operations analysis in iraq helping the command grapple
play

Operations Analysis in Iraq: Helping the Command Grapple with - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Operations Analysis in Iraq: Helping the Command Grapple with Uncertainty and Complexity 26-29 August 2008 LTC Robert Shearer Assistant Professor Department of Operations Research (831) 656 3027 rlsheare@nps.edu Agenda My Background


  1. Operations Analysis in Iraq: Helping the Command Grapple with Uncertainty and Complexity 26-29 August 2008 LTC Robert Shearer Assistant Professor Department of Operations Research (831) 656 3027 rlsheare@nps.edu

  2. Agenda • My Background • Operations Analysis • Intelligence Analysis • Data Collection & Management • Final Thoughts All data randomly generated

  3. My Background • Military – Infantry Officer • 1990-1994 82d Airborne Division (Platoon Leader, Co XO, S3 Air) • 1995-1997 Republic of Korea (Company Commander) – Operations Research Analyst • 1999-2002 Center for Army Analysis (CAA) • 2005 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) • 2005-2007 Center for Army Analysis

  4. My Background – Operations Research Analyst (continued) • 2008 Multi-National Corps - Iraq • 2008 Naval Postgraduate School • Academic – 1990 BS Engineering Management, United States Military Academy – 1999 MS Industrial Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology – 2005 DSc Operations Research, The George Washington University

  5. Operations Analysis Geo-spatial Analysis: Attack Velocity Attacks - Last Eight Weeks 45 40 35 30 12 week average 25 Week 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Attacks “Attacks fell below the twelve week average for the first time in 2008. Woop dee doo! You OA types need to provide me with some analysis beyond bar charts.” - MND-SE Chief of Staff Randomly generated data

  6. Operations Analysis Geo-spatial Analysis: Attack Velocity Attack Density Month 1 Attack Density Month 2 IZ IZ Attack Velocity Month 1-2 IZ Randomly generated data

  7. Operations Analysis Hypothesis Testing: GO Targeting MNC-I requested assistance in evaluating the likelihood that insurgents were targeting a Coalition general officer during his visits to various FOBs. H 0 : X ~ BN (n=20, p=0.20) P(X ≥ 10) < 0.3% Binomial (n=20, p=0.2) Probability Mass Function 0.25 0.20 Probability 0.15 0.10 0.05 ? 0.00 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Number of Visits Attacked Randomly generated data

  8. Operations Analysis Statistical Analysis: Weather & Indirect Fire The MNF-I and MNC-I commanders frequently expressed their opinions on all sorts of matters during staff meetings. “The enemy will conduct more mortar and rocket attacks against the IZ when visibility is limited.” These opinions were not always correct. But some became correct over time. 6 7 6 5 IDF Attacks 5 IDF Attacks 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Minimum visibility (km) Minimum visibility (km) If you correct a general officer, you had best be correct … and remain correct. Randomly generated data

  9. Operations Analysis Statistical Analysis: Casualty Undercounting The press frequently accused MNC-I with undercounting the number of civilian murders in Baghdad. The command believed that not all murders were reported and needed an estimate for the number not in the count. 14 Assume X ~ BN (n, p) 12 10 Frequency n = number of murders in Baghdad 8 6 p = probability that a murder is 4 reported Reported 2 X = number of murders reported 0 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Murders 30 Estimate n and p using method of moments 25 • np = sample mean 20 Murders • npq = sample variance 15 Total • 2 equations, 2 unknowns 10 5 Reported 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Randomly generated data Month

  10. Intelligence Analysis Monte Carlo Simulation: Foreign Fighter Flow MNF-I C2 requested assistance in estimating the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq for the quarterly report to Congress and operational uses. 20 80% Number of Suicide Percentage Suicide Attacks executed X ÷ Attacks by Foreign Fighters 50% 32 Percentage Foreign Fighters that Number of Foreign = execute Suicide Attacks Fighters 16% • Number of suicide attacks modeled 14% with empirical distributions obtained from unit data. 12% • Cell-Days / Attack and Fighters / Cell 10% modeled with triangular distributions, Frequency parameters obtained from intelligence 8% community. 6% 4% 2% Randomly generated data 0% 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Foreign Fighters

  11. Intelligence Analysis Monte Carlo Simulation: Size of the Insurgency MNF-I C2 requested assistance in estimating the size of the insurgency for the quarterly report to Congress and operational uses. 40 6 5 Attacks / Day X Cell-Days / Attack X Fighters / Cell = 1200 Insurgent Manpower Equivalent (MPE) 1200 50% 50% 50% Insurgent MPE = 1 / ((1 - % Part-time) + Effectiveness * % Part-time) X 1600 800 800 0.16 Insurgents (Part and Full-time) 0.14 0.12 • Attacks / Day modeled with empirical distributions obtained from unit data. 0.1 Frequency • Cell-Days / Attack and Fighters / Cell 0.08 modeled with triangular distributions, 0.06 parameters obtained from intelligence community. 0.04 0.02 0 800 1200 1600 2000 2400 2800 3200 3600 4000 4400 Randomly generated data Insurgents

  12. Intelligence Analysis Monte Carlo Simulation: Primer The use of Monte Carlo simulation required (1) a simple, brief primer on the method and (2) a general with 15 minutes to spend on the topic.

  13. Data Collection & Management Strategic v. Operational Requirements MNC-I CDR requires accurate data to make operational decisions in order to secure the Iraqi populace; MNF-I CDR requires consistent data for strategic communications to the President, the Congress and the American people. 60 Updated data changes the trend in attacks. 50 40 Attacks 30 20 MNC-I CDR changes his plans in response to increase in violence, but MNF-I CDR now has 10 to tell the President that his earlier data was wrong. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Days Randomly generated data Updated Original

  14. Final Thoughts • Proximity to decision makers is essential. – III Corps v. XVIII Airborne Corps • The intelligence community desperately needs quantitative support … and a few will even acknowledge this fact. • Operations Analysis – that provides the warfighter with information that he can use – is a challenge. • The basics matter - too much analytical work done in theater is poor in quality – Correlation = Causality – Spurious correlations (data mining will always find something) – Linear models for non-linear relationships

  15. Final Thoughts • The quality of your analysis is inversely proportional to the amount of time that you spend in the palace.

Recommend


More recommend