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SECRET i. Is it the SECRET 2 - SECURITY RUN:2t1A.1.444 1. Is - PDF document

COPY SECRET SECURITY INFORAI 718 CIWULE -- SUDJECT :uestions for Presentation toL_ London, England TO: Info:L 1. Per reference a, it is requested that you secure answers to the following questions fropel Are there any basic


  1. COPY SECRET SECURITY INFORAI 718 CIWULE -- SUDJECT :uestions for Presentation toL_ — London, England � TO: � Info:L 1. Per reference a, it is requested that you secure answers to the following questions fropel Are there any basic principles of the BGFIEND/VALVAIE a. relationship thatL � :feels require amendment? Does S.I.S. accept the o p c view that NCFA should be b. broadened to include Prince Gjon Markagjoni and/or Ali Kalissura either as individuals or as representatives of their respective political groups? c. Does S.I.S. propose to assist in the reorganization of NCFA even if such a move would cause the withdrawal of the Bal l i Kombetar? d. Is S.I.S. now, or do they intend in the future to • P ■ 02 c-s 4 . 4 1E-) negotiate with Prince Gjon Markagjoni, either as an individual z co ""it W C . ) w or as a BKI leader? w CO at at iff . . 1 C � = ale e. Is the British relationship with the Italian Service such that a basis for operational coordination exists? f. For what reasons do the British favor the Bali Kombetar both as members of NCFA and as an independent political party? Ca uJ CP MC Is � providing the Bdlli Kombetar enough financial assistance 2= LU � ■■ 2C F.- as compensation for operational support to constitute political • -■ � 0.■ CM backing? ,mJ cm OC CD uu 4( P4 • 31c E. Are the British subsidizing the Balli Kombetar newspaper = 2 0.4 11.10 Wal � .4( CP and/or newsletter? CZ 1 - 1, am a h. BGFIEND advocates NCFA engagement in such activities as civil affairs planning. At the European Union meeting, the British emphasized the necessity for such planning on the part of exile groups. In view of the above can we expect the BRitish to continue to block planning activities on the part of NCFA? SECRET � i. Is it the

  2. � SECRET 2 - SECURITY RUN:2t1A.1.444 1. Is it the present British view that NC7A or any faction thereof represents a government in exile? Are the British engaged in negotiations with the j. Yugosla y s re Albania? r- k. Is � willing to direct resumption of close BGFIEND/VALtIBLE liaison In the field? , � --, With reference to l � :18940, please ask L__ � jto 2. r-- _ elaborate on his complaint concerning t4L.overactivismL__ Ys well as his decision to giveL_ � _Joreign office L.._ � status. -Inv be unwilling to give direct Although L � 3. replies to the above questions, it should be emphasized to him that forthright answers are vital to the continuance of BGFIEND/VAIBADIE co operatiqp.. Furthermore, they ,r711 � ir rip a partial basis for the impendingt „ � Idiscussions. 12 February 1952

  3. AGENDA FOR FIEM/vALUABLE TALKS IN LONDON (a) Agree interpretation of 1952 Foreign Office State Department directives. (b) Discuss FIEND/VALUABLE programme in light of (a) above:- 1. Support of Committee 2. Propaganda 3. Operations (c) CIA/SS attitude to individual political parties both within and outside the Committee. (d) Broadening of Committee and formation of sub-committee. (e) 0 1 5erational co-ordination in Athens. (f) Division of responsibility for leaflet and article drops; proposed system for numbering leaflets. (C) FIEND/VALUAME attitude toward Italians and position of Home representatives. (h) Progress report CIA on Rome defection. (1) Long term planning and considerations. (j) Discussion of any mutual point of divergence. .01/••••■.- proposed agenda for London Meetings) 5th rarch 1952. TOP SECRE1

  4. Para. a. Are there arty basic principles of the KEED/VALUABLE relationship that eolonel Perkins feels require amendment? 18 Jan 52.Pa 4,01-1 Letter � 7t � cp_id,Ewu. ! 1912: ( IN-19245). - 1/1471- J014 ( IN-23402); - ill

  5. Para. b. Does S.I.S. accept the OPC viewthat NCFA should be broadened to include Prince Gjon Markagjoni and/or All Klissura either as individuals or as representa- tives of their respective political groups? Para. c. Does a.I.S. propose to assist in the reorganization of NCFA even if such a move would cause the withdrawal of the Balli Kombetar? Para. d. Is S.I.S. now, or do they intend in the future to negotiate with Prince Gjon Markagjoni, either as an Individual or as a BKI leader? L 1867 776 (IN-16940).40 IN-19440). - 211 - pa pi. 1,747prAG; IN-18589). - I 1 4944 ( IN-21417).- 3 It '-4 ( 83 ( ( IN-22517).

  6. Para. e. Is the British relationship with the Italian Service such that a basis for operational coordination exists? -- 1.617 � q" d .617 01M-13081. � o L a 1472 (111-15308 . 0 - � S1424856 (OUT-5298 8 ). ‘00 4544 (IN-17134). i � L 112 2 CLEVM - (Lod

  7. Para. f. For what reasons do the British favor the Balli Kombetar both as members of NCFA and as an independent political party? Is S.I.S. providing the Balli Kombetar enough financial assistance as compensation for operational support to constitute political backing? Para. g. Are the British subsidizing the Balli Kombetar newspaper and/or newsletter? 2025-CRIWU. - P44-1 Memorandum of Uonversation,E andL 6 Feb 52. -gig

  8. BGFIEND advocates NCFA engagement in such activities as Para. h. civil affairs planning. At the European Union meeting, the British emphasized the necessity for such planning on the part of exile groups. In viewof the above can we expect the British to continue to block planning activities on the part of NCFA? L 3730. (IN-1 55 25). -

  9. Para. 1. Is it the present British view that NCFA or any faction thereof represents a government—in—exile? Ll 75 LI. (IN46413).-))/

  10. Para. j. Are the British engaged in negotiations with the Yugosla y s re Albania? •-• L-- 2J616 (IN-13085).j 1159_cuwu.

  11. Para. k. Is L. � .willing to direct resumption of close BGFIEND/VALUABLE - flaison in the fieldt _ q I ti L. _ 3 1471 (1N_15 3 7 3 ). � -1 Merandum of Conversation A6 Feb 52 attached under Paras. f. and g.

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