A Bargain Might Not Exist: How the Distribution of Power Causes War Richard Jordan Princeton September 5, 2015
Motivation Central Claim: A bargain that all states prefer to war might not exist, even in the absence of all existing explanations for conflict. Implication: We have barely begun to explore rationalist explanations for war. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 2 / 19
Motivation Rationalist Explanations for Conflict: Fearon: info problems, commitment problems, indivisible goods future cost of arming e.g. Jackson and Morelli (2009) and Coe (2012) principal-agent problems e.g. Downs and Rocke (1994) and Goemans (2000) and alliance dynamics Everything we know about bargaining and war hinges on the second question we should ask. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 3 / 19
Motivation As a result of bargaining models... polarity or a ‘quest for hegemony’ can’t explain the failure to bargain neither can expansionist, revisionist, or imperialist ideologies Powell (1996): odds of war are independent of the distribution of power, contra preponderance-of-power and balance-of-power theories In short: the distribution of power has become uninteresting Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 4 / 19
Motivation Is this Satisfying? 1 Why do rising states start wars? if commitment problems cause war, declining state should initiate 2 Why is appeasement dangerous? under current models, appeasement is a problem only when transferring goods strengthens an aggressor in a large and discontinuous way Simplifying the distribution of power has made it uninteresting. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 5 / 19
Motivation A Bargain Might not Exist Because... 1 Power is complex in games with N > 2 actors 2 Wars can end in stalemate among N ≥ 2 actors Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 6 / 19
Multiplayer Games Power is Complicated Among 2 players, power is simple: p and 1 − p distribution of goods roughly x = p and y = 1 − p , give or take c . Among 3+ players, power is complex Consider Rock/Paper/Scissors which is strongest? What is the numeric power of each? what will be the distribution of goods to each? Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 7 / 19
Multiplayer Games Power is complex: The order in which actors fight their enemies matters Whom they fight and when matters (all at once? one-by-one?) How they fight matters Some actors are strong against some and weak against others Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 8 / 19
Multiplayer Games A Simple Example - WWI German odds of victory: 1 2 Germany fights France and then, if it wins, Russia 1 3 Germany fights France and Russia simultaneously French and Russian odds of victory 1 3 fight Germany at the same time, then fight each other Country Demand 1 Germany 2 1 France 3 1 Russia 3 1 1 Sum 6 Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 9 / 19
Multiplayer Games Proposition 1 Proposition If stalemate is impossible, then for any set of players N and distribution of power p there exists a game ( N, p, c ) which is never peaceful if and only if N and p satisfy divide-and-conquer. Divide and Conquer: at least one actor prefers to fight its enemies piecemeal rather than all at the same time. In short: If the distribution of power among actors satisfies Divide-and- Conquer, whether a bargain exists depends on the costs of war. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 10 / 19
Multiplayer Games Why is this a novel result? Most multilateral models focus on alliance politics or use the standard contest function: m α i j ∈ J m α � j ( J is the set of all actors in a war, m captures an actor’s total materiel, and α augments this materiel for returns to scale.) This function implies that actors always prefer to fight their enemies all at once. Moreover, to assume that actors always prefer to fight their enemies piecemeal requires a new concept: stalemate. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 11 / 19
Stalemate Stalemate “[the model] leaves open the question of how...the possibility of fighting to a stalemate would affect the outcomes derived from the present formulations. Exploring this question is an important task for future rounds of the modeling enterprise” - Robert Powell, In the Shaodow of Power (1999) Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 12 / 19
Stalemate Clausewitz made a mistake. war is a duel in which “each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will...to make him incapable of further resistance” most models: negotiated settlement or (eventually) decisive victory an empire might be able to destroy a small state with probability .9, but this ability does not imply the small state can destroy the empire with probability .1 Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 13 / 19
Stalemate Clausewitz made a mistake. war is a duel in which “each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will...to make him incapable of further resistance” most models: negotiated settlement or (eventually) decisive victory an empire might be able to destroy a small state with probability .9, but this ability does not imply the small state can destroy the empire with probability .1 for one side, the purpose of fighting might not be to render an enemy incapable of further resistance; rather, it might be to render him incapable of further aggression. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 13 / 19
Stalemate In standard models, Demand = Pr(victory) ∗ 1 − costs of war x A = p A − c But if stalemate is possible, Demand = Pr(victory) ∗ 1+Pr(stalemate) ∗ current share - costs of war x A ≥ p A + p S w A − c Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 14 / 19
Stalemate Why does war happen? Melos has $10 Athens can defeat Melos with odds 1 2 . Melos cannot defeat Athens. war costs Athens and Melos $1 each Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 15 / 19
Stalemate Why does war happen? Melos has $10 Athens can defeat Melos with odds 1 2 . Melos cannot defeat Athens. war costs Athens and Melos $1 each Athens demands $4. Say Melos yields. Then... Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 15 / 19
Stalemate Why does war happen? Melos has $10 Athens can defeat Melos with odds 1 2 . Melos cannot defeat Athens. war costs Athens and Melos $1 each Athens demands $4. Say Melos yields. Then... Melos has $6. Athens demands an extra $2. And so on, until... Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 15 / 19
Stalemate Why does war happen? Melos has $10 Athens can defeat Melos with odds 1 2 . Melos cannot defeat Athens. war costs Athens and Melos $1 each Athens demands $4. Say Melos yields. Then... Melos has $6. Athens demands an extra $2. And so on, until... Melos is left with $2. If Melos fought initially, it would get $4. So Melos defies Athens, and Athens fights. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 15 / 19
Stalemate Three outcomes for dissatisfied states: 1 Nothing: if costs are high, the satisfied state ignores its rival 2 Appeasement: if costs are moderate, the satisfied state yields enough to avoid war 3 Revisionist War: if costs are low enough, the satisfied state refuses its rival’s demands. The dissatisfied state then seeks to revise the status quo through force. This is perhaps the first rationalist explanation for revisionist war. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 16 / 19
Stalemate Proposition A two-player game is peaceful for all costs of war c if and only if either 1 stalemate is impossible, p S = 0 2 stalemate is guaranteed, p S = 1 3 the initial distribution of wealth is exactly proportional to relative p A power, w A = p A + p B We can characterize distributions of power based on their stability , i.e. the costs of war necessary to create a bargaining range. Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 17 / 19
Stalemate Conclusion When explaining conflict... Our first question must be: did a bargain exist? Military technology, the distribution of wealth, and the configuration of power can eliminate a bargaining range. Therefore, the distribution of power must once again become our first subject of interest Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 18 / 19
Stalemate Finis. scholar.princeton.edu/rjordan · rpjordan@princeton.edu Richard Jordan (Princeton) A Bargain Might Not Exist: September 5, 2015 19 / 19
Recommend
More recommend
