scion a secure multipath interdomain routing architecture
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SCION: A Secure Multipath Interdomain Routing Architecture Adrian Perrig Network Security Group, ETH Zrich SCION: Next-generation Internet Architecture Path-aware networking: sender knows packets path Enables geo-fencing


  1. SCION: A Secure Multipath Interdomain Routing Architecture Adrian Perrig Network Security Group, ETH Zürich

  2. SCION: Next-generation Internet Architecture ▪ Path-aware networking: sender knows packet’s path ▪ Enables geo-fencing ▪ Multi-path communication ▪ Caution: use is highly addictive! ▪ Highly available communication ▪ Secure by construction ▪ BGP-free Internet communication ▪ Improved network operation ▪ Higher network utilization ▪ Advanced traffic engineering 2

  3. SCION Architecture Design Goals ▪ High availability, even for networks with malicious parties • Adversary: access to management plane of router • Communication should be available if adversary-free path exists ▪ Secure entity authentication 
 that scales to global heterogeneous (dis)trusted environment ▪ Flexible trust: enable selection of trust roots ▪ Transparent operation: clear what is happening to packets and whom needs to be relied upon for operation ▪ Balanced control among ISPs, senders, and receivers ▪ Scalability, efficiency, flexibility 3

  4. SCION Overview ▪ Control plane: How to find end-to-end paths? ▪ Path exploration ▪ Path registration ▪ Data plane: How to send packets ▪ Path lookup ▪ Path combination ▪ Deployment ▪ Demos 4

  5. Approach for Scalability: Isolation Domain (ISD) ▪ Isolation Domain (ISD): grouping of ASes ▪ ISD core: ASes that manage the ISD ▪ Core AS: AS that is part of ISD core ▪ Control plane is organized hierarchically ▪ Inter-ISD control plane TRC ▪ Intra-ISD control plane TRC TRC TRC TRC 5

  6. Intra-ISD Path Exploration: Beaconing ▪ Core ASes K, L, M initiate Path-segment Construction Beacons (PCBs), or K M L “beacons” ▪ PCBs traverse ISD as a flood P N to reach downstream ASes O ▪ Each AS receives multiple S Q PCBs representing path R segments to a core AS 6

  7. PCB Contents ▪ A PCB contains an info field with: ▪ PCB creation time K M 3 ▪ Each AS on path adds: 2 1 M: L • Info field ▪ AS name • Timestamp • ISD: Blue • Hop field 1 2 ▪ Hop field for data-plane • Out: 1 N P • Expiration, MAC 4 • Signature 3 forwarding O P: • Hop fields • In: 2, Out: 3 ▪ Link identifiers • Peering: 4, Out: 3 • Expiration, MAC • Signature S Q ▪ Expiration time ▪ Message Authentication Code R (MAC) ▪ AS signature 7

  8. Inter-ISD Path Exploration: 
 Sample Core-Path Segments from AS T I J T U A B K M V Y Z W L X C E C’ D N P B’ O A’ F H E’ D’ S Q G R 8

  9. Up-Path Segment Registration ▪ AS selects path segments to announce K M as up-path segments L for local hosts ▪ Up-path segments are P N O registered at local path Path server servers S Q R 9

  10. Down-Path Segment Registration ▪ AS selects path Core segments to announce path server K M as down-path L segments for others to use to communicate P N with AS O ▪ Down-path segments S Q are uploaded to core R path server in core AS 10

  11. Ingress and Egress Interface Identifiers ▪ Each AS assigns a unique integer identifier to each interface that connects to a neighboring AS K M ▪ The interface identifiers identify 1 2 L 3 5 4 ingress/egress links for traversing AS P N ▪ ASes use internal routing protocol to 1 2 3 O 9 4 8 find route from ingress SCION border 5 7 6 router to egress SCION border router S Q ▪ Examples 2 1 R ▪ Yellow path: L:4, O:3,6, R:1 ▪ Orange path: L:5, O:2,6, R:1 11

  12. SCION Overview ▪ Control plane: How to find end-to-end paths? ▪ Path exploration ▪ Path registration ▪ Data plane: How to send packets ▪ Path lookup ▪ Path combination ▪ Deployment ▪ Demos 12

  13. Path Lookup ▪ Steps of a host to obtain path segments ▪ Host contacts RAINS server with a name 
 H → RAINS: www.scion-architecture.net 
 RAINS → H: ISD X, AS Y, local address Z ▪ Host contacts local path server to query path segments 
 H → PS: ISD X, AS Y 
 PS → H: up-path, core-path, down-path segments ▪ Host combines path segments to obtain end-to-end paths, which are added to packets 13

  14. Path Lookup: Local ISD ▪ Client requests path segments to <ISD, AS> from local path server ▪ If down-path segments are not locally K M cached, local path server send request L to core path server ▪ Local path server replies P N ▪ Up-path segments to local ISD core O ASes S ▪ Down-path segments to <ISD, AS> Q ▪ Core-path segments as needed to R connect up-path and down-path segments 14

  15. Path Lookup: Remote ISD ▪ Host contacts local path server requesting <ISD, T U AS> ▪ If path segments are not cached, local path server K M V Y Z will contact core path W L server X ▪ If core path server does N P C’ B’ not have path segments O A’ cached, it will contact remote core path server E’ D’ S Q ▪ Finally, host receives up-, core-, and down-segments R 15

  16. Path Construction ISD core A B C D E source destination up-segment core-segment down-segment (intra-ISD PCB) (core PCB) (intra-ISD PCB) INF INF INF AS C ’s entry AS D ’s entry AS D ’s entry … … … CONTROL PLANE HF HF HF … … … AS B ’s entry AS C ’s entry AS E ’s entry … … … HF HF HF … … … AS A ’s entry … forwarding path HF (in SCION header) … INF HF DATA PLANE HF HF INF HF HF INF HF 16 HF

  17. SCION Overview Summary ▪ Complete re-design of network architecture 
 resolves numerous fundamental problems • BGP protocol convergence issues • Separation of control and data planes • Isolation of mutually untrusted control planes • Path control by senders and receivers • Simpler routers (no forwarding tables) • Root of trust selectable by each ISD ▪ An isolation architecture for the control plane, 
 but a transparency architecture for the data plane. 17

  18. Outline ▪ Control plane: How to find end-to-end paths? ▪ Path exploration ▪ Path registration ▪ Data plane: How to send packets ▪ Path lookup ▪ Path combination ▪ Deployment ▪ Demos 18

  19. Deployment @ ETH SWITCH Swisscom BR BR BR BR ETH Legacy device SCION border router 19

  20. SCION-IP Gateway (SIG) Deployment ISP C BR BR A BR BR FW BR ▪ Communication patterns BR B • A - B: SCION • A - C: IP • B - C: IP Legacy device SCION border router SIG 20

  21. Carrier-grade SIG Supports SCION Devices ISP C BR BR A BR BR FW POP ▪ Communication patterns AR B • A - B: SCION (SIG - CG-SIG) • Private address 
 • A - C: IP (SIG) space network 
 Legacy device (not publicly routed) • B - C: IP (CG-SIG) SCION border router • Not SCION aware SIG Carrier-grade SIG 21

  22. How to make this work? ▪ SIG handles legacy IP traffic ▪ If destination is reachable through SCION, encapsulate IP packet and send it to remote SIG over SCION network ▪ Otherwise, send packet through IP ▪ Carrier-Grade SIG (CG-SIG) handles all traffic to destination ▪ NAT for destination network ▪ Destination is not publicly reachable — DDoS defense ▪ Destination does not need to establish an AS 22

  23. SCIONLab SCION Network SCION AS SCIONLab AS Core link Peering link SCIONLab User 23 Prov.-Cust. link

  24. Global SCIONLab Network ▪ https://www.scionlab.org ▪ Collaboration with David Hausheer @ Uni Magdeburg 24

  25. Use Case: Internet Backup through SCIONLab 25

  26. Commercial SCION Network ▪ Deutsche Telekom, Swisscom, SWITCH, Init7 offer SCION connections (as test) on a commercial SCION network ▪ Several banks and Swiss government are running trial deployments • One large bank has been running production traffic over SCION since August 2017 26

  27. How to obtain a SCION Connection? ▪ Individual: SCIONLab https://www.scionlab.org • SCION AS running on VM within 10 minutes ▪ University, research lab • SWITCH, DFN can (soon) provide SCION connections • David Hausheer @ Uni Magdeburg has set up SCION VMs at GEANT <hausheer@ovgu.de> ▪ Corporation, Government entity • Swisscom • Deutsche Telecom <markus.seipel@telekom.de> 27

  28. Conclusions ▪ It is possible to evolve Layer 3: SCION is a secure Internet architecture that we can use today ▪ Strong properties for high-availability communication • Multipath routing architecture offers multitude of path choices for meaningful diverse path selection • For some cases, lower latency than in today’s Internet • Fast failover providing business continuity • Prevention of routing attacks • Built-in DDoS defense mechanisms 28

  29. SCION Commercialization ▪ Founded Anapaya Systems in June 2017 ▪ 4 founders: David Basin, Sam Hitz (CEO), Peter Müller, Adrian Perrig ▪ Several banks and ISPs are customers ▪ https://www.anapaya.net

  30. Online Resources ▪ https://www.scion-architecture.net ▪ Book ▪ Papers ▪ Videos ▪ Tutorials ▪ Newsletter signup ▪ https://www.scionlab.org ▪ SCIONLab testbed infrastructure ▪ https://www.anapaya.net ▪ SCION commercialization ▪ https://github.com/scionproto/scion ▪ Source code 30

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