commander needs tools and information Focused Logistics. within his Command &Control system that allow him to plae track, and predict logistics sustainability. Little progress on logistics command and control directly. He needs a common picture of the battlefield logistically speaking. inclusive of what is there and what is flowing in on asset visibility. finance, procurement medical, info transportation. and personnel. Information. as defined here. is data which has b c m processed to yield susfainability predictions or capability Joint Theater Logistics Command and Control is intended assessments. to be an organization, not an information system. Q Conclusion I The sofhvare to do this docs not exist. Existing logistics sofhvare is mostly supply and maintenance focused and YNU an accounting function. In Naval War College Review. Summer zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA The fundamental deficiency is the lack of models of force sustainability and disbibution capability. Without recognition of the need for logistics in the commander’s command & control system and the development of models for sustainability prediction and assersmenl. focused logistics will not happen. I 1999. pp 49-15. 3 I i