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The Impact of Conditional Cash transfers programmes on household work decisions in Ghana. By E.E-A. Mochiah , R.D. Osei & I.O. Akoto Outline Introduction Objectives Evidence from other studies LEAP program Methodology


  1. The Impact of Conditional Cash transfers programmes on household work decisions in Ghana. By E.E-A. Mochiah , R.D. Osei & I.O. Akoto

  2. Outline • Introduction – Objectives • Evidence from other studies – LEAP program • Methodology • Results/Findings • Conclusions • Recommendations

  3. Introduction • In the last decade, CCT programs have been very popular in developing countries as a policy tool to increase human capital. • Argument of CCTs creating disincentives to work . • CCT programs provide cash payments to households conditional on regular school attendance and visiting health clinics among others. – CCTs have achieved quantified success in reaching the poor and bringing about short-term improvements in consumption, education, and health (Schultz 2004; Gertler 2004; Rawlings and Rubio 2003),

  4. Evidence in favour of CCTs • Skoufias and Maro (2008), assesses the impact of Mexico’s PROGRESA programme on poverty and adult work incentives. – PROGRESA’s cash transfers have not discouraged people from working • Ardington et al. (2009) concludes that – large cash transfers (pensions in South Africa) to the elderly lead to increased employment among prime-aged adults, which occurs primarily through labor migration. • Ferro et al. (2010) find that the Bolsa Escola CCT program in Brazil – increased mothers’ and fathers’ probability of participation in labour force work. • Oliveira et al., 2007 finds in Brazil’s Bolsa Família that – Women in benefiting households had labour market participation rates 4.3 percentage points higher than women in non-participating households

  5. Evidence Against CCTs • Maluccio and Flores (2005) used Nicaragua’s “Red de Proteccion Social" conditional cash transfer scheme. – find no effect on labour supply • Bertrand et al. (2003) use cross-sectional data in South Africa and estimate that – pension receipt substantially lowers the labor market participation of working-age adults in the household.

  6. What of Ghana’s LEAP? • Specifically, the objectives of this paper is to find out whether or not – Conditional Cash Transfer scheme has increased households total hours worked (labour supply) generally; – The hours worked on farm (agriculture) ,off-farm (non- farm enterprise) and paid employment has increased with the CCT scheme

  7. LEAP in Ghana • Provides cash and health insurance to extremely poor households across Ghana – to alleviate short-term poverty and – encourage long term human capital development. • Aimed at improving the basic consumption of beneficiary households by – increasing school enrolment, attendance and retention of children, – improving on livelihood income-earned activities like farming. GLSS5- 164,370 households (bottom 20% of extremely poor • households in Ghana) The target group includes • subsistence farmers and fisher folk, – extremely poor citizens above 65 years without any subsistence support – persons living with severe disabilities without any productive capacity; – Care Givers of OVCs-orphans and vulnerable children (particularly Children Affected By AIDS • and children with severe disabilities), Incapacitated/extremely poor people living with HIV/AIDS and • Pregnant Women/Lactating Mothers with HIV/AIDS. •

  8. LEAP..cont’d For the aged and persons with severe disabilities, the cash transfer • is unconditional. As at 2008,each beneficiary receives GH¢8.00 and that could • increase to GH¢15,00 , depending on the number of beneficiaries in the family (to a maximum of four)- 2(GH¢10),3(GH¢12),4 or more(GH¢15)- Exchange rate at 2008 was about $1 to GH¢1 In July 2012, this was revised to GH¢12 to GH¢36 during a re- • launch. Exchange rate at 2012 was $1 to GH¢1.88 Some recent contributions have came from DFID (£36.4 million), • World Bank (US$20 million), GoG (GH¢18 million)-July 2012 As at 2010 coverage was 35,000 HH but has increased to 71,456 HH • in 2013 (98 districts) with a target of 150,000 HH in 2014 and 200,000 HH in 2015 (170 districts) Amount was to be adequate and acceptable so not to • – encourage unemployment, – create dependency or – benefit beneficiary households excessively compared to the other income groups in the community

  9. Methodology The sampling strategy of the LEAP programme entailed a • longitudinal propensity score matching (PSM) design. The PSM strategy enables one to attribute changes over time • to the intervention by allowing for the construction of a counterfactual through the matched comparison group Group LEAP(Treatment) YALE(Control) Survey Baseline Follow up Baseline Follow up Period 2010 2012 2010 2012 No of HH 700 646 5009 858

  10. Methodology cont’d • Any significant effect of the cash transfer on household hours worked between the treatment group and the control group? – overall, for agriculture, paid employment and non- farm enterprise. • To do this, we adopt difference-in-difference method – vastly used in literature to account for differences in outcome variables in randomized experiments.

  11. • Y it = β 0 + β 1 T it + β 2 A it + β 3 T it A it +β 4 X it + ε it (1) • Where Y it is the number of hours worked by the household i at time t (t=1, 2), • X it is a vector containing covariates which may influence the number of hours worked by a household. • T it is a trend variable (= 1 in follow up and zero (0) for the baseline period. • A it is the treatment dummy • T it A it is an interactive variable . • The coefficient of this interactive variable provides a measure of effect of the intervention which is referred to as the difference in difference estimator and can be expressed as : • β 3 = (Y* a1 -Y* c1 )-(Y* a2 -Y* c2 ) (2)

  12. Descriptive Results Sex of Household head Dist. of age of HH head Male 45.5 10-19 1.0 Female 54.5 20-29 5.6 Marital status of Household head 30-39 12.0 Married 42.0 40-49 13.0 Consensual Union 5.9 50-59 17.3 Separated 4.0 60-64 6.7 Divorced 11.1 65+ 44.5 Widowed 32.6 Household size Never Married 4.5 1 18.9 Betrothed 0.0 2-3 32.7 Educational level of head 4-5 24.5 No education 46.5 6-7 15.3 Senior High School and below 49.4 8-9 5.9 Above Senior High School 4.1 10+ 2.7 Mean household size 3.9  Average HH size is 3.9  Sex of household heads was 54.5 for women

  13. Annual Average labour hours/Days per household Labour Hours Baseline Follow-up Treatment Control Treatment Control Agric 306.1 671.2 349.6 550.5 Paid employment 95.1 106.6 108.4 78.9 Non-farm Enterprise 640.3 673.9 655.9 836.2 Total 1041.5 1451.7 1113.8 1465.7 Days per HH Agric 38 84 44 69 Paid employment 12 13 14 10 Non-farm Enterprise 80 84 82 105 Total 130 181 139 183

  14. Analytical Results Total labour hrs Agriculture Paid employment Non-farm Enterprise Eqn1 Eqn2 Eqn3 Eqn4 Eqn5 Eqn6 Eqn7 Eqn8 VARIABLES lTotallabhrs lTotagriclabhrs lTpaidemphrswk lTotlabhrs_ent Treatdum -0.823*** -0.070 -0.914*** -0.111 -0.075 -0.202** -0.099 0.042 (0.153) (0.117) (0.149) (0.111) (0.085) (0.086) (0.164) (0.165) Time2 0.659*** 0.540** 0.564*** 0.678*** -0.052 0.200 0.366** -0.006 (0.147) (0.245) (0.143) (0.230) (0.082) (0.177) (0.158) (0.296) Treattime -0.398* 0.263 -0.489** -0.074 0.160 0.315* -0.218 0.110 (0.216) (0.264) (0.211) (0.249) (0.120) (0.191) (0.232) (0.371) -0.121*** lLabannualinc 0.389*** -0.140*** (0.024) (0.026) (0.036) 0.044 HHhasnonfarm 0.287 -0.223* (0.174) (0.184) (0.133) -0.095*** lEnt_sales1 0.348*** -0.003 (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) lagricincome 0.219*** -0.043*** -0.039 (0.018) (0.013) (0.026) 0.018 lLoanamt 0.001 0.032** 0.121*** (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.027) -0.004 lLendamt -0.044 0.077*** 0.265*** (0.027) (0.029) (0.021) (0.041) -0.061*** lTransfers -0.095*** -0.045*** -0.074*** (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.025) -0.098*** TTlTransfer -0.101** -0.101*** -0.006

  15. (0.040) (0.038) (0.029) (0.056) lCompensatn_wage -0.028 0.050 -0.185*** -0.013 (0.046) (0.043) (0.033) (0.065) cancarryload 0.845*** 0.725*** 0.594*** 1.129*** (0.117) (0.110) (0.086) (0.163) lsize 1.274*** 2.851*** -0.139** -0.596*** (0.088) (0.072) (0.065) (0.123) males_in_hh 0.012 0.388*** 0.414*** -0.437*** (0.092) (0.086) (0.066) (0.129) hhsize 0.101*** 0.119*** 0.043*** 0.110*** (0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.029) HHelectricity -0.077 -0.139* 0.072 0.688*** (0.086) (0.081) (0.063) (0.121) self_employed -0.868*** (0.075) Constant 5.031*** 1.390*** 3.696*** 0.845*** 0.486*** 0.755*** 1.840*** 1.306*** (0.104) (0.267) (0.101) (0.251) (0.058) (0.195) (0.111) (0.306) 3,008 3,008 Observations 3,008 3,008 3,008 3,008 3,008 3,008 0.039 0.526 R-squared 0.033 0.490 0.001 0.108 0.003 0.093 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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