“We don’t know more about the biological weapons threat than we did five years ago, and five years from now, we will know even less.” Senior CIA official, Counterproliferation Division “… with regard to biological weapons intelligence, ‘there’s still a sense that it’s too hard to do.’” Senior National Security Council official Quotations from: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States , March 31, 2005.
“THE GREATEST EXISTENTIAL THREAT WE HAVE IN THE WORLD TODAY IS BIOLOGICAL.” US Senate Majority Leader William Frist Davos, January 27, 2005 “THIS [BIOTERRORISM] IS ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS WE HAVE ON THE PLANET TODAY.” Dr. Tara O’Toole, Director, Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Davos, January 27, 2005
WE HEARD THE SAME KEY ELEMENTS IN THE MID-1980s : US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, MAY 1986: RE “THE USE OF POTENT, PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (TOXINS)… THEY ARE INCREASINGLY EASIER TO PRODUCE AND VARY THROUGH THE USE OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY – … THEY ARE VERY ATTRACTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS” THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE NO KNOWN “INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS” KNOWN TO BE WORKING WITH ANY BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, AND THE ONLY KNOWN EVENTS TO THAT DATE HAD BEEN BY THE RAJNEESH GROUP IN THE US IN 1984. RECALL, TOO, THAT THE SECOND STATED PURPOSE IN 1990 OF THE US IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE BWC WAS TO “PROTECT THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM.”
DOUGLAS FEITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATIONS POLICY, AUGUST 8, 1986, TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: “… NEW BIOLOGICAL AGENTS ARE SO ‘SIMPLE’ TO MAKE, AND CAN BE MANUFACTURED ‘IN HOURS’.”
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2006 • “...we must exercise caution and not confuse the capabilities of bioterrorists with state-level BW programs. There is no doubt that the knowledge and technologies today exist to create and manipulate bio-threat agents; however, the capability of terrorists to embark on this path in the near- to mid-term is judged to be low. Just because the technology is available does not mean terrorists can or will use it.” • “In general, terrorist capabilities in the area of bioterrorism are crude and relatively unsophisticated, and we do not see any indication of a rapid evolution of capability. It is, therefore, unclear how advancements in high-end biotechnology will impact the future threat of bioterrorism, if at all.” • “With respect to the evolution of bioterrorism, we would expect to see use of traditional biological agents (anthrax, plague, tularemia, and others) before the appearance of advanced BW agents.”
THE WORLD THAT WE EXIST IN: ONE � GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: Food crop growth cycles, food production � OCEAN QUALITY DETERIORATION, DEFORESTATION, DEPLETION OF FRESH WATER AQUIFERS, DESERTIFICATION � GLOBAL POPULATION GROWTH, FOOD PRODUCTION, RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS (ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS), PRODCUTION OF WASTE PRODUCTS (SOLID, LIQUID, GASEOUS) � MILLENNIUM PROJECT “15 GLOBAL CHALLENGES”: Only one relates to pathogens, increase in incidence of antibiotic resistance � DEATHS IN WARS AND CONFLICTS IN THE 20 TH CENTURY: ~230 million � DEATHS DUE TO POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (“STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE”): 20,000 per day; 7.3 million per year, ~75 million over ten years ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- � POTENTIAL FOR CYBERTERRORISM: Currently occurring daily
TWO: MAJOR INFECTIOUS HUMAN DISEASES � TB, MALARIA, AIDS: 5 million deaths annually; 50 million deaths in 10 years � MALARIA: 515 million people infected globally � TB: 1 billion people infected; 1 billion new cases by 2020; 35 million will die � MEASLES: 1999 annual mortality, 873,000; 2003, 530,000; 3.6 million children dead in past 5 years � US FLU MORTALITY: 1977-1999, 788,000 people or 36,000/year; 360,000 deaths in the next decade � EXPECTATION OF PANDEMIC FLU ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- � TOBACCO-RELATED MORTALITY: 13,500/day globally; 5 million/year; 50 million every 10 years
Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat 1. The evolution of state biological weapons programs. 2. The evolution of non-state actors (“terrorist”) biological weapon capabilities. 3. Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public perceptions and policy prescriptions. 4. Costs of the US biodefense R&D program.
The evolution of state biological weapons programs July 2001: US government states 13 offensive national BW programs ---------------------------------------------------- � SOUTH AFRICA: TERMINATED 1995 � CUBA: US WITHDRAWS CLAIM, 2004 � LIBYA: US WITHDRAWS CLAIM, 2004 � IRAQ: TERMINATED, 1990s � RUSSIA: ? Reduction, certainly ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ US “reducing” nature of public descriptions of other ostensibly offensive BW programs
BW PROLIFERATION FROM TERMINATED STATE PROGRAMS � SOUTH AFRICA: NONE � IRAQ: APPARENTLY NONE � USSR/RUSSIA: APPROXIMATELY 12 INDIVIDUALS TO IRAN � RUSSIA: VAST MAJORITY OF EMIGRES TO US, GERMANY, UK, SWEDEN, FINLAND, ISRAEL, AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS
The Requirements to Produce Biological Agents by Non-State Groups There are five essential requirements that must be mastered in order to produce biological agents: • One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen. • One must know how to handle the organism correctly. • One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics. • One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up production properly. • One must know how to disperse the product properly. • “Most of the agents are not readily available, • most of the agents are not easy to make, and • most of the agents are not easy to disperse.”
The years between 1995 and 2000 were characterized by: • spurious statistics (hoaxes counted as “biological” events) • unknowable predictions • greatly exaggerated consequence estimates • gross exaggeration of the feasibility of successfully producing biological agents by non-state actors, except in the case of recruitment of highly experienced professionals, for which there still was no evidence as of 2000 • the apparent continued absence of a thorough threat assessment • thoughtless, ill-considered, counterproductive, and extravagant rhetoric
The Evolution of non-state actors (“terrorist”) biological weapon capabilities 1984: Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon Salmonella 1990-1994: Aum Shinrikyo, Tokyo Botulinum toxin and Anthrax – Failed 1998-9 to November 2001: al Queda, Afghanistan, Anthrax and ? – Failed October – November 2001: United States, “Amerithrax”/Anthrax Outlier: Significance re: anticipation of technical proficiency by “terrorists” 2004: al-Queda affiliates, NO ricin
Non-state actors (cont’d) Jonathan Tucker, Toxic Terror (1999) John Parachini, Motive, Means and Mayhem (forthcoming) � Together the two books cover some 25 case studies of individuals and groups � Official US threat presentations, February 16, 2005 and March 17, 2005. Greatly reduced depiction of BW threat from non-state actors � The relevance of the Amerithrax outlier � No evidence to date of state BW assistance to non-state actors/terrorist groups.
US BIOTERRORISM EXERCISE SCENARIOS 1. 1988, Mexico-Texas border: “Alibek” smallpox chimeric viral agent 2. TOPOFF1, May 2000: aerosolized pneumonic plague, FEMA, and US Department of Justice 3. [Unnamed], July 2000: aerosolized plague, US Department of Justice and DOD/DTRA 4. Dark Winter, June 2001: aerosolized smallpox, Johns Hopkins Center for Biosecurity and 3 collaborating groups 5. Sooner Spring, April 2002: smallpox, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Oklahoma 6. TOPOFF2, May 2003: aerosolized pneumonic plague, US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of State 7. Atlantic Storm, January 2004: aerosolized dry powder smallpox, Center for Biosecurity (now affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) 8. TOPOFF3, April 2005: aerosolized pneumonic plague, US Department of Homeland Security
RICHARD DANZIG, CATASTROPHIC BIOTERRORISM, 2003 � Case 1: a large-scale outdoor aerosol anthrax attack � Case 2: a large-scale outdoor aerosol smallpox attack � Case 3: an attack that disseminates botulinum toxin in cold drinks. � Case 4: an attack that spreads foot and mouth disease among cattle, sheep and pigs.
National Planning Scenarios Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Council) • Scenario #2: Biological Attack, aerosolized anthrax, 5 cities in sequence • Scenario #4: Biological Attack, aerosolized plague in three areas of a single city • Scenario #13: Biological Attack, liquid anthrax placed in ground beef in a factory – producing intestinal anthrax; mortality in low hundreds • Scenario #14: Biological Attack, foot and mouth disease. Economic loss; no human mortality
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