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Threat modelling for developers Arne Padmos xkcd Safety vs Security William Warby Warner Bros Are we doomed? Building security in Security by design Shifting security left Microsoft Microsoft If we ... could do


  1. Threat modelling for developers Arne Padmos

  2. xkcd

  3. Safety vs Security

  4. William Warby Warner Bros

  5. Are we doomed?

  6. “ Building security in ” “ Security by design ” “ Shifting security left ”

  7. Microsoft

  8. Microsoft

  9. “ If we ... could do only one thing “ to improve software security … “ we would do threat modelling “ every day of the week. ” — Howard & Lipner

  10. “ If we ... could do only one thing “ to improve software security … “ we would do threat modelling “ every day of the week. ” — Howard & Lipner

  11. Requirements engineering & Architectural analysis

  12. What’s your threat model? ( security assumptions )

  13. “ More precisely, we will assume “ the following about a saboteur: ” – obtain any message – initiate any conversation – be a receiver to any user

  14. Utagawa Kuniyoshi

  15. NSA

  16. Eleanor Saitta

  17. What could possibly go wrong? & how

  18. What could possibly go wrong? & how

  19. Types of threat modelling – Attacker-centric – Asset-centric – System-centric

  20. William Warby

  21. Paul Pols

  22. Cyril Davenport

  23. Eleanor Saitta et al.

  24. Stewart Brand

  25. Antti Vähä-Sipilä

  26. Popular approaches ( system-centric ) – STRIDE – Trike – PASTA

  27. Relevant questions 1. What are we working on? 2. What can go wrong? 3. What are we going to do? 4. Did we do a good job? Adam Shostack

  28. Lightweight methodology 1. Draw data flows 2. Elicit threats 3. Ranking + controls 4. Check your work

  29. Lightweight methodology 1. Draw data flows 2. Elicit threats 3. Ranking + controls 4. Check your work

  30. CMU

  31. Adam Shostack

  32. Mark Dowd et al.

  33. Trail of Bits

  34. Lightweight methodology 1. Draw data flows 2. Elicit threats 3. Ranking + controls 4. Check your work

  35. Confidentiality Integrity Availability Authentication Authorisation Accountability

  36. Information disclosure Tampering Denial of service Spoofing Elevation of privilege Repudiation

  37. “STRIDE”

  38. SAFEcode

  39. SWIFT

  40. Adam Shostack

  41. Lightweight methodology 1. Draw data flows 2. Elicit threats 3. Ranking + controls 4. Check your work

  42. Dick Bruna

  43. Parker Brothers

  44. Risk ≈ likelihood × impact

  45. ThoughtWorks

  46. Howard & Lipner

  47. Lightweight methodology 1. Draw data flows 2. Elicit threats 3. Ranking + controls 4. Check your work

  48. “ All models are wrong, “ some models are useful. ” — George Box

  49. Koyaanisqatsi

  50. Stephen Checkoway et al.

  51. Howard & Lipner

  52. xkcd

  53. Lightweight methodology 1. Draw data flows 2. Elicit threats 3. Ranking + controls 4. Check your work

  54. Dick Bruna

  55. ThoughtWorks

  56. ThoughtWorks

  57. ThoughtWorks

  58. ThoughtWorks

  59. @wilg

  60. Rijksoverheid

  61. What could possibly go wrong? & how

  62. Arne Padmos hello@arnepadmos.com

  63. github.com /arnepadmos/resources my “ toy collection ”

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