- zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA from zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Lessons zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA fi New USMC Paradigm of Sea-Based Logistics and the Falklands OMFTS/STOM/SBL Platforms JSD 48 1
%% Marbe Expeditionary U n i t , Parameters zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Feadbility zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA BMM/SBL zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Sea-Based Logistics 2
Conclusions about zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Superiority zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Ammunition, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA SBL Other Considerations Feasibility logistics for transporter sorties zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA * Sea Control and A i r are required he1 and water drive the sustainment problem * Aircraft ranges are limiting There will be competing demands between operation. and Selective Amphlb Offload capability i s required * In most instances. sustainment I s not feaslble using * Need for Naval Surface Fire Support vertlcal replenishment exclusively Asset Visibility and Decision Support Software are needed * Whether SBL i s feasible depends on more than the ton. miles arithmetic * There must be an effective command structure 8 - It zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA The Falklands War Execution Y Expeditionary warfare: Royal Sea Control estabilshed with sinking of the General Marines supported by the Royal Navy [and lots of STUPT) Belgrano No LCACs, Tiltrotor, or Heavy Lift Heioa so It was surface was OMFT8 using the sea as maneuver space and landing at a place where the Argles were not deployment. not from OTH but from near the bench . No mines in PakIand Sound, but that could have been a It was STOM but STOM stood for shol.e to objective maneuver rather than to objective maneuver show stopper Landlng at San Carlos successhtl, but Royal It was planned to be SBL without pausing to establish a Navy did not have air superiority combat support services area [CSSA) ashore Lack of zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Limited hours per day, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Execution Execution - not enough lift to move troops and m m m o l ~ l m ~ u p p l y Air Superiority meant SBL was Infeasible and need - build a CSSA ashore to Land forcu commamder noted that .exarcLos don't force commmdon to cboose between moving men md moving beans, STUPT bullet. and fuel" ahips, lack of asset vlsibillty. and Navy's whimsy in sending in the desired shlps meant that the pause to build up the CSSA was a long one Lack o f l i f t impacted on paca of combat 0 p c n t l 0 ~ * - o00.0 Omen ops: U he10 LLft. and ammo for- - Long pa- betroen tho r u s d t on M t . Kont on 3031 May Md * Northwood and Woodward had Uttle appreciation of the M t . Elnkt on 11-12 June duo to need to rMrrpply logistics sltuntion and were Impatient to get on - M with pound t . dohpod to resupply unmo T-blsdorn w a d t - CommMd mtmct- operations tnmmpmtblo dth sensibly doddtng lift prforlth. - Eelos ontrolled by Ampbiblow Commander. st &a - LMd TOICM Commander didn't awn have the to he10 m c - comm net U 3
Conclusions zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA * Whlle OMFTS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA enabled by zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA AMV and LCAC and the amphlba that zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 1s not new, STOM la new - MV-22, carry them * STOM could be wlthout Sea-Baaed Loglatlca Adequate zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Sea Control and zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA * SBL reduces b o t print, vulnerablllties and auatalnment requiremsnta * SBL requires: Alr Superlorlty * . * h e t vlslblUty and aelectlve omoad UR and management of the competltlon for It An approprite command structure * 4
Recommend
More recommend