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Sunspot Equilibrium Karl Shell Cornell University www.karlshell.com Benhabib-Farmer NBER Conference Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Thursday Evening, May 14, 2015 Early History of Sunspots at Penn Dave Cass Karl Shell Costas


  1. Sunspot Equilibrium Karl Shell Cornell University www.karlshell.com Benhabib-Farmer NBER Conference Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Thursday Evening, May 14, 2015

  2. Early History of Sunspots at Penn ◮ Dave Cass ◮ Karl Shell ◮ Costas Azariadis ◮ Roger Farmer ◮ Yves Balasko

  3. Mea Culpa ◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884)

  4. Mea Culpa ◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster

  5. Mea Culpa ◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster ◮ Cass-Shell Sunspots ≡ Extrinsic Randomizing Device

  6. Mea Culpa ◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster ◮ Cass-Shell Sunspots ≡ Extrinsic Randomizing Device ◮ Unfair to extrinsic uncertainty: too cute for central banks Stanley Fischer

  7. Mea Culpa ◮ Totally unfair spoof of Jevons (1884) ◮ Granger, Schuster ◮ Cass-Shell Sunspots ≡ Extrinsic Randomizing Device ◮ Unfair to extrinsic uncertainty: too cute for central banks Stanley Fischer ◮ Excess Volatility (Shiller)

  8. Economy Outcomes Fundamentals Volatility of Outcome Gain = Volatility of Fundamentals + = 0 in SSE

  9. How was SSE received by the profession? ◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math.

  10. How was SSE received by the profession? ◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active government policies. Quantity Theory. REH.

  11. How was SSE received by the profession? ◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active government policies. Quantity Theory. REH. ◮ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural.

  12. How was SSE received by the profession? ◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active government policies. Quantity Theory. REH. ◮ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural. ◮ Some fellow travelers. Used other names such as self-fulfilling prophesies, animal spirits, multiple equilibria, sentiments,... .

  13. How was SSE received by the profession? ◮ Saltwater was non-positive : too much math. ◮ Freshwater was non-positive : SSE might call for active government policies. Quantity Theory. REH. ◮ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural. ◮ Some fellow travelers. Used other names such as self-fulfilling prophesies, animal spirits, multiple equilibria, sentiments,... . ◮ SSE combines ideas from micro, macro, and game theory

  14. What are SSE? ◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily socially rational

  15. What are SSE? ◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily socially rational ◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model ”others”.

  16. What are SSE? ◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily socially rational ◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model ”others”. ◮ Not necessarily public randomizing device

  17. What are SSE? ◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily socially rational ◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model ”others”. ◮ Not necessarily public randomizing device ◮ Rational expectations, but not necessarily co-ordinated on solution to planning problem

  18. What are SSE? ◮ Expectations can be individually rational while not necessarily socially rational ◮ Beliefs about the beliefs of others,... . Best to model ”others”. ◮ Not necessarily public randomizing device ◮ Rational expectations, but not necessarily co-ordinated on solution to planning problem ◮ Not merely randomizations over certainty equilibria (more later)

  19. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations

  20. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles

  21. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation

  22. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets

  23. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition

  24. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information

  25. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies

  26. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility

  27. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility ◮ Political Economy

  28. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility ◮ Political Economy ◮ Winners & Losers from volatility

  29. Economies that generate SSE ◮ Overlapping Generations ◮ Double infinity and bubbles ◮ Restricted participation ◮ Incomplete Financial markets ◮ Imperfect competition ◮ Information frictions, asymmetric information ◮ Non-convex economies ◮ Bank runs, panics, financial fragility ◮ Political Economy ◮ Winners & Losers from volatility ◮ Choice between money taxation and commodity taxation

  30. Money Taxation : Example of Source of SSE ◮ 1 commodity, l = 1, chocolates ◮ 3 guys, h = 1 , 2 , 3 ◮ money taxes τ = ( τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ), dollars ◮ τ 1 + τ 2 + τ 3 = 0, dollars ◮ endowments ω = ( ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 ) > 0, chocolates ◮ allocations x = ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) > 0, chocolates

  31. Certainty Economy ◮ max u h ( x h ) x h = ω h − P m τ h = ˜ s.t. ω h where P m is the chocolate price of money ◮ x 1 + x 2 + x 3 = ω 1 + ω 2 + ω 3 , or ◮ x 1 + x 2 + x 3 = ˜ ω 1 + ˜ ω 2 + ˜ ω 3 ◮ 0 ≤ P m < ¯ P m

  32. Certainty Economy: Example ◮ ω = (20 , 10 , 5) ◮ τ = (5 , 0 , − 5) ◮ 0 ≤ P m < 4 = ¯ P m ◮ Equilibrium: { x = ( x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ R 3 ++ | x 1 = 20 − 5 P m , x 2 = 10 , x 3 = 5 + 5 P m , P m ≥ 0 }

  33. Sunspots Economy ◮ Extrinsic random variable: s ∈ { α, β } , π ( α ) + π ( β ) = 1 ◮ Information: ◮ τ h ( α ) = τ h ( β ) = τ h , incomplete instruments ◮ ω h ( α ) = ω h ( β ) = ω h , extrinsic uncertainty

  34. Sunspots Economy: Example ◮ ω = (20 , 10 , 5) ◮ τ = (5 , 0 , − 5) ◮ u h = log ◮ π ( α ) = 3 / 4 , π ( β ) = 1 / 4 ◮ P m ( α ) = 1 , P m ( β ) = 2 ◮ α is inflationary state, β is deflationary ◮ Mr 1 is taxed. He fears deflation. Mr 3 fears inflation. Mr 2 is a banker. He can only gain from volatility.

  35. Sunspots Economy: Example ◮ ( � ω 1 ( α ) , � ω 1 ( β )) = (15 , 10) ◮ ( � ω 2 ( α ) , � ω 2 ( β )) = (10 , 10) ◮ ( � ω 3 ( α ) , � ω 3 ( β )) = (10 , 15) ◮ � x 3 ( α ) = � ω 3 ( α ) = 10 ◮ � x 3 ( β ) = � ω 3 ( β ) = 15 ◮ Therefore, � x 1 ( α ) + � x 2 ( α ) = 35 − 10 = 25 � x 1 ( β ) + � x 2 ( β ) = 35 − 15 = 20 ◮ TA-EB is a proper rectangle, 25 × 20.

  36. Ta x - A djusted Ed g e w o r t h Bo x β Mr. 2 20 Contract Curve Slope = Slope = 4/5 α ( ) 12 p − = − β ( ) 5 p 1 11 SSE Allocation 2 10 Endowment α Mr. 1 15 25 3 14 8 � � 25 � 20 Ta � � djusted � o � Bo T � E � � � � t �

  37. ◮ Not mere randomization over CE x 2 ( α ) = 105 8 > 10 x 2 ( β ) = 20 − 111 2 = 81 2 < 10 ◮ Mr 2 (”banker”) gains from volatility ◮ Mr 3 (”passive”) loses from volatility ◮ Mr 1 and Mr 2 in aggregate lose ◮ Hence Mr 1 is a loser

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