Insensitive Munitions Industry Contribution for the New STANAG-AOP 4396 Ed. Of Sympathetic Reaction Prepared by Hazard Assessment & Classification IMEMG’s Expert Working Group Presented by Carole FOURNIER (Chairperson) www.imemg.org » IMEMTS – October 24 th , 2019, Seville, Spain
Hazard Assessment & Classification EWG EWG Membership Carole FOURNIER Thales LAS France France (Chaiperson) Yves Guengant ArianeGroup France Malcom Cook AWE UK David Simmons BAE-System Land UK UK Alexandre Lefrançois CEA-DAM France Michel Vivès MBDA France France Sean Randall MBDA UK Ltd UK Frédéric Nozères Nexter Munitions France Laurent Bonhomme Roxel France France David Leipold Germany Diehl Defence Carina Klefer Luigi D’Angelo RWM Italia Italy 2 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
Table of content Hazard Assessment & Classification EWG Contribution for the new STANAG-AOP4396 ed. of Sympathetic Reaction 1 4 EWG OBJECTIVES ISSUES AND RECOMMANDATIONS 2 5 AIMS OF THE STANAG-AOP 4396 CONCLUSION 3 PERFORMING A SR TEST Configuration Initiation Mode Instrumentation / IM assessment 3 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
Hazard Assessment & Classification EWG HA&C Expert Working Group objectives: Survey NATO and UN regulation • Standardized mandatory threats • Maximum response to vulnerability test • Hazard division procedure Exchange on various national implementation in European countries Define common position on document revision and publicize IMEMG position 4 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
Hazard Assessment & Classification EWG STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Why working on this STANAG ? – Current ed.2 is being update by national experts of the NATO AC326 Group IMEMG HA&C EWG has decided to timely carry out its own review of the AOP with the aim of expressing the European Industry shared view. 5 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Aim of the STANAG → extract sympathetically react worst case credible reaction in-service situation Most likely sensitivity of munitions safety barriers Single, Packaged, Multiple packages 6 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction A im of the STANAG → questions raised: Sympathetic Worst case reaction / credible In-service Configuration sensitivity reaction situation • Not only • How to define • THA by • Safety barrier detonation! it? Multiple operational and • Single munition situations! national Item designed experts is to detonate. • Could be an • Packaged needed. Roquette endless and munitions • Life cycle motors and expensive propellant • Multiple work! analysis could powders. be necessary. packages of Others. munitions 7 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: Performing a SR test: • Packaged / unpackaged • Storage or tactical configuration • With confinement or without confinement Configuration • Item designed to detonate • Rocket motors and propellant powder Donor • All others initiation mode • Blast pressure • Fragmentation Measure / IM • Other assessment 8 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: Storage / Replace some live items Within a by inert items → generally Packaging transport package not acceptable configuration Total volum of Must be > 0,15 m 3 packages approved by authorities 2 acceptors Number of acceptors Preferrably 3 acceptors If donor or acceptor If donor or acceptor package > 0,15 m 3 package > 0,15 m 3 (2 are required) If a storage Stack volum > 0,15 m 3 stack Outer confinement = inert munitions or sand bags Perform If a protection a THA device Use it 9 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: ❑ ““2 tests shall be performed” ➢ One tests without confinement Smallest individual package Life cycle analysis? Unpacked ? In launchers ? Worst case acceptor reaction? How to define the worst case ? Ennemy threats / human error ? ➢ One test with confinement Inert munitions (IM test) UN / IM harmonization? Or package filled with sand (IM and UN test) How to perform measurments? Need for: THA / Life cycle analysis / Test: could be expensive and complicated 10 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: ❑ Donor / 2 acceptors « Additional storage arrangement – storage ramp » Package Inert Donor Acceptors « Munition stacks » « not appropriate to use « within a package […] inert items […] simulating generally not acceptable the unconfined situation » Example: configuration approved by to replace live items with national authorities inert items » STANAG is not clear on package, stack of package, confinement and inert items 11 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: ❑ Confinement: → “Where stacks of munitions, unpacked or packed are to be used, [ … ] inert munition [ … ] may also be used to obtain a reasonable simulation of confinement” → “Confinement may be simulated with Example of a test performed with confinement sand bags [ … ] stacked around the test at least 1m thick in all direction” How to perform measurements and → “Within a package, it is generally not IM assessment in this acceptable to replace live items with configuration ? inert items” UN test harmonization → ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.5_Test – 6(b) Stack Test ? 12 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: ❑ UN test for transportation: → Orange book : ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.5_Test – 6(b) Stack Test Individual In the condition they are Total volum must be No volum > 0,15m 3 offered for transport > 0,15m 3 A stack of packaged articles Yes Use several No A stack of unpackaged article acceptors Position resulting in SR between individual products is known Confinement packages filled Use one Yes acceptor with sand, thickness > 1m in every direction Cause the article to function in the design mode Not the same threat for a No Or replace it by another article which can be ! peace time transport and Article provided with their own caused to function with the same effects an in-service situation means of initiation or ignition Use it or use a stimulus Yes having the same effects Configuration for UN test ↔ Configuration for confined IM test? 13 October, 24t h , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (1/3) → configuration: 3 tests ❑ UN test for transportation: → Orange book : ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.5_Test – 6(b) Stack Test Criteria for 1.1 = Explosion of more than one package: IM - Crater > crater of one package Type I - Damage to the witness plate > damage of one package Type II - Blast > blast of one package - Violent disruption of the confinement ~ Type III → Harmonization of: ❖ NATO regulation for IM ❖ with UN regulation for transportation: ▪ Why? For regulation simplification and clarification To save money and time! ▪ How? - Perform UN test with IM instrumentation? - Threats → not the same for a transport in peace time and for an in-service situation! → consequences on the initiation mode 14 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (2/3 ) → Donor initiation mode: Performing a SR test: • Packaged / unpackaged • Storage or tactical configuration • With confinement or without confinement Configuration • Item designed to detonate • Rocket motors and propellant powder Donor • All others initiation mode • Blast pressure • Fragmentation Measure / IM • Other assessment 15 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (2/3) → donor initiation mode: NOT TRUE: → For exemple, IM assessment for SR on smoke and illuminating ammunition is required by customers. ❑ Difficulties: - How to defined a credible threat ? THA? Life cycle analysis? - How to determine the worst case donor reaction ? FMECA? Perform tests? Could be an expensive and endless work! 16 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
STANAG-AOP 4396 – Sympathetic Reaction Performing a SR test (2/3) → donor initiation mode: ❑ ““if designed to detonate, detonate in the design mode” - Is it representative to the worst credible threat? ▪ IM munitions: double security fuze Initiation by the fuze is not a credible case (probability = 10 -9 ) ▪ Credible threat: SCJ, Fragment, Heat and fire Depends on the in-service situation - Worst case donor reaction: Does it produce the worst ▪ Detonation in the design mode Design donor reaction? mode Real fuze ? → cope with double sécurity! o Specific device representative of the fuze ? → define what is o “representative” (IM is hard to initiate) Effects → fragments shape and velocity: not necessarily similar o to effects produced by an initiation with SCJ or fragment impact on the side of the body SCJ initiation 17 October, 24 th , 2019 IMEMG Presentation
Recommend
More recommend
