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Chip and PIN is broken Steven Murdoch, Saar Drimer, Ross Anderson, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Faculty of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group Chip and PIN is broken Steven Murdoch, Saar Drimer, Ross Anderson, Mike Bond Europay Mastercard Visa (EMV) 730 million cards worldwide


  1. Faculty of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group Chip and PIN is broken Steven Murdoch, Saar Drimer, Ross Anderson, Mike Bond

  2. Europay – Mastercard – Visa (EMV) • 730 million cards worldwide • Solution to all the banks' problems: – Chip to prevent copying of a card – PIN to prevent abuse of stolen cards • PIN to prove customer's liability 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 2 von MAXNR

  3. Card Fraud in the UK 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 3 von MAXNR

  4. PIN and Chip protocol from 10,000 ft 1. Card authentication prove that card is correct → 2. Cardholder verification prove that customer owns the card → 3. Transaction authorization prove that transaction is valid → 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 4 von MAXNR

  5. Card authentication 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 5 von MAXNR

  6. Cardholder verification 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 6 von MAXNR

  7. Transaction authentication 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 7 von MAXNR

  8. The attack • TVR only records auth failures • IAD may contain info about PIN auth used – Issuer-specific, terminal cannot check • MITM: intercept PIN request and send 0x9000 to terminal • Result: – Terminal: PIN ok – Card: PIN never requested – Bank: no TVR failure, no PIN auth 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 8 von MAXNR

  9. Hardware used 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 9 von MAXNR

  10. What caused the vulnerability? • Closed protocol specification process • Huge spec – 707 pages for core EMV spec – 2,126 pages testing documentation – 810 pages VISA public extensions • No documentation of threat / security model 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 10 von MAXNR

  11. Fixes? • Economic factor: – Customers can be held liable – No incentive for costly redeployment – Cooperation of banks and terminal vendors • Let terminal parse IAD – As the name says: issuer -specific data • Incorporate Cardholder Verification Method Results into ARQC – Possible with EMV, requires only cards and issuer backends to be fixed – Will stil take a long time 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 11 von MAXNR

  12. Discussion • How to educate the uneducated? • Is there formal protocol validation? – Would it have helped? 2010-03-03 Chip&PIN is broken Slide 12 von MAXNR

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