security and customer experience in self service a brief
play

SECURITY AND CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE IN SELF SERVICE A brief history - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

SECURITY AND CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE IN SELF SERVICE A brief history NCR Confidential - Use and Disclose Solely Pursuant to Company Instructions NCR Confidential NCR Confidential friction Experience = + confusion NCR Confidential NCR


  1. SECURITY AND CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE IN SELF SERVICE

  2. A brief history… NCR – Confidential - Use and Disclose Solely Pursuant to Company Instructions

  3. NCR Confidential

  4. NCR Confidential

  5. friction Experience = + confusion NCR Confidential

  6. NCR Confidential

  7. 1. Enter your account number 2. Enter your TPIN NCR Confidential

  8. NCR Confidential

  9. 1. Insert your card 2. Enter your PIN NCR Confidential

  10. NCR Confidential

  11. NCR Confidential

  12. NCR Confidential

  13. AGAIN… NCR Confidential

  14. AGAIN… What to do? NCR Confidential

  15. 2 Factor Authentication

  16. THE POWER OF PRE- STAGING 20

  17. NCR – Confidential - Use and Disclose Solely Pursuant to Company Instructions

  18. Realized the power of prestaging long ago NCR – Confidential - Use and Disclose Solely Pursuant to Company Instructions

  19. NCR Confidential

  20. Checkin at Home, speed up transaction at airport NCR Confidential

  21. NCR Confidential

  22. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 26

  23. We go from this… 1. Enter your account number 2. Enter your TPIN NCR Confidential

  24. 1. Enter your account number 2. Enter your TPIN My voice is my password NCR Confidential

  25. 1. Enter your account number 2. Enter your TPIN My voice is my password NCR Confidential

  26. We go from this… 1. Insert your card 2. Enter your PIN NCR Confidential

  27. 1. Insert your national ID card 2. Scan your fingerprint NCR Confidential

  28. We go from this… NCR Confidential

  29. experience becomes happiness NCR Confidential

  30. NCR Confidential

  31. 80 The Growth and Geographic Expansion of Logical Attacks since 2013 Requires URGENT Action UKUK 70 Czech Republic Norway India UK UK Dom Ireland Cyprus Black Box Rep 60 Cyprus Peru Russia Online Spain Philippines Italy Mexico Offline Dominican Republic Mexico Network Mexico 50 UK Thailand Czech Republic India Unknown Romania Germany Greece Brazil Sweden Estonia 40 Germany Brazil Italy India Russia Russia Russia Ukraine Total No of attacks USA Ukraine India 30 Poland Russia Russia Germany Brazil India Spain India Mexico 20 Hungary Romania Germ… Jordan Oman Canada Mexico Malaysia Russia Brazil 10 Russia Russia Mexico UK Dominican Republic Mexico Guatemala Mexico Mexico 0 Oct‐12 May‐13 Nov‐13 Jun‐14 Dec‐14 Jul‐15 Jan‐16 Aug‐16 Mar‐17

  32. Logical Attacks responsible for major losses Brazil Malaysia Lost more in 1 day than in Over $19 million lost the previous year Mexico Germany Over $12 million in losses Approximately $200K in in 2013 losses United Kingdom Canada Multiple malware attack Potential losses of $300K attempts made per ATM affected NCR Confidential

  33. Logical Attacks EMERGING NEW LOGICAL THREATS Malware Malware Black in the on the Box Network ATM NCR Confidential 39

  34. Logical Attacks EMERGING NEW LOGICAL THREATS Malware Malware Black in the on the Box Network ATM NCR Confidential 40

  35. Black Box Attacks Criminal gains access to the Top Box of an ATM NCR Confidential

  36. Black Box Attacks Bypasses the ATM’s core Criminal gains access to processor and connects the Top Box of an ATM an electronic device to the cash dispenser NCR Confidential

  37. Black Box Attacks Bypasses the ATM’s core Send unauthorized Criminal gains access to processor and connects commands to dispense the the Top Box of an ATM an electronic device to the cash from the ATM cash dispenser NCR Confidential

  38. Black Box Attacks Encrypted Comms Core to Dispenser Bypasses the ATM’s core UL 437 Locked Cabinets Send unauthorized Criminal gains access to processor and connects commands to dispense the the Top Box of an ATM an electronic device to the cash from the ATM cash dispenser NCR Confidential

  39. Source: http://www.lockwiki.com/index.php/UL_437 NCR Confidential 45

  40. Logical Attacks EMERGING NEW LOGICAL THREATS Malware Malware Black in the on the Box Network ATM NCR Confidential 46

  41. 47

  42. Logical Attacks: Malware in the Network EMERGING NEW LOGICAL THREATS Malware Malware Black TLS Encryption or VPN (end to end encryption of in the on the Box ATM traffic) Network ATM NCR Confidential 48

  43. Logical Attacks EMERGING NEW LOGICAL THREATS Malware Malware Black in the on the Box Network ATM NCR Confidential 49

  44. Logical Attacks ATTACK CATEGORIES – Malware on the ATM ATM Hard Disk ATM Hard Disk Malware on the ATM OFFLINE ONLINE NCR Confidential 50

  45. Logical Attacks ATTACK CATEGORIES – Malware on the ATM ATM Hard Disk ATM Hard Disk Malware on the ATM OFFLINE ONLINE NCR Confidential 51

  46. Lockdown the BIOS, Encrypt Hard Disk NCR Confidential 52

  47. Temkin Group Employee Engagement Benchmark Study, 2017 53

  48. NCR Confidential

  49. Logical Attacks ATTACK CATEGORIES – Malware on the ATM ATM Hard Disk ATM Hard Disk Malware on the ATM OFFLINE ONLINE NCR Confidential 55

  50. 56

  51. WHITELIST 57

  52. Security Requirements Summary to Protect against Logical Attacks 1. Secure your BIOS 9. Implement Rule based access control e.g. • Only allow boot from the primary hard disk • Define different accounts for different user privileges • Editing of BIOS settings must be password protected • Restrict functionality allowed via remote desktop access to ATMs 2. Establish an adequate operational password policy for all 10. Deploy a network authentication based Hard Disk ….passwords ..Encryption Solution • NCR Secure Hard Disk Encryption 3. Implement communications encryption • e.g. NCR Secure TLS Encrypted Communications 11. Ensure there is protected communications to the ...dispenser of the ATM 4. Establish a secure firewall • The ATM firewall must be configured to only allow known authorized 12. Perform a Penetration Test of your ATM production 15 Recommendations incoming and outgoing connections necessary for an ATM ...environment annually environment, the connections must be configured per program rather than per port 13. Use a secure Remote Software Distribution that will 5. Remove unused services and applications ..assist in maintaining the Confidentiality; Integrity and . ..Availability of your ATMs • Removing these from the system help reduce the attack surface area Required to meet rule 7 and allows for timely distribution of • 6. Deploy an effective anti-malware mechanism updated malware signature files if malware is found • NCR Recommends active whitelisting applications: e.g. Solidcore Suite for APTRA 14. Consider the physical environment of ATM deployment • e.g. Through the Wall ATMS may be more suitable for unattended 7. Establish a regular patching process for ALL environments software installed 8. Harden the Operating System e.g. 15. Consult a security enterprise specialist to deploy industry best-practice security controls within your enterprise • Ensure the application runs in a locked down account with minimum privileges required • Disable Auto play

  53. http://response.ncr.com/security-alerts 59

  54. Thank you 60

Recommend


More recommend