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Persistent Effects of a Temporary Input Subsidy Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Mozambique Michael R Carter , Rachid Laajaj & Dean Yang University of California, Davis Paris School of Economics University of Michigan . IGC


  1. Persistent Effects of a Temporary Input Subsidy Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Mozambique Michael R Carter , Rachid Laajaj & Dean Yang University of California, Davis Paris School of Economics University of Michigan . IGC Africa Growth Forum 2014, Accra June 17, 2014 Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  2. The Yield Gap Problem Sub-Saharan Africa largely sat out the seed-fertilizer ’Green Revolution’ that swept most of the developing world over the 1960-2000 period with tiny increases in the yields of basic grains In 2009, SSA farmers used an average of 13 kg/hectare of fertilizer, compared to 94 in other developing countries Mozambique is no exception to this pattern–at the national level, most maize farmers use no fertilizer and yields are less than 1 ton per-hectare International Fertilizer Development Center program in Mozambique identified a gaping 2-3 ton/hectare yield gap between what is possible with existing technologies and what farmers currently achieve Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  3. Input Subsidies: Temporary or Permanent? Governments & (sometimes) aid agencies have responded to this apparent yield gap challenge with input subsidies Malawi, beginning with its “starter pack” program in the early 1990s has led this approach in sub-Saharan Africa Across 10 countries implementing input subsidy programs, 2011 expenditures totaled $1.05 billion, or 28.6% of public agricultural spending Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  4. 2011 Expenditures on Input Subsidies 70% Expenditures as % of public agricultural spending 58.3% 60% 50% 46.0% 39.9% 40% 29.9% 30% 26.0% 26.1% 25.7% 18.1% 20% 10.4% 8.4% 10% 0% Burkina Ethiopia Mali Kenya Nigeria Senegal Ghana Zambia Tanzania Malawi Faso Source: Jayne and Rashid (2013) Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  5. Input Subsidies: Temporary or Permanent? High opportunity cost of these funds raises question, “Why subsidize a privately profitable input?” Subsidies can arguably make sense as they can break a low technology poverty trap they: Make technology affordable for low income farmers (i.e., relax liquidity constraints) Share the risk of experimentation Reduce learning costs & break the ’let someone else experiment’ equilibrium These are all arguments for temporary subsidies But will a one-time subsidy work & will its impacts persist over time? If not, must input subsidies become a permanent feature of the agricultural and budgetary landscapes? Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  6. Possible Short Term Impacts of Subsidies Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  7. Possible Long Term Impacts of Subsidies Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  8. Mozambique Test of Temporary Input Subsidies Impacts on Fertilizer Use: Control Group Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  9. Mozambique Test of Temporary Input Subsidies Impacts on Fertilizer Use: Short term Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  10. Mozambique Test of Temporary Input Subsidies Impacts on Fertilizer Use: Long-term Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  11. Mozambique Test of Temporary Input Subsidies Impacts on Maize Production Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  12. Summary of Results As we shall see, these simple ’intention to treat’ estimators understate impacts for those who actually used the subsidies We will also see that input subsidies also have impacts on: Agricultural production (not only maize) Household consumption Assets Housing investments Impacts of one-time subsidies persist into two subsequent post-subsidy seasons Evidence for learning: positive impacts on estimated returns to modern inputs Positive spillovers to control group Based on random variation in share of social network in treatment group Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  13. Mozambique Voucher Program Voucher program funded by European Union, implemented by Mozambican government, FAO, and IFDC Followed the AIMS program that expanded agro-dealer network in study area 2 year program 2009-2010 and 2010-2011, 25,000 vouchers of maize and rice in 5 provinces Evaluation focuses in Maize vouchers in the Manica Province Voucher gave 73% subsidy on package of 12.5 kg of improved seeds (either OPV or hybrid), and 100kg of fertilizer Market price of package was about USD 113, with the individual having to pay about USD 30 to use coupon Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  14. Research Design 94 localities randomly assigned to one of three treatment arms “Subsidy only” localities are the subject of this paper Eligibility rules at household levels (0.5-5 hectares in maize; willing & able to make voucher co-pay) Subsidies assigned by random lottery to eligible households within 41 villages Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  15. Theoretical Model of Subsidies Paper details a model of technology adoption by credit-constrained, risk averse households with imperfect information on returns to fertilizer: Without input subsidy, non-adoption is possible if initial wealth is low; exacerbated by low beliefs about returns to fertilizer One-time subsidy can lead some non-adopters to adopt Persistence of adoption (beyond subsidy period) is possible via wealth effect Wealth effect is stochastic, dependent on realized production outcomes Sustained adoption may be fragile: poor outcomes in future may lead to disadoption Sustained adoption more likely (and stable) if there is also a learning effect Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  16. Theoretical Model of Subsidies Other explanations of low fertilizer use tend to imply that a temporary subsidy would at most have a temporary effect: Bio-physical limitations, leading to negative returns at unsubsidized prices (Marenya & Barrett 2009) Behavioral biases: Self-control problems (Ashraf et al 2006) or naïveté about stochastic temptation (Duflo et al 2011) Savings constraints, e.g. due to egalitarian norms and demands from social network (Platteau 2000) Our finding of persistence effects suggests that these explanations are not the whole story Let’s now look at results in more detail Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  17. Voucher Uptake & Use Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  18. Impacts on Input Use Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  19. Impacts on Production Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  20. IV Estimates of Returns to Fertilizer Given prices, estimates imply a benefit cost ratio of 220% in first year, higher in later years Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  21. Impacts on Consumption & Savings Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  22. Impacts on Learning Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  23. Learning from Others We collected data at outset on social network links with other study participants Definition of social network member: individuals with whom you discussed agriculture in the 2010 season (prior to the project) “moderately” or more Can estimate effect of fraction of social network randomly assigned to treatment group Regression equation: Y iv = α + β Z iv + δ 1 SNS iv + δ 2 SNTR iv + θ v + ε iv where SNS is the size of the individual’s social network and SNTR is the fraction of the social network that won the voucher lottery Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  24. Learning from Others Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  25. Conclusions On average, fertilizer appears to be profitable (heterogeneity, however) Impact of temporary input subsidies persist, a finding that is consistent with common economic models, but less so with behavioral explanations Strong evidence that learning is an important part of the story Overall uptake was quite modest –> other constraints Important to emphasize that intervention took place against the background of a program to expand fertilizer dealer network (AIMS program) Forthcoming work on Matched savings intervention By itself, appears to have same impacts as vouchers But no added impact of combining them Interactions between behavioral and material Finding that interventions extend planning time horizon for poorer respondents, suggesting either a further learning or aspirational effect Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

  26. Regression Approach Reduced form (ITT) for individual i in community v with treatment indicator Z iv : Y iv = α + β Z iv + θ v + ε iv (1) Estimate in levels of outcome variables and using Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation: sinh − 1 ( x ) = ln ( x +( x 2 + 1 ) 0 . 5 ) Carter, Laajaj & Yang Input Subsidies

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