IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People Vienna, October 20-24, 2014 A Canadian Perspective on the IAEA’s State-level Concept Presented by Patrick Burton Senior Safeguards Advisor Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission October 21, 2014 nuclearsafety.gc.ca
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission • The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA). • The CNSC regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials. Its mandate is to: Protect the health, safety, and security of Canadians and the environment; Implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 2
Outline • IAEA Safeguards in Canada • The IAEA’s State-level Concept • Effectiveness • Efficiency • Non-Discrimination • Acceptance of the State-level Concept • Conclusions Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 3
IAEA Safeguards in Canada Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 4
Canadian Fuel Cycle UF6 U C O O C U UO3 UO2 UOC Fuel Fabrication Uranium Mining Uranium Refining Uranium Conversion and Milling Fresh Fuel Spent Fuel Spent Research and Development Fuel Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs) and Research Reactors Power Reactors Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 5
IAEA Safeguards in Canada • Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) - 1972 • Additional Protocol (AP) - 2000 • First Broader Safeguards Conclusion attained in 2005 • Extensive ‘Roadmap’ of IAEA questions addressed • 57 Complementary Accesses between 2000 and 2005 • IAEA approval for their “State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada” in 2005 • Developed by the IAEA through an iterative and cooperative process involving the CNSC and industry Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 6
The IAEA’s State-level Concept Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 7
The IAEA’s State-level Concept “State-level Concept” means safeguards that are based on State-level approaches developed for each State, using safeguards objectives common to all States, and taking State-specific factors into account • At a high level, the idea that IAEA safeguards should be reactive to the conditions (good or bad) in each State • Not a new idea! • INFCIRC/153 Art. 81 embodies most of the SLC • Discussed by the Board of Governors since 2005 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 8
The IAEA’s State-level Concept The IAEA’s State-specific Factors (paraphrased) I. The type of safeguards agreement(s) in force, and the IAEA’s safeguards conclusion(s) under the agreement(s) II. The State’s nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities III. The technical capabilities of the SSAC/RSAC IV. The ability of the IAEA to implement certain safeguards measures (SNRIs, UIs, RM, Mailbox) V. The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency VI. The Agency’s experiences in implementing safeguards in the State Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 9
The IAEA’s State-level Concept • Why move to the SLC? • The CNSC feels that implementation of the SLC across all States will positively affect: • The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards • The efficiency of IAEA safeguards • The non-discriminatory nature of IAEA safeguards Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 10
Effectiveness under the SLC • INFCIRC/153 and the Criteria have been shown to be ineffective via multiple cases of non-compliance • Too focused on ‘correctness’ – declared material, facilities • ‘State as a whole’ aspects folded into detection probabilities • Legal authority to pursue indications of undeclared material or activity perceived as insufficient • Under the SLC, the IAEA will consider of all safeguards- relevant information for all States to address this issue Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11
Effectiveness under the SLC • Consideration of all safeguards-relevant information will evaluate the completeness of a State’s reporting, regardless of the safeguards agreement in force • Evaluating completeness is within the IAEA’s existing legal authority under a 153-style agreement • The IAEA has existing tools under INFCIRC/153 to follow up on discrepancies • Amplification and Clarification reports, Special Inspections • An in-force AP is still required in order for the IAEA to draw a conclusion on completeness Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 12
Efficiency under the SLC • The Department of Safeguards faces considerable resource challenges • Ongoing growth of the global nuclear industry, including the expansion of nuclear power into new States • Ongoing cases of non-compliance, which take significant resources • A ‘no real growth’ budget • Although not the primary goal of the SLC, significant efficiencies can be generated through its implementation Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 13
Efficiency under the SLC • The SLC allows the IAEA to adapt to the conditions in a State via evaluation against State-specific Factors • Evaluation against State-specific Factors permits justified increases or decreases in safeguards effort • Achievement of technical objectives no longer intrinsically linked to performing the activities dictated by the Criteria • This represents a fundamental shift in IAEA thinking • Efficiencies will come because most States are in full compliance with their Safeguards obligations Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 14
Efficiency under the SLC in Canada 15 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Efficiency under the SLC in Canada • Canadian State-specific Factors • CSA + AP in force, broader conclusion annually since 2005 • Natural uranium-based fuel cycle; no reprocessing or enrichment • Support for SNRIs, UIs, Remote Monitoring, transmission of data direct from facilities to the IAEA safeguards mailbox • Timely and accurate State Reports • An SSAC that strives to be cooperative – responsiveness to IAEA questions, timely granting of multiple entry/exit visas, timely access to sites, safe working conditions, etc. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 16
Efficiency under the SLC in Canada • As long as Canada continues to have a significant nuclear industry, the IAEA will continue to spend significant safeguards effort in Canada • 2013 Canadian PDIs were more than 6% of total PDIs expended by the IAEA • PDIs in Canada will vary from year to year based on relevant nuclear activities, inspection results, etc. • There is no ‘steady state’ – variation from year to year is normal Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 17
Non-discrimination under the SLC • IAEA Safeguards must continue to be, and must continue to be perceived as being, non-discriminatory • Non-discrimination under the Criteria was based on the treating all States the same • Simple, easy-to-understand system of non-discrimination • Non-discrimination under the SLC is based on treating all States fairly • More sophisticated – taking relevant aspects of current situation, past performance into account • States help determine what is ‘fair’ Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 18
State-specific Factors under the SLC I.The type of safeguards agreement(s) in force, and the IAEA’s safeguards conclusion(s) under the agreement(s) II.The State’s nuclear fuel cycle and related capabilities III.The technical capabilities of the SSAC/RSAC IV.The ability of the IAEA to implement ‘certain safeguards measures’ (SNRIs, UIs, RM, Mailbox) V.The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the Agency VI.The Agency’s experiences in implementing safeguards in the State Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 19
Acceptance of the State-level Concept Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 20
Acceptance of the SLC • Beginning in 2012, some States expressed concerns about the SLC in a Board of Governors meeting • The IAEA has since expended considerable effort to better explain the SLC to States • GOV/2013/38, created at the request of the 2012 General Conference Safeguards Resolution • 7 Technical Meetings in 2014, open to all States, to better describe the SLC and to receive feedback from Member States • The ‘Supplementary Document’, GOV/2014/41, and Corrigenda Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 21
Acceptance of the SLC • The consensus Safeguards Resolution from the 2014 IAEA General Conference demonstrates States’ widespread acceptance of the SLC • The same resolution contains important caveats which the IAEA must keep in mind Implementation within existing legal rights; Close consultation with States; Ongoing updates on SLC implementation to the BoG Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 22
Conclusion • Based on nearly ten years of experience, Canada strongly supports the implementation of the SLC across all States Effective – Efficient – Non-discriminatory • State-level approaches are not new and the application of SLAs to all States is a natural evolution • The concept adheres to the fundamental principles of non- discriminatory, technically-based and effective safeguards Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 23
Thank-you! Questions? nuclearsafety.gc.ca facebook.com/CanadianNuclearSafetyCommission youtube.ca/cnscccsn Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 24
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