Overview of the Development and Discussion on Evolving Safeguards Implementation Jill N. Cooley Department of Safeguards IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Contents • Key Developments in Safeguards Implementation for the ‘State as a whole’ • Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States • Elements of the State-Level Concept • Key Assurances • Next Steps IAEA 2
Key Developments in Safeguards Implementation for the ‘State as a whole’ 1971 1991 1993 2002 2007 1999 INFCIRC/153: IRAQ: greater Board: essential Conceptual Resolution GC(51)/RES/15: “further First broader Application of consideration of to verify conclusion drawn Framework for effectiveness and efficiency when a safeguards to all ‘State as a whole’ correctness and for a ‘State as a Integrated State level perspective is used in the nuclear material completeness of whole‘ Safeguards planning, implementation and (NM) DPRK initial evaluation of safeguards activities” report 1995 2001 2010 First State First SLA for a Medium Term Strategy 2012– evaluation State under 2017:“further develop” SLC report integrated and “develop and implement safeguards SLAs for all States” with CSAs implemented 1990s 2000s 1970s 1980s 2010s Progressive 1995 1995 development and Board: reaffirms SG Board: requests 2013 implementation of SLAs system for CSAs CSA States to GOV/2013/38 1992 1997 for States with the should be designed facilitate Board: reaffirms Board broader conclusion and to verify “correctness implementation “all” NM to be under approves under IS (based on the 2014 of Programme and completeness of SG in CSA States Model AP 2002 Framework) GOV/2014/41 State’s declarations ” 93+2 Supplementary Part I Measures Document IAEA 3
State-Level Concept The general notion of implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the State’s safeguards agreement IAEA 4
Scope of Application of SG Agreements and the Associated Generic Objectives Scope Generic Objectives CSA all nuclear - to detect diversion of declared nuclear material material - to detect misuse of declared facilities - to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole Item specified - to detect diversion of nuclear material subject to items safeguards - to detect misuse of facilities and other items subject to safeguards VOA nuclear - to detect undeclared withdrawal of safeguarded material in nuclear material in selected facilities selected facilities IAEA 5
Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States Collect and process Developing State-Level Approaches Evaluate all safeguards safeguards relevant relevant information Drawing Safeguards Conclusions information Collecting and Evaluating Information Establish findings and Analyse draw safeguards diversion/acquisition conclusions paths Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Safeguards Establish and prioritize Evaluate results of Follow-up technical objectives safeguards activities activities? Activities Conduct in-field & HQ Identify applicable safeguards activities safeguards measures Develop annual plan for safeguards activities IAEA 6
Elements of the State-Level Concept Item- Elements CSA VOA Specific √ √ √ Generic objectives √ √ √ Technical objectives √ Acquisition path analysis √ √ Diversion path analysis State-level safeguards approach addressing: All nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the - √ State Specified facilities, nuclear material, equipment or other - √ items subject to safeguards in the State Nuclear material in selected facilities or parts thereof in the - √ State √ √ √ Annual implementation plan √ √ √ State-specific factors √ √ √ Evaluation of all safeguards relevant information √ √ √ Safeguards conclusion drawn and reported for a State IAEA 7
State-Specific Factors • Safeguards-relevant factors particular to a State used in the development of an SLA and in the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities for that State • Based on factual information about a State, are objective and are objectively assessed by the Agency in the implementation of safeguards for a State IAEA 8
State-Specific Factors i. The type of safeguards agreement in force for the State and the nature of the safeguards conclusion drawn by the Agency ii. The nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State iii. The technical capabilities of the State or regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC) iv. The ability of the Agency to implement certain safeguards measures in the State v. The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency in the implementation of safeguards vi. The Agency’s experience in implementing safeguards in the State IAEA 9
Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States Collect and process Developing State-Level Approaches Evaluate all safeguards safeguards relevant relevant information Drawing Safeguards Conclusions information Collecting and Evaluating Information Establish findings and Analyse draw safeguards diversion/acquisition conclusions paths Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Safeguards Establish and prioritize Evaluate results of Follow-up technical objectives safeguards activities activities? Activities Conduct in-field & HQ Identify applicable safeguards activities safeguards measures Develop annual plan for safeguards activities IAEA 10
Developing a State-Level Approach Establish and prioritize Identify applicable Analyse technical objectives safeguards measures acquisition paths Spen t fuel Spen Detect diversion of spent fuel • Nuclear material accountancy State’s t fuel assemblies from declared • Inspections reactors nuclear and nuclear- Detect undeclared • Design information verification related Reprocessing reprocessing activity in the • Inspections declared hot cell activities and capabilities as • Detect undeclared Evaluation of open source information a whole Conversion conversion to Pu (metal) in • Complementary access, where the State applicable Hot cell Pu Pu Undeclared Undeclared IAEA activities in activities in the declared facility State
Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to All States Collect and process Developing State-Level Approaches Evaluate all safeguards safeguards relevant relevant information Drawing Safeguards Conclusions information Collecting and Evaluating Information Establish findings and Analyse draw safeguards diversion/acquisition conclusions paths Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Safeguards State Establish and prioritize Evaluate results of technical objectives safeguards activities Activities Conduct in-field & HQ Identify applicable safeguards activities safeguards measures Develop annual plan for safeguards activities Role of the IAEA State
Key Assurances • The State-level concept (SLC) does not, and will not, entail the introduction of any additional rights or obligations on the part of either States or the Agency, nor does it involve any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations • The SLC is applicable to all States, but strictly within the scope of each individual State’s safeguards agreement(s) • The SLC is not a substitute for the AP and is not designed as a means for the Agency to obtain from a State without an AP the information and access provided for in the AP GC(58)RES/14 – September 2014 IAEA 13
Key Assurances (2) • The development and implementation of State-level approaches requires close consultation with the State and/or regional authority, particularly in the implementation of in-field safeguards measures • Safeguards-relevant information is only used for the purpose of safeguards implementation pursuant to the safeguards agreement in force with a particular State – and not beyond it GC(58)RES/14 – September 2014 IAEA 14
Next Steps • Continue to implement and update the existing SLAs for States with CSAs and APs in force and for which the broader conclusion has been drawn • Progressively develop and implement SLAs for States with: • CSAs and APs in force for which the broader conclusion has been drawn but the necessary arrangements for implementing an SLA have not yet been completed • CSAs and APs in force for which the broader conclusion has not yet been drawn • CSAs in force without an AP • Item-specific safeguards agreements in force • VOAs in force IAEA 15
Next Steps (2) • In developing and implementing an SLA for a State, the Agency will conduct consultations with the State and/or regional authority, particularly on the implementation of in-field safeguards measures. • The Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue on safeguards matters with States to increase transparency and build confidence and, in that regard, intends to continue to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards. • The Board of Governors will be kept informed of progress made in the development and implementation of safeguards in the context of the SLC and the associated impact on effectiveness and efficiency, as appropriate. IAEA 16
Thank You IAEA
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