crowdbc a blockchain based decentralized framework for
play

CrowdBC: A Blockchain-based Decentralized Framework for - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CrowdBC: A Blockchain-based Decentralized Framework for Crowdsourcing Hailiang ZHAO htp://hliangzhao.me December 10, 2019 This paper was published on IEEE Trans. on Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS) , Jun 2019. Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS


  1. CrowdBC: A Blockchain-based Decentralized Framework for Crowdsourcing Hailiang ZHAO htp://hliangzhao.me December 10, 2019 This paper was published on IEEE Trans. on Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS) , Jun 2019. Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 1 / 26

  2. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 2 / 26

  3. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 2 / 26

  4. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 2 / 26

  5. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 2 / 26

  6. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 2 / 26

  7. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 3 / 26

  8. What is Crowdsourcing? Crowdsourcing It is a distributed problem-solving model through an open call for solutions, which consists of three groups of roles: 1 requesters 2 workers 3 a centralized crowdsourcing system Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 4 / 26

  9. The Weakness of Traditional TRUST-based Model 1 Vulnerable to DDoS atacks Elance and oDesk downed services for many workers due to be hit bt DDoS atacks in May 2014. 2 Single point of failure Uber China’s passengers can’t stop the order because of hardware failure, April 2015. 3 Risk of privacy disclosure and data loss Freelancer breached the PRIVACY ACT for uncovering a user’s true identity, Dec 2015. 4 False-reporting A subjective arbitration could happen. 5 Rotalties from platforms Most of crowdsourcing systems demands a sliding services fee for 5 % ∼ 20 % . Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 5 / 26

  10. How to Deal with the above Issues? 1 Data security : Encryption and differential privacy 2 False-reporting : Reputation-based mechanisms 3 Single point of failure & performance botleneck : Distributed architectures Those approaches cannot solve the issues simultaneously and suffer from breakdown of trust . Can We Design A Decentralized Crowdsourcing System with Reliability, Fairness, Security, and Low Service Fee? � Let us embrace the future of Blockchain Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 6 / 26

  11. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 7 / 26

  12. What is Blockchain? Blockchain reduces the existence of third-party intermediary It is a decentralized architecture and distributed computing paradigm underlying Bitcoin, whose key advantages include decentralization , time-series data , collective maintenance , programmability , and security . Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 8 / 26

  13. What is Smart Contract? Smart Contract They are computerized transaction protocols that can self-verify and self-execute the terms of contracts without a third-party intermediary. Decentralized + Trustless + Programmable + Tamper-resistant Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 9 / 26

  14. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 10 / 26

  15. Four Roles: Requester, Worker, CrowdBC Client, Miner 1 Requesters Identified by R � { R 1 , ..., R n } , post tasks by providing descriptions 1 Deposite (reward + monetary penalty) cannot be redeemed before ddl 2 2 Workers Identified by W � { W 1 , ..., W m } , compete for tasks to get rewards 1 Worker W j is selected depending on a tuple of reliability value 2 { β W j , C k ( ǫ k , ψ k ) } With reputation β W j , W j submit solutions to C k for ǫ k times and got ψ k 3 high evaluation A deposit π W j is required to thwart DDoS and Sybil atack (How?) 4 The solutions submited by workers are identified by s � { s 1 , ..., s m } 5 Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 11 / 26

  16. Four Roles: Requester, Worker, CrowdBC Client, Miner 3 CrowdBC Client Served as a medium for R and W , is not controlled by any third party 1 Run locally on users’ personal computer 2 4 Miners Add past transactions into a block and provide a valid proof (through 1 mining) to claim the block reward and transaction fees R and W can also be miners if they participate in the mining 2 Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 12 / 26

  17. System Model Overview Scheme ⊲ R and W firstly need to register: ( K p R i ) , ( K p R i , K s R i , K a R i , K s R i , K a R i ) . ⊲ R i posts a task with CrowdBC Client (the categories are pre-defined) ⊲ Authenticated W j can receive the task ⊲ R reach agreements with W by smart contracts in CrowdBC Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 13 / 26

  18. Potential Threats 1 Malicious Requesters Collect usefull solutions without losing deposit [false-reporting] 1 Misreport the high-quality solution as low level 2 Deny the obtain of solutions 3 Create a fork chain afer receicing the solutions 4 2 Malicious Workers Obtain rewards without paying sufficient effort [free-riding atack] 1 Create fork chain when receiving low level evaluation 2 receive tasks but not submit solutions on time 3 3 Malicious Miners Earn virtual coins by forking a chain 1 Collude with malicious requesters/workers to break the normal 2 execution Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 14 / 26

  19. Security Assumption 1 Majority Honest Security 2 Secure Transfer with Wallet 3 Secure Encryption Algorithm Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 15 / 26

  20. Outline 1 Introduction 2 Background Blockchain Smart Contract 3 Theoretical Model Roles Potential Threats and Malicious Behaviors Security Assumption 4 Framework Design Three Layers Architecture Crowdsourcing Procedure in CrowdBC 5 Concrete Implementation Designed Smart Contracts Time-locked Deposit Protocol Reputation Management Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 16 / 26

  21. Three Layers Architecture of CrowdBC Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 17 / 26

  22. Three Layers Architecture of CrowdBC 1 Application Layer [CrowdBC Client] The entrance for users to finish a crowdsouring task 1 User Manager (UM) : Registration and user info. management 2 True identities are not needed, just public key and address are fine 3 Registered users can post or receive tasks with Task Manager (TM) 4 TM manages task posting, task receiving, solution submission, and 5 reward assignment 2 Blockchain Layer [Decentralized Server] Provide consensus on the order in which program is writen 1 Run state machine for tasks 2 3 Storage Layer [Distributed Database] Data values are signed by private keys of data owners 1 Authenticity and integrity of the data values can be checked 2 Task data are stored outside the blockchain 3 Hailiang ZHAO @ ZJU-CS CrowdBC: An Overview December 10, 2019 18 / 26

Recommend


More recommend