tracking desktop ransomware payments end to end
play

Tracking desktop ransomware payments end to end Elie Bursztein, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Tracking desktop ransomware payments end to end Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Luca Invernizzi with the help of many people from UCSD, NYU, and Chainalysis Only 37% of users backup their data g.co/research/protect Since 2016 ransomware


  1. Tracking desktop ransomware payments end to end Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Luca Invernizzi with the help of many people from UCSD, NYU, and Chainalysis

  2. Only 37% of users backup their data g.co/research/protect

  3. Since 2016 “ransomware” search queries increased by 877% g.co/research/protect

  4. How profitable is ransomware? g.co/research/protect

  5. Agenda 1. How we trace ransom payments at scale 2. Revenue & ecosystem insights 3. The kingpins and the fads

  6. The website ahead contains malware Keeping users safe

  7. The team Google Chainalysis University of New York California, University San Diego g.co/research/protect

  8. Life of a ransomware infection

  9. Victim gets infected

  10. Payment URL Victim is shown ransom note

  11. Victim ID Unique Bitcoin wallet Victim visits payment site via Tor

  12. Victim buys bitcoin at exchange

  13. Why Bitcoin? Pseudonymous No need to show ID card to create wallets Fully Automatable Allows scalable payment processing Irrefutable Transactions can’t be reverted Fungible Bitcoins are easily converted into cash g.co/research/protect

  14. Bitcoin transactions are public Transaction 152Lf[...] on 2016-08-09 4 BTC Sender wallet: 1N1Nn[...] Receiver wallet: 152Lf[...] g.co/research/protect

  15. Life of a ransom payment 1. Victim buys bitcoins at exchange g.co/research/protect

  16. Life of a ransom payment 2. Ransom moves across multiple wallets ... 1. Victim buys bitcoins at exchange g.co/research/protect

  17. Life of a ransom payment 2. Ransom moves across multiple wallets ... 1. Victim buys 3. Criminal accumulates bitcoins bitcoins then sells them at exchange for currency at exchange g.co/research/protect

  18. Measuring revenue

  19. Identifying victims To identify other victims, we look at transactions with the criminal’s accumulation wallet ... g.co/research/protect

  20. Discovering payment network g.co/research/protect

  21. Discovering payment network g.co/research/protect

  22. Discovering payment network ... ... ... g.co/research/protect

  23. Gathering seed bitcoin transactions Victim reports Synthetic “victims” g.co/research/protect

  24. Automating payment tracing Compute near-collision blocks Initial seed Dataset Payment site Payment ransomware expansion & and wallet tracing clustering extraction g.co/research/protect

  25. Initial dataset: 34 families, 154k binaries g.co/research/protect Static/Dynamic signatures

  26. Using clustering for dataset expansion NotPetya - v1 Cerber - v1 Cerber -v2 Shared infrastructure Code similarity g.co/research/protect

  27. Expanded dataset 301,588 binaries 154,227 147,361 Seed dataset Additional binaries g.co/research/protect

  28. Automatically identifying payment sites at scale Tor proxy URL hjhqmbxyinislkkt.1a58vj.top/XXXX Found in 4 files and 1 screenshot + = Bitcoin wallet 1AZvk[...] Found in 16 files and 1 screenshot g.co/research/protect

  29. Tracing payments through the bitcoin chain NotPetya Coinbase Poloniex Huobi BTC-E LocalBitcoin Locky BiThumb BtcBank WannaCry g.co/research/protect

  30. Market insights

  31. $25,253,505 g.co/research/protect

  32. In 2016 ransomware became a multi-million $ business g.co/research/protect

  33. The ecosystem is dominated by a few kingpins g.co/research/protect

  34. A fast changing market g.co/research/protect

  35. In 2017 ransomware increased binary diversity to evade AVs g.co/research/protect

  36. Many victims buy Bitcoins through the “Craigslist of Bitcoin” g.co/research/protect

  37. Split payment Victim payments in multiple transactions 90% 9% Paid the ransom in a single Did not account transaction for transaction fees g.co/research/protect

  38. 95% traced ransoms cashed out via BTC-E Cashout list available on request g.co/research/protect

  39. Ransomware notable actors

  40. Locky Bringing ransoms to the masses g.co/research/protect

  41. The first ransomware to make >$1M per month g.co/research/protect

  42. Renting-out cybercriminal infrastructure Dridex Locky Dridex, Locky, Cerber are distributed via the Necurs botnet g.co/research/protect

  43. Cerber Rise of ransomware as service g.co/research/protect

  44. Enrolling low tech criminals made Cerber the new king of the hill in 2017 g.co/research/protect

  45. Consistent income - $200k per month for over a year g.co/research/protect

  46. 8 affiliates are responsible for 50% of the infections g.co/research/protect

  47. Embedding ransom site in the blockchain 1AzkuxChzMB4[...] Hardcoded wallet transacts with new wallets periodically. 1Azkux.top Cerber derives ransom site from these wallets. g.co/research/protect

  48. From infection to full encryption in under a minute g.co/research/protect

  49. Spora Ransomware business model refined g.co/research/protect

  50. Wannacry notPetya Rise of the impostors

  51. The (low) bottom line 56 BTC 5 $0 revenue bitcoin wallets cashed-out g.co/research/protect

  52. Testing out the malware, then unleashing it at once g.co/research/protect

  53. No early warning - Activity start on the day of the outbreak g.co/research/protect

  54. Takeaways Multi-million dollar black market Ransomware generates tens of millions of revenue for criminals RaaS is the new black Cerber’s affiliate model is taking the world by storm Rise of the impostors Wipeware pretending to be ransomware is on the rise g.co/research/protect

  55. Questions? Join us tomorrow 12pm | South Seas CD Attacking encrypted USB keys the hard(ware) way

  56. Thank you g.co/research/protect

Recommend


More recommend