Preparing for the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons: The Relevance of the Biological Weapons Convention to Central Asian States Parties Regional Workshop for Central Asian States Parties to the BWC On Preparedness to Respond to the Deliberate Use of Biological Weapons 26 – 27 June 2019, Issyk Kul, Kyrgyz Republic Dr. Alex Lampalzer Deputy Chief, BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
WEF Global Risks Report 2019 “The world is badly under -prepared for even modest biological threats. We are vulnerable to potentially huge impacts on individual lives, societal well-being, economic activity and national security. Revolutionary new biotechnologies promise miraculous advances, but they also create daunting challenges of oversight and control.”
The Biological Weapons Convention in a Nutshell prohibits development , production , stockpiling , acquisition , retention or transfer of BWs • opened for signature on 10/04/72, EiF on 26/03/75 • First multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of WMD • Non-discriminatory in nature • Unlimited duration and open to any state 182 States Parties • No verification regime; no own, 5 Signatories separate int. organization 10 States not party • Intersessional Work Programmes, decisions by consensus
Article I Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons Article II To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources prior to joining Article III Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or retain biological weapons Article IV To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC domestically Article V To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation of the BWC Article VI To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and to comply with its subsequent decisions Article VII To assist States which have been exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the BWC Article X To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology
What is the relevance of the BWC? • Provides an unequivocal norm against biological weapons • Sole multilateral forum for dialogue concerning all issues pertaining to BWs in a holistic manner • Facilitates assistance and cooperation at the bi- and multilateral level and helps building capacity • Supports the promotion of peaceful uses of biological S&T • Offers a mechanism for consultation and cooperation in solving any problems • Builds transparency through Confidence Building Measures
Continued Political Support for the BWC 200 178 165 155 146 132 150 124 118 103 103 102 94 87 100 78 77 114 63 53 93 78 50 69 68 65 58 40 0 RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6 RC7 RC8 1980 1986 1991 1996 2001/02 2006 2011 2016 SPs Participating SPs PrepCom Participating SPs RevCon 6 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 17 new States Parties since 2012
2019 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, Bishkek, 13-14 June 2019 The SCO member states called for unfailingly honouring the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
Multilateral Instruments against WMD 1540 State NPT CTBT 1925 BWC CWC 1540 Natl. Geneva Natl. Action Protocol Report Plan (vol.) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Belarus ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Kazakhstan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Kyrgyzstan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Russian Fed. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Tajikistan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Turkmenistan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Uzbekistan
How does the BWC work? • No international verification regime • No separate international organization • States Parties obliged to translate the commitments found in the Convention into effective national action • Intersessional work programmes between the Review Conferences that include annual Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties • Highest Organ: Review Conference • Chair 2019 Meeting of States Parties : • Ambassador Yann Hwang (France) • Three regional groups: • Eastern European Group (Poland) • NAM (Venezuela) • Western Group (Australia) • Three Depositaries
2018-2020 Intersessional Programme 5 Meetings of Experts (29 July - 8 August 2019) MX Topic Chair 1 (2d) Cooperation and assistance, with a particular Amb. V. Dolidze, focus on strengthening cooperation and Georgia assistance under Article X 2 (2d) Review of developments in the field of science Y. Nikolaichik, and technology related to the Convention Belarus 3 (1d) Strengthening national implementation M. Reddiar, South Africa 4 (2d) Assistance, response and preparedness U. Jadoon, Pakistan 5 (1d) Institutional strengthening of the Convention L. Masmejean, Switzerland Annual Meeting of States Parties (3 - 6 December 2019)
Resources to facilitate Treaty implementation Weapon Category Nuclear Biological Chemical Treaty (Status) NPT CTBT BWC CWC States Parties to the 191 168 182 193 Treaty Verification Organisation IAEA CTBTO - OPCW Budget (Mio., 2019) € 371.8 $ 70,9 $1,52 € 69,7 € 49,8 Personnel (approx.) 2,560 275 3 462
BWC Finances - $ 1,519,800 50000 47231 45000 40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 4,903.47 2922 5000 2329.92 856 767.44 303.37 398 352 31 0 61 0 36.67 0 Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russian Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Federation Assessed Contribution (USD) Measures taken in 2018 to address financial predictability and sustainability: Status as at 30/05/2019: • Assessed contributions: $1,354,110 (89.1%) • Insufficient funds at this stage to conduct the Meeting of States Parties - funding gap of $165,000 • BWC Working Capital Fund: $166,594 (21,9% of target level) (Russian contribution: $50,000 • Considerable interest to strengthen preparedness, implementation and cooperation/assistance - vol. contributions
National Contact Points Belarus Bela (Minis (Mi istry ry of of Rus Russia ian Healt Hea lth) Fed ederation (Minis (Mi istry ry of of Trade and Ind and ndustry) Kaz azakhstan (Mi (Minis istry ry of of Edu ducatio ion & & Science) Scie Uzbekis istan (Commissio (Com ion of of the the Cab Cabinet of of Minis Min isters of of the the Kyr yrgyzstan Rep epubli lic of of (Mi (Minis istry ry of of Uzbekis istan on on the the Econ onomy) Proh ohib ibit itio ion of of Biol Biolog ogical Weap eapon ons) Taj ajik ikis istan Tur urkmenis istan (Nucle (Nu lear and and Ra Radia iatio ion Sa Safety Ag Agen ency) (non (none)
Confidence Building Measures (submissions by 15 April each year) • CBM A: o Part 1: research centres and laboratories o Part 2: Natl. biological defence R&D programmes • CBM B: Info on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences, that seem to deviate from the normal pattern • CBM C: Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge • CBM E: legislation, regulations and other measures • CBM F: past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes • CBM G: vaccine production facilities
Participation in CBMs 35 33 30 25 25 20 20 15 10 6 6 5 2 1 0 Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russian Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Federation CBM Report submitted in 2019 Previous submissions
BWC Cooperation & Assistance Database 61 active offers made by ten SPs and one group of SPs Australia Group
BWC Cooperation & Assistance Database 43 active requests from 12 SPs
Perspectives on the BW Threat
Perspectives on the BW threat • Use of BWs has so far been extremely rare • Most cases involved toxins, most cases were criminal in nature • Significant level of expertise and tacit knowledge still required for effective production and delivery of large quantities • Some potential for a high consequence bioterrorism event, attacks are much more likely to be crude, amateurish and small-scale • Greater threat posed by financially, scientifically and militarily well-resourced groups: states or groups sponsored by states • Presently gravest challenge may come from (rogue) individuals with access to BSL-3/4 labs • Actors do not necessarily have to launch a technically perfect attack to achieve their malicious objectives, as causing major panic and other disruption may already be sufficient
Impact of S&T Developments S&T Review – IAP Report (2015) • Global ability to detect and treat disease has been enhanced • Recent advances also facilitated development of BWs • Technical barriers to acquiring and using BWs have been significantly reduced in recent years Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (2018) • Large-scale production of BWs still likely to require significant financial and intellectual resources • Developing a synthetic biology-enabled bioweapon would likely still require significant testing • Continued convergence may help overcome some barriers to usability as a weapon for synthetic biology-enabled bioweapons
The Global Risks Landscape 2019
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