The Biological Weapons Convention Richard Lennane BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
BWC Facts and Figures (1) • Opened for signature in 1972 • Entered into force in 1975 • Current membership: – 162 States Parties – 13 signatories – 20 states neither signed nor ratified • Depositaries are Russia, UK, USA Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
BWC Facts and Figures (2) • No BWC organisation or implementing body, in contrast to: – the Chemical Weapons Convention (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) – the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (IAEA) • Implementation Support Unit is new development – established by Sixth Review Conference in 2006 – mandate to “help States Parties help themselves” Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Main Provisions: Overview (1) • Article I: do not acquire biological or toxin weapons • Article II: get rid of any such weapons you already have • Article III: do not help or allow anyone else to acquire such weapons • Article IV: take necessary domestic measures to ensure such weapons are prohibited Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Main Provisions: Overview (2) • Article V: consult and cooperate with other States Parties on problems • Article VI: report suspected breaches to the Security Council • Article VII: help States Parties which have been attacked or threatened with BW • Article X: do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
And just what is a biological weapon? “(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” - from Article I of the BWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Strengthening the BWC (1) • Review Conferences every five years (1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 – next one in 2011) • Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) introduced 1986, expanded 1991 • VEREX group established 1991 to examine verification possibilities • Special Conference in 1994 establishes Ad Hoc Group to negotiate protocol • Ad Hoc Group negotiations end in failure in 2001; Fifth RevCon suspended Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Strengthening the BWC (2) • Fifth RevCon resumes in 2002, agrees new process for 2003-2005 • Expert meetings consider specific topics related to improving implementation of the BWC • Exchange of information and experience, but no binding decisions • Reluctant agreement and modest expectations, but proved surprisingly successful Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Sixth Review Conference • Overcame past divisions (although these remain unresolved) • Established new intersessional process similar to 2003-2005 • Established Implementation Support Unit (ISU) • Agreed on action plan for universalization • Made modest improvements to CBM process • Agreed to nominate national contact points Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
2007-2010 Work Program Topics • 2007: national implementation; regional cooperation. • 2008: biosafety/biosecurity; oversight, education, awareness raising, and codes of conduct. • 2009: capacity-building in disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment. • 2010: assistance in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
So what changed? • Bioterrorism becomes major concern after September 11, 2001 • Rapid development, growth and spread of biotechnology capabilities – Nuclear weapons: 1000 facilities – Chemical weapons: 5000 facilities – Biological weapons: 100,000+? • Recognition of interconnection of BW with other biological risks Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Weapons of Mass Destruction Nuclear Chemical Biological Weapons Weapons Weapons Nuclear Chemical Biological Non-proliferation Weapons Weapons Treaty Convention Convention International Organization for ? Atomic Energy the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Agency Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
The Spectrum of Biological Risk Natural Unintended Vandalism, Deliberate disease Accidents Negligence consequences sabotage use of BW outbreak WHO BWC “We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
WMD Regime: Traditional Model Treaty Organisation State State State State State Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
New approach: a network model? BWC OIE INTERPOL WHO SCR 1540 FAO State State Professional Scientific Industry associations organisations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
New approach: a network model? BWC OIE INTERPOL WHO SCR 1540 FAO Work Program State State ISU Professional Scientific Industry associations organisations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Controversial Issues • Relationship between Article III and Article X – “spectrum” concept is starting to bridge the gap • Verification, and investigation of alleged non- compliance • UN Secretary-General’s CBW investigation mechanism (and UNGA Res 60/288) • Prohibition of use of BW (and Iranian proposal to amend the BWC) • Improving CBMs Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
Verification for the BWC? • Always a technological challenge, and becoming more so • Technological advances may help, but can do little to detect “intention” • Political differences remain stark • Seventh RevCon will be first opportunity for major reassessment Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Disarmament Fellowship 2008 (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Briefing on the BWC, 28 August and on their Destruction
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