on fair selection in the presence of implicit variance
play

On Fair Selection in the Presence of Implicit Variance Emelianov, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

On Fair Selection in the Presence of Implicit Variance Emelianov, Gast, Gummadi, Loiseau (EC 2020) Various fairness mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate discrimination Rooney rule: select at least one from underrepresented group


  1. On Fair Selection in the Presence of Implicit Variance Emelianov, Gast, Gummadi, Loiseau (EC 2020) Various fairness mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate discrimination ◮ Rooney rule: select at least one from underrepresented group ◮ 80%-rule: the selection rate for the underrepresented group be at least 80% of that for the overrepresented group ◮ Demographic Parity: the selection rates should be equal across the groups Most literature show that fairness mechanisms introduce a quality/fairness tradeoff Kleinberg and Raghavan [ITCS’18] study the selection with implicit bias estimate of quality A ˆ W = W/β ← bias parameter quality W ˆ W = W B They show that the Rooney rule improves the quality of selection

  2. Selection with Implicit Variance Selection Problem Setup Our Model budget estimate of quality ˆ A W i ˆ W = W + ε · σ A n candidates select αn quality W ˆ W = W + ε · σ B B n A + n B x A n A + x B n B We consider two natural selection algorithms W ∼ N ( µ, σ 2 ) W ∼ N ( µ, σ 2 ) ˆ ˆ ˆ W B W B W B W W φ ˆ φ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ W A W A W A x B x A x B x A w ˆ w ˆ Group-Oblivious : select best Group-Fair : select best from each group ( x A ≥ γx B and x B ≥ γx A ) irrespective of their group

  3. Our main result is that fairness mechanisms improve the quality Theorem Assume that the quality distribution is group-independent W ∼ N ( µ, σ 2 ) . For any α and γ < 1 : U d . p . > U γ -fair ≥ U g . obl . Proof Sketch ˆ ˆ ˆ W B W B W B ˆ ˆ ˆ W A W A W A w ˆ w ˆ w ˆ x A > x B x A = x B x A < x B Group-Oblivious Demographic Parity Bayesian-Optimal

  4. We also study the cases when our assumptions are not valid Non-Gaussian Quality Distribution 3 U d . p . − U g . obl . , % Pareto(1,3) 10 2 pdf 5 1 0 0 α 1 W 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 1 1 . 2 1 . 4 1 . 6 1 . 8 2 Two-Stage Selection ˆ W i W i budget at 1st stage budget at 2nd stage n select α 1 n select α 2 n 1 stage 2 stage α 1 = α 2 4 4 2 2 U d . p . − U g . obl . U d . p . − U g . obl . 1 1 , % 2 2 , % U g . obl . U g . obl . 1 2 0 0 α 1 α 1 0 0 . 5 1 0 0 . 5 1

Recommend


More recommend