Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares ABACC and the Safeguards Regional System MARCO MARZO Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Response to Radiological Emergencies Rio de Janeiro - Brazil – 12 February 2019
The Bilateral Agreement • Signed in July 1991 • Ratified in December 1991 • Countries committed to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes • ABACC starts its activities in April 1992 Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Mission of ABACC • To verify that all nuclear materials and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes • To apply the Common System of Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control (SCCC) Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Structure of ABACC 2 Argentines Commission Each technical area: 2 Brazilians 1 Argentine and 1 Brazilian 1 Argentine Secretary 1 Brazilian Institutional Planning & Technical Administrative Operations Accounting Affairs Evaluation & Finance Support 1 Argentine 1 Brazilian Inspetors ≈ 50 inspectors of each country Non-permanent staff Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Technical Objective of Safeguards The technical objective of the traditional safeguards is to detect timely the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials for the fabrication of a nuclear weapon device or any other explosive device, and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Fissile Material to Produce a Rudimentary Nuclear Weapon Device A significant quantity of fissile material is the amount needed to fabricate a rudimentary nuclear weapon device 25kg high enriched Uranium 8kg Plutonium Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Significant Quantities Nuclear Material Quantity Pu, U 233 8 kg 25 kg U 235 HEU 75 kg U 235 LEU Natural U 10 t Depleted U or Th 20 t Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Detection Time Category of Nuclear Material Time Direct-use material 1 month (fresh Pu, HEU, U 233 ) Irradiated direct use material 3 months (Pu in spent fuel elements) Indirect-use material 1 year (LEU, Nat. U or Th) Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Flow of Information National Nuclear ABACC Authority Facility • Maintains Accounting Data • Maintains Centralized • Maintains Basis Accounting Records Accounting and • Audits the facility records • Audits the facility Operational Records • Evaluates the consistency records • Takes the Physical between records and • Sends Accounting Inventory reports Reports • Sends Accounting • Examines and verifies • Prepares the Technical Reports to National Technical Questionnaires Questionnaire Authority • Elaborates Safeguards • Negotiates the • Prepares the Approaches Application Manual Technical • Proposes and negotiates ( Facility Attachment ) Questionnaire ( DIQ ) Application Manuals • Verifies nuclear materials Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Nuclear Facilities (as of Jan 31, 2019) TYPE OF FACILITY ARGENTINA BRAZIL TOTAL Conversion & Fuel Fabrication 9* 2 11 Uranium Enrichment Plants 2 3 5 Power Reactors 5*;** 3* 8 Research Reactors, 7* 8** 15 Critical Units, Subcritical Units Others (R&D Facilities, Storages, LOF) 28* 11** 39 Total 51 27 78 * One facility under construction; ** One designed facility Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Verification Activities • Visits to verify the information contained in the Technical Questionnaire (DIVs) • Inspections to verify the nuclear material inventory and its changes • Announced inspections (1 week notification) • Short Notice inspections (24h) • Unannounced inspections (2h) • Use of Containment & Surveillance to maintain the continuity of knowledge on NM inventories • Environment Sampling • To confirm that the facility operates as declared Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Inspections • 3000+ inspections performed • About 100 inspections annually • Inspection effort: ≈ 1000 inspector.days • On average ≈ 4 inspectors on inspection mission every day Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Nuclear Material Verification • Nuclear Material Accountancy as fundamental safeguards measures • Nuclear material quantity and/or quality determined by measurements • Containment and Surveillance as complementary safeguards measures • To keep continuity of knowledge over the nuclear material Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Nuclear Material Measurements • Integral measurements • Mass, volume, item counting • Non-Destructive Measurements (NDA) • Gamma detection • Neutron detection • Destructive Measurements (DA) • Determination of U concentration • Determination of U enrichment Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
NDA: Hand Held Detector HM-5 • Gamma spectrometer of low resolution: NaI detector • Identification of materials and isotopes • Verification of U enrichment • Digital • Up to 50 gamma spectra with 1024 channels can be stored Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
NDA with Mini-Multi Chanel Analyser Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
LaBr3 Radiation Detector • Robust • Low cost • Intermediate resolution between NaI and Ge detectors Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Neutron Coincidence Collar Determination of U Mass in fresh fuel elements Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Cerenkov Radiation Detector To verify spent fuel elements in ponds of nuclear power plants Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Cerenkov Detector Images Improved Cerenkov View Device (ICVD) Digital Cerenkov View Device (DCVD) Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Destructive Measurement (DA) • Determination of Uranium in the compound • e.g. U in UO 2 or UF 6 • Determination of Uranium Enrichment • Analytical Laboratories available in the two countries • ≈ 40 samples/y collected by ABACC Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Analytical Laboratories Brazilian Labs Argentine Labs Centro Tecnológico da Marinha Comisión Nacional de Energía em São Paulo – CTMSP Atómica (CNEA) Laboratório de Caracterização Unidad de Actividad Química - de Urânio UAQ Coordenação de Salvaguardas – Comisión Nacional de Energía DRS/CNEN Atómica (CNEA) Laboratório de Salvaguardas - Centro Atómico Constituyentes LASAL – CAC Laboratorio de Control Químico y Físico – U. A. Combustibles Nucleares Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Cont Containmen ainment t Mea Measur ures es Paper Seals (1000 seals/y) Metallic Seals (700 seals/y) Electronic Seals (≈ 50 seals applied) Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Su Surveillan eillance ce Systems Systems Systems composed by a microprocessor and associated circuits that digitilize the images captured by cameras DCM-14 – Digital Camera Module 14 ≈ 60 cameras installed DCM-C5 – Digital Camera Module C5 40 cameras procured 28 already installed Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Applications of Surveillance Systems Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Safeguards Agreement - Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, AIEA Quadripartite Agreement • Signed in 12/1991 and ratified in 03/1994 • IAEA shall apply its safeguards taking into account the SCCC • ABACC and the IAEA shall avoid unnecessary duplication of activities • ABACC and the IAEA shall obtain independent conclusions • A series of provisions to define how the IAEA shall cooperate with ABACC • Agreed safeguards approaches • Common use of equipment • Joint inspection procedures Workshop on Nuclear Safeguards – EGN – 12 February 2019
Thank you Muchas gracias Muito obrigado marzo@abacc.org.br www.abacc.org.br
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