Professional Performance The Warren Centre Sirui Sun (M.E. Chemical and Biomolecular) Leying Yang (B.E. Civil (Environmental)) Joseph Kong (B.E. Mechanical) Andrew Levula (Line manager)
INTRODUCTION • Engineering profession already has Competence and Ethics standards • After case studies, Engineers’ Performance is another factor affect the engineering deliverable Good engineering deliverable Code of Ethic (sources: Engineers Australia) 2
THREE LEGGED STOOL • Performance is the missing ‘third leg of the stool’ Ethic, competency and performance (sources: PPIR) 3
PPIR • The Warren Centre introduces the Professional Performance innovation and risk (PPIR) protocol PPIR eight elements (source: PPIR) 4
Case studies of failure should be made a part of the vocabulary of every engineer so that he or she can recall or recite them when something in a new design or design process is suggestive of what went wrong in the case study. – Henry Petroski 5
OBJECTIVE Our Final Report outlines: • Identify the importance of the PPIR • Detailed investigation into six case studies • Provides analysis of failures bases on the eight elements of PPIR • Highlights potential outcomes using the PPIR protocol Structure for each case study 6
CIVIL ENGINEERING FAILURES London bridge, Syncrude tailings dam, Opera house, London city 7
Case Studies 1: Ok Tedi Tailings Dam Description • Dumped excavation material at an unstable slope • On 6 January 1984, a landslide occurred • No people died due to this incident Ok Tedi Mine site Ok Tedi tailings dam location (source: Griffiths, J) 8
Case Studies 1: Ok Tedi Tailings Dam Competence to Act Risk Management • Many experienced and senior experts had • Fast-tracking method visited the site • Pervious assumptions proved inaccurate • Rechecking the aerial photographs 9 Aerial photograph (source: Griffiths, J) Plan view of Ok Tedi tailings dam (source: Griffiths, J)
Case Study 2: Fundão Tailings Dam Description • 5th of November 2015, failure occurred at the left abutment of the Fundão Tailings dam • Destroying the ecosystem of the Doce River • 18 casualties • Direct cause: liquefaction 10 Mud reach Atlantic Ocean (source: Wikipedia) The village of Bento Rodrigues after the disaster (source: Wikipedia)
Case Study 2: Fundão Tailings Dam Risk Management Engineering Task Management • Solved visible problem • The quality of drain system was unacceptable • Did not consider its impact on whole project 11 Before incident happened (source: Investigation report) After incident happened (source: Investigation report)
MECHNANICAL ENGINEERING FAILURES Piping system 12
CASE STUDY 3: HMAS WESTRALIA FIRE Description • 5th of May 1998, a significant fuel leak was appeared at a cylinder • Nearby exposed hot engine ignited the fuel • Four casualties all from acute smoke inhalation • Incorrect flexible hoses was used 13 HMAS Westralia alongside HMAS Regina (source: Wikipedia) The area where the fire started. (source: Investigation report)
CASE STUDY 3: HMAS WESTRALIA FIRE Relevant Parties and Other Stakeholders Competence to Act • • Lack of proper approval procedure Involved engineers have insufficient knowledge • Stakeholders: ADI (contractor carry out to carry out this project maintenance program) and ENZED (subcontractor carry out the selection of the flexible hoses) 14 Filed supply hose on the cylinder (source: Investigation report) The indicator cocks at cylinders 8, 9 & 10. (source: Investigation report)
CASE STUDY 4: FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION Description • Occurred in a caprolactam plant • Leak from reactor circuit • Ignited by furnace • Killing 28 and injuring 36 inside the Plant • Burned for 10 days 15 The Flixborough Disaster Memorial The Fires Seen From South-west
CASE STUDY 4: FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION Creases in Bellows Evident in a Simulation Test for Reactor 5 Showing Crack Leading to Removal 20-inch By-pass Assembly and Replacement by By-pass 16
CASE STUDY 4: FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION The Engineering Task Engineering Task Management • Replace reactor using the by-pass • No measures of Quality Assurance • Aware of the task and instructions • No strength test • Poor design without liaising with professionals Design of 20-inch By-pass Assembly Fliborough Disaster without Quality Assurance Process 17
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING FAILURES Chemical Disaster 18
CASE STUDY 5: BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY EXPLOSION Description • 15 deaths and 180 injured • Release and overheating of combustible vapour cloud • All fatalities were in or near office trailers • Occurred in start-up of isomerisation (ISOM) Placement Surrounding the ISOM Unit Emergency of Texas City Refinery Explosion 19
CASE STUDY 5: BP TEXAS CITY REFINERY EXPLOSION The Engineering Task Engineering Task Management • BP Board of Director (Assess performance) • Supervisor decision • Night Board Operator (Logbook) • Board Operator response • Day Supervisor (Communication) • Night Lead Operator irresponsible attitude BP Texas Refinery Employee Raffinate Splitter Tower Diagram 20
CASE STUDY 6: TIANJIN PORT EXPLOSION Description • 165 deaths, 8 missing and 798 injured on 12 August 2015 • Nitrocellulose self-ignition • Ignited other dangerous goods and exploded • Six severe conflagration points and couples of small burning spots • Equivalent to 450 tonnes of TNT The Second Explosion in Tianjin Port Ruins in Centre of Explosion 21
CASE STUDY 6: TIANJIN PORT EXPLOSION Statutory Requirements and public interest Risk Management • Near communities • Without conducting risks • High volume of chemical goods • No professional engineer • Without management system and emergency strategy • Potential risk Clean the Ruins After Explosion Investigation After Explosion 22
KEY FINDINGS • A need for PPIR performance protocol • Changes in management process • Risk management • The application involves in engineering task • Internationally recognised protocol 23
CONCLUSION Better and Competency Engineering PPIR Safer and Ethical Project Protocol Engineering Standards Outcomes 24
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