The contribution of the Biological Weapons Convention to global biosecurity Se Second OIE IE Glo lobal l Confere rence on Bio Biological Thre reat Red eduction Ottawa, Canada 31 Oct ctober – 2 November r 2017 Daniel Feakes Chief BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch)
“Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons” “Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk”
“Without a shadow of a doubt there is something in man’s make -up th that causes him im to hesit sitate when at t th the poin int of bri ringin ing war r to his is enemy by poiso isonin ing him im or r his is cattle le and crops s or spreading disease […] The human race sh shri rinks and draws back when the su subje ject is is broached. It It alw lways has, and it probably always will”. Vannevar Bus Bush, US US pr presid identia ial l scie science ad advis iser, 1949 1949
The BWC represents an “ironclad norm against the possession and use of biological weapons, and the abhorrence associated with the very idea of using disease as a weapon. How many States today boast that they are “biological weapon States”? Who argues now that the bubonic plague and smallpox are legitimate weapons to use under any circumstances?” Angela Kane, Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
Biological Weapons Convention Prohibits the development , production , stockpiling , acquisition , retention or transfer of biological weapons • Opened for signature on 10 April 1972 • EiF on 26 March 1975 • First multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of WMD • Comprehensive scope • Non-discriminatory in nature • Unlimited duration • Open to any state 179 States Parties • No institution, no in-built 6 Signatories verification mechanism 11 States not party
Global trends impacting on the BWC Technology is accelerating progress but causing discontinuities: • “Biotechnologies such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine and other fields, while sharpening moral differences.” • “Technological barriers to acquiring and using a biological weapon have been conspicuously eroded since the Seventh Review Conference.” Governing is getting harder: • “Managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply— to include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals — resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts.” The nature of conflict is changing: • “Disrupting societies will become more common, with long -range precision weapons, cyber, and robotic systems to target infrastructure from afar, and more accessible technology to create weapons of mass destruction”.
“ I view the threat of deadly pandemics right up there with nuclear war and climate change. Getting ready for a global pandemic is every bit as important as nuclear deterrence and avoiding a climate catastrophe. […] Whether it occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, epidemiologists say a fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year. And they say there is a reasonable probability the world will experience such an outbreak in the next 10-15 years .”
“The means by which these agreements survive and adapt to changing conditions after they enter into force deserve as much attention as the negotiations that produced them in the first place. They cannot be left simply to fend for themselves . … For governments to realize the benefits they originally sought in arms control agreements, some government officials must live with them full- time, all the time.” Charles Flowerree, former US Representative to the BWC
Eighth BWC Review Conference Issues of contention - different principle visions • Comprehensive, legally-binding verification protocol vs. incremental strengthening of the BWC • Decision-making authority of the Meeting of States Parties Outcome • Minimal decisions compared with the large number of Working Papers, ideas and programme of work originally put forward • Fundamentally different visions on the way forward • Agreement to hold “annual meetings” from 2017-2020
BWC in 2017 • MSP to take place from 4-8 December in Geneva: • “ seek to make progress on issues of substance and process for the period before the next Review Conference, with a view to reaching consensus on an intersessional process” • To be chaired by Amb. Amandeep Singh Gill (India) with 2 Vice-Chairs Amb. Michael Biontino (Germany) and Amb. Juraj Podhorsky (Slovakia) • “Convening function” of the MSP – international/regional organizations, industry, NGOs, scientific and professional associations etc • Side events and statements – can be made and organized by any relevant stakeholders, e.g. international organizations like OIE • Financial crisis putting future of BWC meetings and ISU in jeopardy
13. The Conference notes the value of national implementation measures, as appropriate, in accordance with the constitutional process of each State Party, to: • implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity • encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to promote awareness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors … promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness of the obligations of States Parties under the Convention … • promote the development of training and education programmes for those granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and toxins • encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct
BWC as a network/facilitator • 179 States Parties • Approx. 115 National Contact Points • Around 70-75 annual reports submitted per year • Annual meeting in Geneva • Collaboration with e.g. AU, EU, IAP, TWAS, OIE, OPCW, WHO, Interpol etc Piers Millett, “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in context: from monolith to keystone”, Disarmament Forum , 2006
BWC Cooperation & Assistance Database • ISU established and administers a database, open to all States Parties, where the requests and offers are stored • States Parties may bilaterally match offers with requests or use the services of the ISU to facilitate the exchange of information • Database will be improved before the end of the year • 60 offers of assistance made by: science outreach and education joint cooperation and research governance-legal assistance emergency response & assistance Australia Group Assistance on CBM preparation capacity building and training www.unog.ch/bwc/database 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
BWC Sponsorship Programme • To enable participation in BWC meetings in Geneva • Supported by voluntary contributions • Aimed at developing States Parties, who have not previously/regularly attended BWC meetings • Also available for States not party to the BWC • Covers cost of flights to and from Geneva and DSA for attendance at BWC meetings • BWC sponsorship programme for MSP in December 2017 closed on 30 Sept 2017 • Applicatio now being evaluated and selection will be made by Chair and Vice-Chairs • www.unog.ch/bwc/sponsorship
Mexico, March 2018 Jordan, January 2018 South Africa, July 2018 Ukraine, September 2017
Beneficiary countries Cameroon Iraq Lebanon Nepal Cote d’Ivoire Yemen Colombia Sierra Leone Malaysia Malawi
“Deliberate disease” project Strengthening global mechanisms and capabilities for responding to the deliberate use of disease • Strengthened response preparedness through effective policy coordination and resource sharing among relevant international organizations; • Strengthened international coordination capabilities at the operational level in the event of a BW attack; and • Availability of operational procedures and tools under the BWC at the disposal of BWC States Parties.
SDG 3 – Good health and well-being • Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages • Target 3D - Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks • Indicator 3.D.1 - International Health Regulations (IHR) capacity and health emergency preparedness “ The Conference recognizes capacity building at the national and international levels as the most immediate imperative for enhancing and strengthening the capacity of the States Parties to promptly and effectively detect and respond to the alleged use or threat of use of biological weapons” “States Parties recognize that in this regard health and security issues are interrelated at both the national and international levels .”
WHO Joint External Evaluations • Aims of the International Health Regulations are compatible with the BWC • BWC is relevant to JEE Prevent-6 and Respond-3 • BWC also relevant to GHSA Action Package Prevent-3 and Action Package Respond-2
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