THE GREAT PACIFIC WAR: U.S. v. JAPAN, 1940-1945 24 SEPTEMBER 2020: RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED Dr. Joe Fitzharris Professor Emeritus of History The University of St. Thomas
RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED – 24 Sept. • Rising Expectations • Rising Expectations Denied • Japanese Expansionism / Imperialism • American Responses • Japanese Quandary and Yamamoto’s Solution • Unanticipated Consequences of the Attack on Pearl Harbor • Conspiracy Theories
THEORETICAL: E RISING x EXPECTATIONS p e c t Gap a t i Reality o n s Time Popularized by the “Kerner Commission on Civil Disorder” after the 1968 Riots 4 √
JAPAN’S E RISING x EXPECTATIONS p e c t Rise as a Major • a Regional Power t i Rising Urban • Reality o n Incomes and Well- s being Time Japan expected greater respect as a major power. The Japanese people came to expect better times. 3 √
Japan as a Major Regional Power • Acquiring colonies: Korea, Taiwan • Role in Boxer Rebellion • Russo-Japanese War(1904-1905) • Naval Alliance with Britain (1902-1921) • Involvement in World War I and Economic Growth • 1920s Expanded Trade and industrialization
RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED E x Paris Peace • p Conference e c Naval Disarmament • t Gap a Treaties t i Immigration • Reality o Restrictions n s The Showa (Great) • Time Depression, 1930- 1931
Japanese Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference Billie Hughes W. Bigot Wilson Racial Equality Clause Progressive Racism (for Member Nations only)
Naval Disarmament • RATIONALE: primary way of projecting national power was naval – especially battleships • Washington Naval Agreement, 1920: 5:5:3 ratio (US:UK:JP), recognized as power, • Japanese view ratio as insult • Geneva and London Naval Conferences, 1927-1936 • World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, 1932 Mutsu , 1920-1943 • Japan actually GAINED by these disarmament agreements – but they did not see it that way!
ANTI-JAPANESE CRUSADE IN 1920s • Typical Immigrants • 1924 Immigration Act • Ended Asian Immigration • Severely Limited Immigration from South & Central Europe • (Based in Eugenics - Margaret Sanger & PP) • West Coast Prejudice and Bigotry (hence 1942 removal of Japanese) Tacoma News Tribune , 27 July 1920
Japanese Economic Situation ● No Resources – except people − Despite stereotype, highly capable, imaginative (not inventive), driven, dedicated, indoctrinated, unified, militaristic. Bushido Code ● Export Goods all luxury – Income Elastic ● Need to Import Resources, Oil
Trends and Break in Prices Japanese Economy: Urban-Industrial Recovery, Worsening Rural Depression
RISING EXPECTATIONS DENIED after 1930 E • Rural areas hardest hit, limited x recovery more people, no land p e • Few migrated to urban areas c and got jobs - discrimination t Gap a • IJ Army recruits heavily from t rural areas i Reality o • IJ Navy draws from urban areas n s • IJA operates in Manchuria & Time China supported by IJN airpower (lots of opportunity for Japanese in colonial areas) 3 √
JAPANESE EXPANSIONISM OR IMPERIALISM • Manchuria (1931) and China - “Marco Polo Bridge” 1937 • “Rape of Nanking” in 1937 -1938 • Seizure of Hainan Island, 1939 • Seizure of bases in Indi-China from Vichy France Sept. 1940 • Desire access to resources in Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and Malaya “Delicacies Of The Season - Yellow Bread” French Cartoon ~ 1941 on Japanese Imperialism
lron, Coal, Land, JOBS Manchuria, 1931 Army Insubordination an Issue
Rape of Nanking Nationalist capitol
Rape of Nanking, 13 December 1937-30 January 1938 See: Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (1997)
Despite Denials, the Japanese Knew An article on the "Contest to kill 100 people using a sword" published in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun . The headline reads, "'Incredible Record' (in the Contest to Cut Down 100 People) – Mukai 106 – 105 Noda – Both 2nd Lieutenants Go into Extra Innings"
The Nanking Blunder • Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, GOC Nanking, Royal Family • Taking Nanking did not end Chinese resistance. lt effected Japan’s relations with China - and still does. • Tarnished Japan’s reputation throughout Asia • Volume of killing led Adm. Harry Yarnell, CO USN Asia Fleet, to forecast millions killed in Sino-Japanese War
Hainan, Indo-China, the Dutch 1939-1940 – threatens PI East Indies, and Malaya
Resource Needs
Resource Needs
Dependence of Japanese Economy on Foreign Imports Other Than Oil in 1941 [t-4]
US RESPONSE: Economic Sanctions • Japanese gain concessions and bases in French Indo-China in 1940 • US closed Panama Canal to Japanese shipping • Embargoed scrap metal sales • 74% of scrap from US • 93% of copper from US • Spring 1941 occupies all of Indo- China • Summer 1941: Japanese assets in US frozen, Sale of oil and gasoline embargoed
JAPAN’S QUANDRY AND YAMAMOTO’S SOLUTION: The Problems: • Unwilling to give up gains in China or Indo-China • Sanctions meant 2 years of oil in stock for IJN • JPN economy needed East Asian and Malayan resources • Diplomatic Question: • Will US support UK? Dutch? • Desirability of US in PI
Japan’s Situation 1940-1941 • Unwilling to end war in China and give back territories seized • Unable to defeat guerrillas in China or control army units taking extra territory • War in Europe opened new opportunities for conquest • Need for tin, rubber, petroleum (from DEI and Malaya) • 2 July 41 Imperial Conference - press on southward! • Co-Prosperity Sphere
SEA LANES AND STRATEGY • South China Sea Shipping Threatened by US Navy and B-17 Operational Range AAF heavy Bombers • NEED East Indies Resources • Eliminate Singapore (Defenses Strongest to Seaward, IJA plans to attack from land) Straits of • Ignore US or not? Malacca • Fear US come to aid of UK • Economic Warfare Underway • Maximum 2 years of supplies
YAMAMOTO’S Much more than Pearl Harbor SOLUTION
JAPAN ASSUMED: • US and Japanese interests in the Pacific were asymmetric • Acquiring resource rich regions ensures Japanese economy would be self-sufficient • US would be unwilling to pay a very high price to defeat Japan if the costs were raised by: • quickly acquiring and fortifying Central and SW Pac • forcing US to advance by a deadly island-by-island slog that would exhaust US will to fight
WAR PLANS and WAR GAMES • US WAR PLANS (Joint Army-Navy): • War Plan ORANGE: IJ surprise attack PI; island bases; rescue PI, decisive battle with IJN, blockade Japanese Home Islands. RAINBOW plans built on • IJN WAR PLANS (IJA not involved) • KANTAI KESSEN (Decisive Battle): seize PI, USN drive across PAC to rescue; severely attrit USN in transit; superior skill and quality overcome numeric inferiority, • YAMAMOTO’S Plan: Shatter US morale by massive offensive on US fleet at PH, resulting negotiated peace • WAR GAMES: IN COMMON – IJN attack on Pearl Harbor alone or as part of an attack on the US West Coast
L.A. Examiner, 7 Nov 1937
DAWN, HAWAII, 7 DECEMBER 1941 • NO clear warning from Washington • Lot of Intell, none specific to PH • Expected strikes in East Indias, PI (PH too far) • No real defensive preparations • Prepared for sabotage in PI and PH - planes wing tip • Normal Sunday shore liberty in PH • No torpedo nets, AAA not manned, ammo lacked • Carriers out delivering plans to Midway and Wake
JAPANESE ATTACK ON US BASES ON OAHU, English explanations added in original HAWAII
USS Ward, DD 139: Forward 5” gun (at State Capitol) Minnesota Naval Reservists
ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES • Severely damage US “will to fight” and public morale by destroying US Pacific Fleet offensive punch (BBs) • Buy time to build a fortress so strong the US would chose to negotiate rather than fight • Open protected sea lanes to resources • Yamamoto warned that attacking the US was not a really good option, but his plan was the best of the Japanese plans
RESULTS OF THE ATTACK • Damage to USN negligible in longer-run - minor damage to shore establishment, no loss of oil stocks, only 2 BBs lost, no carriers attacked. • Galvanized US public opinion behind a “total war” effort to destroy Japan (raising tolerance of war costs dramaticaly). • Terminated the “Isolationist” opposition to FDR’s interventionist foreign policy. • Japan did not eliminate USN, only partially fortified the island barriers, and created conditions in which they could achieve their preferred “death before dishonor” on a national scale.
UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES • Public united in fight against Japan (Germany no so much) • Business saw the “hand - writing” and was supportive (except Henry Ford) • Unleashed savage warfare across the Pacific and Asia • Ended Japanese imperialism – and European imperialism too’ • Japan became the “victim” of the evil US war machine
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