YANBIAN RISING China’s Strategic Design for NE Asia XXIX ISMOR Charles F. Hawkins Hawkins.CF@gmail.com
Asia Through a Chinese Lens Area of Emphasis Chinese National Priorities for this • Harmonious Development Briefing 1 • Counter Encirclement • Near-sea defense • Two-ocean navy • Pushout areas Pushout Areas • Sovereignty Campaigns 1.Rason EDZ, North Korea 4 2.Burma (Myanmar) 2 3.Hambantota, Sri Lanka 4.Gwadar, Pakistan 3 U.S. Containment: ‘Pressure from the Sea’ and ‘Pressure from the Land’ 2 2
China Russia North Yanbian Korea Rason EDZ East Sea Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and Hamgyong Bukto Hamgyong Bukto Province are engaged in a transformation that will fundamentally alter NORTH the relationship between China and North KOREA Korea. Changes in Yanbian and Hamgyong Bukto will improve China's strategic flexibility and extend its influence over Northeast Asia in ways that are yet to be surmised or calculated. This report is based on years of direct observation during multiple visits, interviews and discussions with local officials, businessmen, academics, and citizens in Yanbian Prefecture. Observations, findings and 3 judgments expressed here are my own and not those of any U.S. government organization.
The China-North Korea Frontier 1,416 Kilometers China Jilin Yanbian Korean Province Autonomous Prefecture Liaoning Province North Korea Sea of Japan (East Sea) 4
Two Centers of Gravity • China: Stability on Sino-North Korean frontier • North Korea: Regime survival/perpetuation Chinese soldiers at a remote border checkpoint North Korean guard 5
PLA in Northeast China Ground, Air, Amphibious Forces 6
Why Is Yanbian So Important? Jilin Province Railway across • 27 million total the Tumen • 91% Han • 4% Korean Yanbian Prefecture • 2.3 million total • 58% Han • 39% Korean Heilongjiang Province • 36 million total • 95% Han • 1% Korean Liaoning Province • 42 million total • 94% Han • 0.5% Korean Dilapidated NK guard post 7
Reasons for Chinese Intervention in North Korea • Restore stability Publicly stated by state- • Provide humanitarian assistance level Chinese think tanks* • Secure nuclear facilities • Prevent or neutralize Russian intervention • Secure important infrastructure interests – Ports in Rason (Luoxin) EDZ – economically and strategically important – Islands, ports at mouth of Yalu River – Power generation facilities on Yalu River – Frontier commercial structures, industrial/mineral assets – Communications hubs/transportation nets (within reach) • Establish buffer zones on the frontier and present a fait accompli to ROK-US and thereby demand a seat at the unification table * See Bonnie Glaser, et. al., ‘Keeping and Eye on an Unruly Neighbor,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies & U.S. Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., January 2008; position also taken by Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in January 2009. 8
First to Fight: China’s Historic Pattern of Conflict • Realpolitik as a first principle, not Confucian- Mencian ‘good government’ accommodation • Ming dynasty’s grand strategy against the Mongols (1368-1644) Rail crossing over the – About 70 conflict initiations by China Tumen River near Tumen City • Communist China’s initiation of armed conflict during crises (1949-1985): – 8 of 11 (73%) – 10 of 13 (77%) if Spratlys and Tiananmen Square are counted for 1988 and 1989 – High value, zero sum perception • Territorial disputes • Political-diplomatic disputes 9 See: Cultural Realism by Alastair Iain Johnston
Constraints on Opportunism • Opportunism will be narrowly focused – Korean population in Yanbian makes North Hamgyong the center of gravity; East Sea access and ports at Rajin- Sonbong provide added Frozen Tumen near Sanhe incentive – Infrastructure along Yalu will be protected but incursion limited • Opportunism has its limits – There must be instability in North Korea; refugee flow into Yanbian is the core of Chinese concerns – No direct confrontation w/ROK- US • Three-way cooperation w/UN What if “opportunism” meant the opportunity for mandate can save face economic development and integration instead of military adventurism? 10
How can the lights be turned on in North Korea? 11
2004 2009 Growth in Dandong spurs North Korean economic activity in Sinuiju 2009 12
Yanbian: What kind of future? Is Dandong a good model, or a chance event? 13
A new four-lane express highway has been completed from Changchun to Tumen City and terminates at Hunchun near the Chinese-Russian-North Korean border. New Hunwu Expressway (G12) from Changchun to Yanji 14
DPRK-PRC Electricity Trade http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/reportsElectricity Trade/DPRK_PRC_Trade_Aden New construction activity on the North Korean side of the Tumen River near Fengchuan and the Quanhe Bridge More North Korean construction activity on the Tumen near Quanhe Bridge 15
New railway trestle construction between Helong and Nanping Port border crossing. New railways and expressways in Jilin Province will open up Yanbian’s interior and will facilitate more rapid shipment of goods, products and raw materials from both Jilin and Heilong-jiang provinces to foreign and Chinese markets via ports in Raison EDZ. They also serve as a MSR for military use. 16
China’s Push Into Hamgyong Bukto • • Economic sustainability is key to $3 billion deal in December 2011 stability gives China access to East Sea • Lower Yalu comparatively better developed; can be a model North Korean customs at Quanhe Bridge • ‘Economic integration’ with • However, Beijing must balance Hamgyong Bukto is a ‘stability interests with Pyongyang; and enabler’ that benefits China and maintain accommodation with North Korea Moscow This may be a zero-sum game, but China will portray it as win-win. 17
Russian ships at Rajin North Korean Antonov An-12 at Yanji The Prize 18 Bottom three: Pictures of Russian-North Korean activity at Rajin port
Some Important OA Questions • NK Refugees (into China) – How many is too many? Rate of influx? Cumulative? • Displaced persons (inside North Korea) – What will cause North Koreans to leave their villages? What kind and size of organization is best suited to provide HA? Can the PLA do this? How? • Instability (lack of effective governance) – What are warnings and indicators? Are there MOEs (or MOIs)? – What is the scope of the problem? Can it be compartmented by province, township? – What resources are required to provide assistance? What are access issues and barriers to effectiveness? • Are there historical analogs that can be examined for what worked and what didn’t?
Discussion/Questions 20
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