Convergence of Safety and Security Sebastian Fischmeister Dept. of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Convergence of Safety and Security Sebastian Fischmeister Dept. of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 Convergence of Safety and Security Sebastian Fischmeister Dept. of Electrical and Comp. Engineering University of Waterloo esg.uwaterloo.ca 2 Research area: Safety and security of software- intensive embedded safety- critical systems 3


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Convergence of Safety and Security

Sebastian Fischmeister

  • Dept. of Electrical and Comp. Engineering

University of Waterloo

esg.uwaterloo.ca

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Research area: Safety and security of software- intensive embedded safety- critical systems

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  • Prof. Fischmeister

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  • 3. Data extraction

(2008-now)

  • 4. Data analysis

(2011-now)

  • Static analysis and instrumentation
  • Dynamic binary instrumentation
  • Side-channel analysis
  • Runtime verification, monitoring
  • Anomaly detection, intrusion detection
  • Reverse engineering

Applied to: Safety-critical systems

  • 2. Embedded and safety-critical systems (2002-now)
  • Exec. Director WatCAR
  • Consulting for ISO 26262
  • Member of SCC TC56
  • 1. Security of mobile code systems

(1999-2001)

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Observation:

Modern systems are beyond deep comprehension of human minds

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Systems Are Complex

5 Picture of car

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Code Complexity is Increasing

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Illustrating one example: Bridge from Tokyo to Vancouver

System size and complexity are the challenge!

Nobody would try building that bridge; unless it was software only! => Humans are bad at judging logical complexity We Cannot Comprehend Digital Systems

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Observation:

Safety deals with the universe Security deals with people

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Attacker flips bits on purpose. Security: The sun flips bits by chance. Safety:

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Millions of people are driving this vehicle …

Safe but not secure

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… but nobody would drive this car. (except Colin Furze)

Secure but not safe

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Observation:

Safety is static Security is dynamic

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Safety Following ISO 26262

14 Recommended lifecycle leading to a safe product.

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Once a Safe Product … Always Safe*

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More Vulnerabilities Every Year

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137,729 (Dec ‘18)

In last 10 years:

  • 206 per week
  • 1.2 per hour (!)
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Once a Secure Product … Not Secure Tomorrow!

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News of the Day

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Observation:

Security operates at a different speed than product development

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Passenger aircraft Vehicle Smart phone Flashy IoT thingy 10 years 5 years 1 year 1 week CVE entries? 137,729+

(206 per week)

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RELATION TO DEFENCE SYSTEMS

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Weapon Systems Spending $25.5 Billion $1.66 Trillion

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Cyber attacks have the potential to take control of or shutdown any of these systems that are dependent on software.

  • Ref. US Government Accountability Office – Report t U.S. Senate, Weapons Systems Cybersecurity - 9 October 2018
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“This … herald[s] the coming rise of strategic cyberwarfare as a means of striking in very costly, disruptive ways at an adversary without a prior need to defeat

  • pposing military forces in the field, at sea, or in the air.”

John Arquilla, The Rise of Strategic Cyberwar, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

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An estimated 15% of spare and replacement parts for DoD equipment are counterfeit.

Toohey, Brian. “Counterfeit Semiconductors – A Clear and Present Threat.” Testimony Before Senate Committee

  • n Armed Services, Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the U.S. Military Supply Chain, November 8, 2011.
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CHALLENGES: AN INCOMPLETE, BIASED SELECTION

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Challenge:

How to assist engineers to understand modern systems?

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Challenge:

How to provide effective protection of cyberphysical systems?

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Challenge:

How to maintain 30-year

  • ld systems?

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Challenge:

How to holistically address safety and security?

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+100% more AI inside now

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EXAMPLE RESULTS OF COLLABORATING WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO

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Palisade: Cyberphysical Mission Assurance

Attack Detector – Detect crafted attacks Attack Capture – Capture&store adversary attacks Attack Counter – React to detected attacks Multiplicative security controls – Heterogeneous design to maximize resilience

A scalable, retrofittable solution for surviving crafted cyberphysical attacks

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Palisade Test: Hexacopter Drone

Detected control disruption, denial-of-service, reverse engineering attacks

Public test

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Palisade Test: Vehicle Body Control Module

Detected buffer overflow, arc injection attacks

Public test

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Palisade Test: Autonomous Driving AI

Detected GPS spoofing, steering hijack, man-in-the-middle attacks

Public test

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Palisade Test: Autonomous Vehicles

Detected gear-shift & control state irregularities

Public test

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Palisade Test: Military Platform

Detected gear-shift & control state irregularities

Public test

Detected various attacks and induced anomalies

Released photos

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Conclusions

  • Systems are becoming too complex for humans to comprehend
  • Computerization of systems will continue to happen
  • We need to identify methods and technology for building

safe and secure systems

  • Be prepared as change can come practically over night!
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Contact info: Sebastian Fischmeister sfischme@uwaterloo.ca

  • Dept. of Electrical and Computer Eng.

University of Waterloo 200 University Ave West Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1