Polycentric Organization: A Fundamental Requisite for Solving Urban - PDF document

Polycentric Organization: A Fundamental Requisite for Solving Urban Problems Agus Dharma Agus Dharma Fakultas Teknik Sipil dan Perencanaan Fakultas Teknik Sipil dan Perencanaan Universitas Gunadarma Universitas Gunadarma email : agus_dh@staff.gunadarma.ac.id email : agus_dh@staff.gunadarma.ac.id website : staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh/ website : staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh/ staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 1

What is the Puzzle? � How to provide and produce local collective goods in urban areas of developing countries efficiently and equitably staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 2

What are Local Collective Goods? � Local public goods � Difficult to exclude beneficiaries � Consumption is not subtractable � Example: Public safety � Local common-pool resources � Difficult to exclude beneficiaries � Consumption is subtractable � Example: Water supply staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 3

What is the Challenge? � Potential for free-riding due to difficulty of exclusion � Potential for overuse due to subtractability � Competitive markets fail to solve problems of free- riding and overuse of local collective goods staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 4

When Competitive Markets Fail, What Can Be Done? � The Top-Down View – create very large urban governments � Basis for massive reforms of U.S. urban areas in 20 th century � Basis for African post-independence urban development strategies � The Polycentric View – a system of large and small, public and private agencies perform more effectively � Basis for recent U.S. reforms � Basis for improving urban services in developing countries staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 5

Assumptions of the Top-Down View � Collective goods are homogeneous � Substantial economies of scale � Urban voters have similar preferences � Voting aggregates preferences well � Elected officials command public bureaus to produce desired goods � Bureau chiefs command street-level bureaucrats to deliver goods and services � Street-level bureaucrats deliver services to passive clients staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 6

Additional Assumptions of the Top-Down View in Developing Countries � Government must control provision and production of public goods � Regular citizens have limited capacities to solve problems of collective action � People as subjects to be cared for by national government or claimants to demand public goods staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 7

Assumptions of Polycentric Theory � Urban collective goods vary substantially in production and consumption characteristics � Major economies of scale do exist for some goods, but not for all � Road networks vs education or policing � Coproduction essential to enhance production of education, police, and other services staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 8

Assumptions of Polycentricity (cont.) � Urban voters have a wide diversity of preferences � Individuals with similar, but evolving, preferences tend to cluster in neighborhoods � Preferences within neighborhoods are more homogeneous than across neighborhoods staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 9

Assumptions of Polycentricity (cont.) � Aggregating citizen preferences is always problematic � Voting systems may produce unstable outcomes when preferences are heterogeneous � Decisions within smaller jurisdictions related to neighborhood goods and services reduce heterogeneities � Need face-to-face mechanisms to supplement voting staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 10

Assumptions of Polycentricity (cont.) � Presence of many potential producers of local collective goods � More information to citizens and public officials � Provides an exit mode if voice is not sufficient � Elements of competition enhance efficiency and innovation staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 11

Polycentric Assumptions Particularly Relevant to Developing Countries � Existence of other centers of authority in addition to national government � National government cannot and should not strive to provide all public goods � For many countries, constitutional-level reform required � Individuals need to have legal standing � local communities need to have limited constitutional authority staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 12

What are Public Economies? � Collective consumption units (local governments, larger governmental units, neighborhood associations, other voluntary associations) � Production units (governments as well as private organizations) � Relationships between them � Larger collective consumption units with smaller producers � Smaller collective consumption units with larger producers � Collective consumption units and provision units of the same size staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 13

Urban Public Economies in U.S. � Police – increased efficiency and better service to poor neighborhoods in urban areas with complex public economies � Education – smaller schools are more effective and efficient � Coproduction of safety, education, health is greater in smaller units nested in a larger urban area staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 14

Let’s Learn from Past Errors! � Many citizens in the U.S. now receive lower performance from their “reformed” urban government than prior to the massive reforms based on unvalidated theory staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 15

Learning from Past Errors in Developing Countries � Monocentric government most often turns predatory � Rent-seeking is encouraged � Predatory governments often become repressive staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 16

Learning From the Past (cont.) � The monocentric “developmental state” is not the answer: � Benevolent government may provide many basic needs, but citizens/local communities may not be empowered � Participation through national elections essential but inadequate as means of empowerment � Not all forms of “decentralization” provide public goods equitably and efficiently and promote the empowerment of local people (local boss rule does occur) staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 17

Critical Considerations When Providing Public Goods � Nature of goods strongly affect performance of institutional arrangements for provision and production of goods � Biophysical and social conditions of community need to be considered in crafting institutional arrangements � Rules to be effective must be agreed and known (these may or may not be the same as rules on the books) staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 18

Essential Principles that Shape Successful Urban Collective Action � Established boundaries � Cost/benefit proportionality � Participation in collective choices � Monitoring � Graduated sanctions � Conflict-resolution mechanisms � Some autonomy at local level � Rules governing nested relationships with central government and external authorities staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 19

Providing Public Goods in Urban Areas: Examples from Developing Countries � Shack/Slum Dwellers Federation of India � Solidarity and Urban Poor Federation of Cambodia � Community-based organizations in Mexico City (San Miguel Teotongo, Cananea, Sierra Nevada) � Homeless People’s Federation of Philippines staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 20

Providing Public Goods in Local Communities: Examples from Africa (Niger Delta, Nigeria) � Gbogbara Development Association (Rivers State) � BunuTai Community Associations � Gio-Kpoghor and Ogu Communities Association � Ilaje Development Association staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 21

Gbogbara Development Association (Rivers State, Nigeria) Community of about 20,000 � Provided pipe borne water project through � CBO � Goal of establishing 100 mono pumps over 10 year period (1994-2004) � Completed 55 by 1999 � Community contributed 85 per cent funding � Local government contributed 15 per cent Maternity home project � � Local women organizations initiated as 3 year project � Project cost N5 million � Community raised 63 per cent funding (with largest contributions from women, youth) � Local government contribution of 37 per cent funding staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 22

Bunu Tai Community Development Associations � Association of 5 community development associations (embracing population of 25,000) � Undertook bridge construction project as 4 year project (connecting communities to fishing ports and farm settlements) � Raised N12 million � 92 per cent contributed by communities � 8 per cent by local government staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 23

Gio-Kpoghor and Ogu Communities � 2 Communities of 12,000 � Commercial center of Tai local government but without market stalls and shed � Completed first phase of community market project over 3 years (1998-2000) at N5 million � Communities contributed 89 per cent � Local government 11 per cent staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 24

Ilaje Development Association (Ondo State) � Ilaje a war ravaged community � Form Gwama Cooperative Society to lead post conflict reconstruction � Post-conflict reconstruction activities include: � Scholarship program � Micro-credit to youthful fishermen � Established mass transport business staffsite.gunadarma.ac.id/agus_dh 25