2017 2017 energytech EMP Strategic View David Ball, American Electric Power Managing Director, Transmission Operations 1
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission EMP Focus 2
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission EMP Focus 3
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission EMP Focus 4
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Transmission EMP Concerns AEP Transmission has taken the position that the E1 environment poses the most significant threat to electronic protection, control and monitoring devices • Substation Electronic Equipment • These substation facility devices could be defined as system protection relays, security systems, network switches, routers, and any other solid state components • Transmission Operations Centers • Situational Awareness tools (servers, monitors and electronics) • Communications paths (SCADA data) • Telecomm routing hubs using electronic devices for priority 1 substations needed for strategic service restoration 5
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus Vulnerability #1 • Event: The first major vulnerability is the direct radiation/illumination of the protection equipment • Mitigation: Increasing shielding effectiveness (SE) of the control building can help reduce impact to protection devices and other critical components Vulnerability #2 • Event: The second major vulnerability, and most predominant, is the coupling of currents on to outdoor control cable coming into the control building • Mitigation: Proper grounding techniques and the use of sufficient cable shields can reduce overall impact to protection devices 6
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus • Control Building Device Impact (Mitigation of Vulnerability #1) • In 2010, American Electric Power started the development of a modularized control building standard • The purpose of this standard is to gradually replace protection and control assets as both time and budgets permit • Each building module contains project specific protection and control system components that have been installed and tested prior to delivery • This affords AEP the flexibility to pay and plan for assets that are only needed today, rather than risking the under or oversizing of a control building for future needs 7
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus • Control Cable Protection (Mitigation of Vulnerability #2) • Control cable can pose a significant problem as Transmission facilities require copper cable runs in excess of 1000’ or more for EHV installations that can cover several acres • USE SHIELDED CABLE • Common types of cable shields: • Aluminum/Copper Foil • Helically Wrapped Aluminum/Copper Tape • Braided Wire Shields • Longitudinally Wrapped Corrugated Copper • The appropriate grounding methodology must be used with the type of shield selected • Improper grounding of shields could result in shield failure 8
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus • Control Cable Protection (Cont’d) • Following proper industry standard procedures as outlined in IEEE 525 , IEEE Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Substations can also reduce the impact on electronic equipment and provide guidance on grounding methodology and when to use shielded cable • Metal Oxide Varistors ( MOV’s ) and other surge protection devices ( SPD’s ) can also be used to in conjunction with proper grounding methodologies to protect equipment • Burying cables in pre-cast trench systems and removing exterior cable risers will also provide additional protection 9
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Substation EMP Focus 10
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments Neutral Environment Tests • Low-Level Characterization Tests (LLCT) performed on the Drop-in Control Module designs in 2011/2012 were done in a neutral environment • No control cables were connected • Few conduit penetrations were created • Average attenuation ~40-50dB across frequency spectrum 11
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments Live Environment Tests • Follow up tests in 2014 were performed on AEP TP02 F02 Vert Shielding Effectiveness (SE) 200 a Drop-in Control Module using both LLCT Vert SE Bz Vert SE By Vert SE Bx and Continuous Wave Immersion (CWI) methods on an in-service EHV 345/138kV 150 substation SE (dB) • Requires an FCC Special Temporary 100 Authorization (STA) • All control cables were connected 50 • Several conduit penetrations had been created 0 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 • Average attenuation ~30-40dB across Frequency (Hz) frequency spectrum 12
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments Legacy Building Assessment AEP TP01A F02A Vert Shielding Effectiveness (SE) • The follow-up testing in 2014 also included 200 Vert SE Bz Vert SE By the evaluation of a 30yr old metal control Vert SE Bx building 150 • Differences included: SE (dB) • Poured concrete floor 100 • Several dozen conduit penetrations from years of construction and maintenance 50 • Metal walls not as robust • All control cables were connected 0 • Average attenuation ~20-40dB across 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 Frequency (Hz) frequency spectrum 13
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments EMP Assessments Buried Conduit EMP Drive 200 Direct Drive Stress Characterization 150 • This test injects a high current pulse directly Current (A) 100 onto the shield of our control cable. • It simulates the pulse which would be 50 induced on the control cables in the yard, 0 0 0.2x10 -5 0.4x10 -5 0.6x10 -5 0.8x10 -5 1.0x10 -5 and is used to generate a transfer function Time (S) for the expected stress at the critical AEP Coupling Loss Comparison DD I01A 200 TC4 to I01A equipment (relay, RTU, etc.). • The test waveform is based on an EMP 150 coupling model for buried conductors. SE (dB) 100 50 0 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 Frequency (Hz) 14
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Transmission Control Center EMP Focus Vulnerability #1 • Event: The first major vulnerability is the direct radiation/illumination of the electronic equipment used in control centers to drive situational awareness tools • Mitigation: Increasing shielding effectiveness (SE) of the control center to reduce impact on identified electronic equipment and other critical components Vulnerability #2 • Event: The second major vulnerability, and most predominant, is the coupling of currents on to power and control cable entering the protected area • Mitigation: The use of wave guides, shielding and proper grounding to reduce the overall impact to control center electronic equipment 15
2017 EMP Threat Mitigation Developments Communications Paths Vulnerability #1 • Event: The first major vulnerability is the direct radiation/illumination of the electronic equipment used in telecomm “huts” to drive situational awareness tools • Mitigation: Increasing shielding effectiveness (SE) of the utility owned “huts” to reduce impact on identified electronic equipment and other critical components Vulnerability #2 • Event: The second major vulnerability, and most predominant, is the coupling of currents on to “non fiber” based communications paths • Mitigation: Working with utility and Teleco’s to identify risks and take proper mitigation steps to ensure situational awareness tools are in place after an event 16
2017 Be Cautious • Be wary of information and publications from doomsday advocates • Many are primary investors in testing and solutions firms that are trying to sell systems that won’t solve any problems • Do your research and background checks to ensure credible services and information • There are individuals out there overplaying the risks “end of the world” 17
2017 Next Steps • Industry Rule Making and Legislation Considerations • Transmission Operations Center Hardening • MIL-SPEC-1588 (80dB) • Substation Control Building Hardening • Something less that MIL-SPEC-188 – Based on type of EMP event that we expect substation components to provide restoration (40dB, 60dB) • Cost Effective for utility customers • Customer Focused • Current Information is protected requiring special Security Clearance • Current IEC standards focus is lacking with regard to EMP • IEC-61000-2-x 18
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