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Ohio Tax The Power to Tax: Constitutional Issues with the Ohio CAT - PDF document

Dec 18, 2023 •246 likes •2.05k views

26th Annual Tuesday & Wednesday, January 2425, 2017 Hya Regency Columbus, Columbus, Ohio Workshop QQ Ohio Tax The Power to Tax: Constitutional Issues with the Ohio CAT in a Global & Digital Economy Wednesday, January 25, 2017

  1. Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa • 5‐2 Majority Opinion Upholds the CAT • No physical presence required to impose CAT – Quill is limited to sales and use taxes – Pre‐ Complete Auto interstate‐commerce immunity case law inapplicable – No distinction between gross receipts and income taxes for Commerce Clause purposes • $500k sales‐receipts threshold per se complies with “substantial nexus” requirement – Burden on interstate commerce not “clearly excessive” – Legitimate state interest to “evenhandedly” tax in‐state and out‐of‐state sellers

  2. Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa • Dissenting Opinion (J. Kennedy) • Physical presence standard applies to business privilege taxes such at the CAT – Hypothetical: One sale could exceed $500k Ohio taxable gross receipts threshold • Court should remand to Ohio Board of Tax Appeals to determine whether internet retailers had a physical presence in Ohio

  3. Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa • Potential Issues on Appeal to SCOTUS – “Economic Nexus” Issue • Does $500k gross receipts threshold satisfy substantial nexus in all instances? – Does physical presence standard apply to business privilege taxes? – Is Norton Co. v. Dept. of Rev. , 340 U.S. 534 (1951) still good law? See also, Avnet (WA) • Factual Findings Lacking for an Appeal

  4. Due Process • Qualitative Due Process Test. Int’l Shoe v. Wash. , 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) • “It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative .” • “Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”

  5. Potential Congressional Acts  Update P.L. 86‐272  Beyond sales of tangible personal property  Beyond net income taxes to gross receipts taxes  H.R. 2584 includes other measures  14‐day presence test  Eliminate combined reporting “loophole”: may not include an entity’s sales in sales factor if no “substantial nexus” with taxing state  Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015  Would grant states authority to require remote sellers to collect sales/use tax

  6. Substantial Nexus Standard? • Assuming Congress does not act, have we identified the “substantial nexus” standard, or test, for business privilege taxes? • “Establish and maintain a market in the State” – Ohio Supreme Court in Crutchfield rejects this language from Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Wash. Dept. of Rev. , 483 U.S. 232 (1987) – Washington Supreme Court in Avnet cites Tyler Pipe to put burden on taxpayer to show instate sales office would not provide any post‐shipment services • Avnet v. Wash. Dept. of Rev. , 384 P.3d 571 (Wa. 2016)

  7. Substantial Nexus Standard? • Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test typically applicable to police power regulations, not state taxes • Ohio Sup. Ct. analyzed $500,000 threshold for substantial nexus through Pike’s balancing test – “Burden imposed on interstate commerce clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”

  8. Computerized Technology and Substantial Nexus • Are Internet Retailers Similarly Situated to the Direct Mail Industry? – Computerized technology may distinguish • Three States Say “No”; Reject Quill – South Dakota; SB 106 (2016), eff. May 1, 2016 – Alabama; Ala. Admin. Code 810‐6‐2‐90.03, eff. Jan. 1, 2016 – Tennessee; Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320‐05‐01.129 • Notice & Reporting Laws: CO, LA, OK, VT – DMA v. Brohl , 814 F.3d 1129 (10 th Cir. 2016), cert denied to SCOTUS on Dec. 12, 2016

  9. Implications for Sales/Use Tax • May computerized technology establish physical presence? – The Court in Crutchfield found it unnecessary to address whether the internet retailers in the cases had a physical presence in Ohio • “Canned application software” is tangible personal property under Ohio law – Andrew Jergens Co. v. Wilkins , 109 Ohio St.3d 396 (2006); O.R.C. 5739.01(YY) – Canned software “always stored on a tangible medium that has physical existence”

  10. How The Web Works  Conversation between user’s computer and webserver, and server of websites user visits  HTTP protocol is the language and the user’s IP address tells website where to send content requested to view website

  11. How The Web Works • The user’s computer downloads software code from website’s server and assembles the content to generate the website – Content is stored on user’s computer as “cache” • Third party servers – Website servers may instruct user’s to download content not only from their server but from other third party servers – Crutchfield’s website directed users to download content from servers in Ohio that a third party company called Akamai hosted

  12. How The Web Works • IP addresses identify geographical location but not more specific info and only short‐term • Cookies may be used to track users for longer periods – Text files usually stored on user’s hard drive – 1 st Party and 3 rd Party Cookies • Mobile Devices – Mobile apps work like websites, tracking users and storing software content on user’s devices

  13. Internet Marketing • Do efforts to “establish and maintain a market in the State” create substantial nexus? – Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Wash. Dept. of Rev. , 483 U.S. 232 (1987) • Web Analytics – Continuous and systemic gathering of computer data to analyze behavioral patterns • Retargeting & Behavioral Advertising – Tracking users on the web to gather data on the user and “re‐present” products or services • Customized Email

  14. Agency and Affiliate Nexus • In‐state sales agents create substantial nexus even if no in‐ state employees or facilities – Scripto, Inc. v. Carson , 362 U.S. 207 (1960) – Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Wash. Dept. of Rev. , 483 U.S. 232 (1987) • But in‐state solicitation of sales not necessary to create nexus – National Geographic v. Bd. of Equal. , 430 U.S. 551 (1977) – Avnet v. Wash. Dept. of Rev. , 384 P.3d 571 (Wa. 2016) • Thus, Other Considerations for Internet Retailers – In‐state sales representatives – In‐state installation, warranty, and/or service providers – In‐state third party webservers, e.g. Akamai

  15. Affiliate Nexus: State cases • Overstock.com, Inc. v. NY Dept. of Tax. and Finance, 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013) – New York: sales and use tax are facially constitutional where nexus established due to in‐state independent contractor posting links to remote seller’s website on its own website and earning commission for clicks, i.e. “click‐through” nexus • Barnesandnoble.com cases 303 P.3d 824 (N.M. 2013); see also CA, LA – New Mexico: in‐state activity on behalf of related member (brother‐sister entity) establishes nexus for purposes of New Mexico gross receipts tax • Intangible Holding Company Cases – Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm. , 437 S.E. 2d 13 (S.C. 1993) • South Carolina: income tax imposed on in‐state parent’s wholly owned intangible holding company satisfies Due Process and Commerce Clause due to licensing of trade name or trademark used in‐state – Scioto Ins. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012) – KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue , 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010) • Iowa: income tax imposed on intangible holding company leasing trademark to franchisees used in in‐state fast food business satisfies Commerce Clause – Griffith v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 2012) • West Virginia: income tax imposed on in‐state parent’s wholly‐owned out‐of‐state licensor violates Due Process and Commerce Clause – Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc., 87 A.3d 1263 (Md. Ct. App. 2014) • Maryland: income tax imposed on in‐state parent’s wholly‐owned intangible holding company establishes nexus to impose income tax

  16. Questions? • David Ebersole, Esq. – McDonald Hopkins, LLC – Phone: (614) 484‐0716 – Email: debersole@mcdonaldhopkins.com • Fred Nicely, Esq. – Senior Tax Counsel, Council on State Taxation – Phone: (202) 484‐5213 – Email: fnicely@cost.org • Christine Mesirow, Esq. – Section Chief, Taxation Section, Ohio Attorney General – Phone: (614) 466‐5967 – Christine.Mesirow@OhioAttorneyGeneral.gov

  17. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7760.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. S LIP O PINION N O . 2016-O HIO -7760 C RUTCHFIELD C ORPORATION , A PPELLANT AND C ROSS -A PPELLEE , v. T ESTA , T AX C OMMR ., A PPELLEE AND C ROSS -A PPELLANT . [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7760.] Taxation—Commercial-activity tax (“CAT”)—Physical presence is not necessary condition for imposing CAT because CAT’s $500,000 sales-receipts threshold is adequate quantitative standard that ensures that taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio is substantial—Burdens imposed by CAT on interstate commerce are not clearly excessive in relation to Ohio’s legitimate interest in imposing CAT evenhandedly on sales receipts of in-state and out-of-state sellers—Board of Tax Appeals’ decision affirming CAT assessments against appellant affirmed. (No. 2015-0386—Submitted May 3, 2016—Decided November 17, 2016.) A PPEAL and C ROSS -A PPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2012-926, 2012-3068, and 2013-2021. ____________________

  18. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO O’N EILL , J. {¶ 1} Appellant and cross-appellee, Crutchfield Corporation, appeals from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (“CAT”) on revenue it has earned from sales of electronic products that it ships into the state of Ohio. Crutchfield is based outside Ohio, employs no personnel in Ohio, and maintains no facilities in Ohio. The business Crutchfield does in this state consists solely of shipping goods from outside the state to its consumers in Ohio using the United States Postal Service or common-carrier delivery services. In this appeal, Crutchfield contests the issuance of CAT assessments against it, arguing that Ohio may not impose a tax on the gross receipts associated with its sales to Ohio consumers because Crutchfield lacks a “substantial nexus” with Ohio. Crutchfield argues that a substantial nexus within a state is a necessary prerequisite to imposing the tax under the federal dormant Commerce Clause. Further, citing case law interpreting this substantial-nexus requirement, Crutchfield argues that its nexus to Ohio is not sufficiently substantial because it lacks a “physical presence” in Ohio—i.e., property in the state or agents or employees acting in the state in connection with its sales. {¶ 2} Appellee and cross-appellant, the tax commissioner, advances a two- prong defense. First, he argues that the Commerce Clause case law does not impose a physical-presence requirement and that as a result, the $500,000 sales- receipts threshold set forth in the Ohio CAT statute satisfies the Commerce Clause requirement of a substantial nexus. Second, even if the Commerce Clause does impose a physical-presence requirement, the tax commissioner argues, Crutchfield’s computerized connections with Ohio consumers involve the presence of tangible personal property owned either by Crutchfield or by contractors acting specifically on Crutchfield’s behalf and the presence of that property on computers located in Ohio constitutes physical presence in this state. 2

  19. January Term, 2016 {¶ 3} We agree with the first prong of the tax commissioner’s argument, and we therefore do not address the second one. Our reading of the case law indicates that the physical-presence requirement recognized and preserved by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of use-tax collection does not extend to business-privilege taxes such as the CAT. We further conclude that the statutory threshold of $500,000 of Ohio sales constitutes a sufficient guarantee of the substantiality of an Ohio nexus for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. We therefore affirm the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) and the assessments issued by the tax commissioner against Crutchfield. The CAT’s Statutory Bright-Line-Presence Standard {¶ 4} The CAT is imposed under R.C. 5751.02(A), which levies “a commercial activity tax on each person with taxable gross receipts for the privilege of doing business in this state.” To determine what constitutes “taxable gross receipts,” we look to R.C. 5751.01(G), which defines them as “gross receipts sitused to this state under section 5751.033 of the Revised Code.” In the case of sales of tangible personal property like those made by Crutchfield, R.C. 5751.033(E) informs us that the sales are “sitused to this state if the property is received in this state by the purchaser.” The statute specifies that when property is delivered “by motor carrier or by other means of transportation, the place at which such property is ultimately received after all transportation has been completed shall be considered the place where the purchaser receives the property.” Id. It is the tax commissioner’s position that by filling orders initiated on computers in Ohio and arranging for its products to be transported into Ohio, the receipts from Crutchfield’s sales qualify as “taxable gross receipts” under this provision. {¶ 5} Next, we turn back to the imposition of the CAT under R.C. 5751.02(A) on the “privilege of doing business.” The statute defines “doing business” as “engaging in any activity, whether legal or illegal, that is conducted 3

  20. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO for, or results in, gain, profit, or income, at any time during a calendar year.” Specifically, the statute states that the CAT is imposed on “persons with substantial nexus with this state,” id. , a phrase defined at R.C. 5751.01(H)(3) to include persons having a “bright-line presence in this state.” R.C. 5751.01(I)(3) includes within the bright line of taxability those persons having “during the calendar year taxable gross receipts of at least five hundred thousand dollars.” {¶ 6} There are other statutory bases for imposing the CAT, but the bright- line standard of receipts from sales into the state that amount to $500,000 per calendar year is the one that is relevant in this appeal. We refer to this basis for imposing the CAT as the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold in this opinion. Factual Background {¶ 7} This is an appeal from a decision issued by the BTA on February 26, 2015, in consolidated case Nos. 2012-926, 2012-3068, and 2013-2021. The three BTA cases were appeals from three separate final determinations of the tax commissioner:  In BTA case No. 2012-926, the tax commissioner issued 19 assessments covering audit periods that extended from July 1, 2005 (the inception of the CAT) to June 30, 2010. The assessments amounted to $65,689 in tax, $5,659.94 in preassessment interest, and $37,128.23 in penalties, for a total assessed amount of $106,239.43.  In BTA case No. 2012-3068, the tax commissioner issued five assessments for five quarterly periods beginning July 2010 and ending September 2011. The assessments were based on estimated tax amounts of $10,000 per period; the total amount assessed with interest and penalties was $60,988.50.  In BTA case No. 2013-2021, the commissioner issued assessments for the last quarter of 2011 and the first two quarters of 2012 based on estimated tax amounts of $10,000 per quarter. The assessments consisted of tax plus interest and penalties for a total amount of $39,703.01. 4

  21. January Term, 2016 {¶ 8} In each instance, Crutchfield contested the original assessments, advancing statutory and constitutional challenges. The tax commissioner issued three final determinations covering all the assessments. {¶ 9} The final determinations are substantially the same. Each final determination notes that Crutchfield is “a corporation based in Virginia,” that it functions as “a direct marketer that sells consumer electronics through the Internet from locations entirely outside of Ohio,” and that it “ships its merchandise via the U.S. Mail or using common carriers.” The final determinations rejected Crutchfield’s objections on the grounds that the taxpayer “has ‘substantial nexus with this state,’ as that phrase is defined in R.C. 5751.01(H),” inasmuch as Crutchfield “satisfies the third and/or fourth conditions in that division, and therefore is a person on whom the tax is levied.” 1 {¶ 10} Next, the final determinations found that Crutchfield “sells consumer goods through orders received via the Internet and telephone orders,” noting that Crutchfield “admits that it has customers in Ohio to which it sells and ships these goods.” After further discussion of the relevant statutory provisions, the final determinations state that Crutchfield’s “overriding assertion is that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution precludes the State of Ohio from subjecting it to the commercial activity tax” and that Crutchfield maintains that “the nexus required is a ‘physical presence’ in the taxing state, which it alleges it did not have during the assessed periods.” {¶ 11} In all three cases, the tax commissioner found that Crutchfield had “more than $500,000 in sales to customers in Ohio” and that Crutchfield “failed to file and pay the commercial activity tax.” The commissioner made no factual 1 The “third condition,” R.C. 5751.01(H)(3), refers to the bright-line-presence provision at division (I) of the section, which imposes the tax given $500,000 in sales receipts; the “fourth condition” is a catchall at R.C. 5751.01(H)(4) that applies when a taxpayer “[o]therwise has nexus with this state to an extent that the person can be required to remit the tax imposed under this chapter under the Constitution of the United States.” 5

  22. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO finding regarding physical presence but instead noted that he lacked authority to “adjudicate the constitutionality of th[e] statutes.” At the BTA, Crutchfield stipulated that it did “not contest the amounts of estimated Ohio Commercial Activity Tax set forth on the assessments” while reasserting that it was immune from the tax. Proceedings at the BTA {¶ 12} At the BTA, Crutchfield offered the testimony of two company employees, its senior vice president of finance and its director of Internet marketing. The former testified concerning the company’s active intent to avoid nexus anywhere but in its home state of Virginia. The latter testified concerning the general character of Crutchfield’s Internet marketing efforts, with the thrust being that no specific effort was targeted at Ohio. {¶ 13} With respect to the constitutional issues, the parties offered expert opinions concerning Crutchfield’s promotion of its products and filling orders in conjunction with its customers’ use of computers in Ohio. The tax commissioner offered written reports of two marketing experts, Ashkan Soltani and Joseph Turow, while Crutchfield offered the written report of its own marketing expert, Eric Goldman. The conflicting expert opinions addressed the tax commissioner’s theory that interstate sales through the Internet involved “physical presence” because of the physical realities of online transactions. Crutchfield’s Arguments and the BTA’s Decision {¶ 14} Before the BTA, Crutchfield argued that its “gross receipts * * * cannot be taxed consistent with the Constitution,” inasmuch as Crutchfield “lacks the in-state business activity required by the Commerce Clause.” Crutchfield also argued that “[i]n addition to violating the Constitution,” the assessments against 6

  23. January Term, 2016 Crutchfield violated the provision of the CAT statute that excluded receipts when the tax could not constitutionally be applied. 2 {¶ 15} In its decision, the BTA rejected Crutchfield’s reading of the statutory provisions by relying on the plain meaning of the bright-line $500,000 sales-receipts threshold and citing its earlier resolution of the issue in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Levin , BTA No. 2010-2853, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 1539 (Mar. 6, 2014). BTA Nos. 2012-926, 2012-3068, and 2013-2021, 2015 WL 1048564 or 1048699, *4 (Feb. 26, 2015). As for Crutchfield’s constitutional challenge, the board noted that it lacked jurisdiction to decline to apply statutes on constitutional grounds. Id. at *3. The BTA therefore affirmed the assessments issued by the tax commissioner. Standard of Review {¶ 16} This appeal presents questions of statutory construction and the constitutional validity of applying the CAT statute. These constitute legal questions, which we decide de novo without deference, Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision , 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10. As for entertaining the Commerce Clause challenge to the application of the CAT statute, “the BTA receives evidence at its hearing, but we determine the facts necessary to resolve the constitutional question.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach , 68 Ohio St.3d 195, 198, 625 N.E.2d 597 (1994). Crutchfield Properly Raised its Constitutional Challenge to the CAT Assessments {¶ 17} In his cross-appeal, the tax commissioner renews an argument that we already rejected when we denied the commissioner’s motion to dismiss. See 2 Crutchfield’s BTA brief quoted former R.C. 5751.01(F)(2)(jj) (now (F)(2)(ll)), which excludes from the statutory definition of “gross receipts” “[a]ny receipts for which the tax imposed by this chapter is prohibited by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution of this state.” 7

  24. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO 143 Ohio St.3d 1414, 2015-Ohio-2911, 34 N.E.3d 928. Namely, the commissioner contends that “Crutchfield has failed to impart jurisdiction on the BTA, and therefore derivatively on this Court, to consider its as-applied constitutional challenges.” While the tax commissioner is correct that a failure to specify an as-applied challenge in the notice of appeal to the BTA would bar that kind of relief, the commissioner is wrong about the content of the notices of appeal that Crutchfield filed at the BTA. Each notice of appeal states in the sixth assignment of error that “[a]pplication of the CAT to Crutchfield would violate the Company’s rights under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.” The notices of appeal also state that “Crutchfield is protected from imposition of the Commercial Activity Tax (‘CAT’) under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution” and that “[a]s it applies to gross receipts taxes like the CAT, the [Supreme] Court has made clear that the physical presence standard is only satisfied through in-state activities by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer that are significantly associated with its ability to establish and maintain a market in the state.” {¶ 18} Taken together, these assertions adequately specify the constitutional error. We do not recognize any significance to the distinction between a facial or as-applied challenge in the present context; we find that the notices of appeal suffice to place both theories at issue, inasmuch as any facial challenge under the Commerce Clause nexus standard would necessarily have to demonstrate that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to Crutchfield itself; that would be a necessary predicate for showing that the statute is unconstitutional in all its applications. See Harrold v. Collier , 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37 (“A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult to bring successfully because the challenger must establish that there exists no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid”). 8

  25. January Term, 2016 The CAT Statute Manifests Clear Legislative Intent to Impose the CAT Based on the $500,000 Sales-Receipts Threshold {¶ 19} Crutchfield argues that the CAT statute may be construed and applied to avoid the constitutional infirmity that it raises here, but these arguments do not withstand close scrutiny. {¶ 20} First, Crutchfield argues that this court should strictly construe “doing business” under R.C. 5751.02(A) to avoid the constitutional infirmity, by holding that Crutchfield’s lack of physical presence means that it was not “doing business” in Ohio. But “doing business” is defined in R.C. 5751.02(A) solely for the purpose of establishing that “privilege of doing business,” the incidence of the tax, broadly includes profit-seeking activities. Interpreting the term “doing business” to exclude situations in which there is no physical presence simply would not be consistent with the broad intent reflected in the language of the provision. {¶ 21} Moreover, after defining “doing business,” R.C. 5751.02(A) proceeds to explicitly impose the tax on “persons with substantial nexus,” which includes, under R.C. 5751.01(I)(3), those persons who satisfy the $500,000 sales- receipts threshold. Thus, far from avoiding the constitutional infirmity, the “doing business” language of R.C. 5751.02(A) invites the constitutional challenge to be considered on its own terms. {¶ 22} Crutchfield asserts that the tax commissioner’s interpretation of R.C. 5751.02(A) “read[s] out of the statute [its] primary, in-state activities requirement.” But the statute speaks of taxing “the privilege of doing business in this state” without stating an “in-state activities requirement,” much less any reference to the additional requirement of physical presence within the state. Nor is there any ambiguity to be interpreted in Crutchfield’s favor in this section; the reference to a “physical presence” requirement is unambiguously absent, and the 9

  26. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO insistence that the tax is imposed on persons based on the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold is unambiguously incorporated by reference. {¶ 23} Second, Crutchfield contends that former R.C. 5751.01(F)(2)(jj) (now (F)(2)(ll)) should be construed to preempt imposition of the CAT based on the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold. That provision states that “ ‘[g]ross receipts’ excludes * * * [a]ny receipts for which the tax imposed by this chapter is prohibited by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution of this state.” According to Crutchfield, the “only reasonable interpretation of the exclusion is that the General Assembly wished to avoid conflict with all limitations on the State’s authority to impose a tax measured by gross receipts, including restrictions arising under the substantial nexus requirement of the dormant Commerce Clause.” {¶ 24} We disagree. The proposed interpretation is irreconcilable with the insistence in R.C. 5751.02(A) that the “[p]ersons on which the commercial activity tax is levied include, but are not limited to , persons with substantial nexus with this state.” (Emphasis added.) This language invokes by reference the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold for imposing the tax as part of the definition of “substantial nexus with this state” under R.C. 5751.01(H), but the language then proceeds to express legislative intent that the tax not even be bound by that expansive definition . This cannot be squared with attributing to the legislature an intent to acquiesce in the substantial-nexus/physical-presence test that Crutchfield advocates here. {¶ 25} Moreover, R.C. 5751.01(F)(2)(ll) excludes receipts from the “gross receipts” definition; it does not create an exception to the statute’s substantial- nexus definition . The exclusion requires the tax commissioner to disregard any receipts that by their character, or the character of the taxpayer itself , are immune or exempt from state taxation as a matter of federal constitutional or statutory law. See NLO, Inc. v. Limbach , 66 Ohio St.3d 389, 394, 613 N.E.2d 193 (1993) (“The 10

  27. January Term, 2016 federal Supremacy Clause, Clause 2, Article VI, United States Constitution, prevents the state from taxing the federal government and its instrumentalities”). Under the statute’s definition of “[e]xcluded person,” R.C. 5751.01(E), “the state and its agencies, instrumentalities, or political subdivisions” are not subject to the CAT, R.C. 5751.01(E)(8), but the definition makes no mention of the federal government and its instrumentalities. As a result, it is the gross-receipts exclusion at R.C. 5751.01(F)(2)(ll) that removes the federal government and its instrumentalities from the operation of the CAT. It is unnecessary to find additional legislative purposes for the provision. {¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Crutchfield’s statutory challenges to the CAT assessments. “Substantial Nexus” Does Not Require a Taxable “Local Incident” {¶ 27} Our analysis of this appeal under the Commerce Clause begins with a “before and after” view of the case law. The pivot point is Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), which altered how the dormant Commerce Clause interacts with a state’s taxing powers. {¶ 28} Before Complete Auto , we characterized the United States Supreme Court case law as “enigmatic,” embodying “[a]t the opposite ends of the conceptual spectrum * * * two competing * * * propositions that (1) a state may not levy a tax for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce * * * and (2) interstate commerce must pay its way in relation to the immediate benefits and protections afforded it by the state.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Porterfield , 28 Ohio St.2d 97, 102, 276 N.E.2d 629 (1971). Whatever other effect it had, Complete Auto abolished the first of these two principles by embracing the doctrine of those cases in which the high court had “rejected the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from state taxation.” Complete Auto at 288. {¶ 29} In place of the old conceptual framework, the high court articulated the now familiar four-prong test, under which a state tax is valid if is “applied to 11

  28. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Id. at 279. It is, of course, the requirement of a substantial nexus that is at issue in this appeal. {¶ 30} The main flaw in Crutchfield’s argument lies in its reliance on case law that embodies the since-discarded theory of interstate-commerce immunity from state taxation. Namely, Crutchfield cites cases in which a taxable “local incident” was required as a predicate for state taxation, because the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce was regarded as immune from state taxation. See also Freeman v. Hewit , 329 U.S. 249, 252, 254, 67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265 (1946) (“by its own force,” the dormant Commerce Clause “created an area of trade free from interference by the States,” with the result that the Commerce Clause barred “a levy upon the very process of commerce across State lines”); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor , 340 U.S. 602, 608, 71 S.Ct. 508, 95 L.Ed. 573 (1951) (invalidating tax that was “placed unequivocally upon the corporation’s franchise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transportation in the state”). Crutchfield then equates the taxable “local incident” required in earlier cases with “substantial nexus” under Complete Auto . {¶ 31} Crutchfield relies in particular on Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue , 340 U.S. 534, 71 S.Ct. 377, 95 L.Ed. 517 (1951). In Norton , a Massachusetts manufacturer had a Chicago office through which it made sales in Illinois; it separately engaged in a purely mail-order business in which in-state customers mailed an order to Massachusetts that was then filled by mailing the ordered items back to Illinois. Illinois assessed a retail-business tax measured by gross receipts against the manufacturer, which protested that it was engaged in interstate commerce. The manufacturer’s argument was rejected in state court. {¶ 32} On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the state statute exempted “ ‘business in interstate commerce’ as required by the Constitution.” Id. at 535- 12

  29. January Term, 2016 536. The court vacated the state court judgment and remanded the cause to distinguish those transactions involving purely mail-order business; once identified, those transactions would be held immune from the state tax. Id. at 539. The linchpin of the court’s analysis is instructive: Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects except to send abroad advertising or drummers to solicit orders which are sent directly to the home office for acceptance, filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the State of the buyer has no local grip on the seller. Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the transaction within its taxing power , the vendor is not taxable. McLeod v. [J.E.] Dilworth Co ., 322 U.S. 327 [64 S.Ct. 1023, 88 L.Ed. 1304 (1944)]. Of course, a state imposing a sales or use tax can more easily meet this burden, because the impact of those taxes is on the local buyer or user. Cases involving them are not controlling here, for this tax falls on the vendor. (Emphasis added.) Norton at 537. {¶ 33} At first blush, this passage could be mistaken for a statement about the substantiality of nexus, and that is precisely the error that Crutchfield makes. Read in context, however, the passage does not at all comment on “substantial nexus”; instead, it reflects the interstate-commerce-immunity theory, whereby the sales made by or through local agents in the state—such as the purchases in Ohio of Crutchfield’s products—are taxable as local commerce, but the strictly mail- order transactions are immune as purely interstate commerce. {¶ 34} Crutchfield maintains that the local incident in a case like Norton equates to the substantial-nexus requirement of the Complete Auto test. That is 13

  30. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO wrong. Complete Auto abolished the prohibition against levying a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court’s articulation of the substantial-nexus test was not intended to resurrect it. {¶ 35} Essentially, the same is true for the other pre- Complete Auto cases cited and relied upon by Crutchfield. In Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dept. of Revenue , 419 U.S. 560, 562-563, 95 S.Ct. 706, 42 L.Ed.2d 719 (1975), the high court rejected the proposed analogy to Norton on the grounds that Norton presented the questions whether the in-state activity related to the interstate aspect of the business and whether the taxpayer had to prove the absence of such a relationship in order to “establish[ ] its immunity” from state taxation; by contrast, Standard Pressed Steel had an employee “with a full-time job within the State” that consisted of maintaining the seller’s relationship with its in-state customer, Boeing. In Gen. Motors Corp. v. Washington , 377 U.S. 436, 84 S.Ct. 1564, 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964), the high court invoked the proposition as “ ‘beyond dispute * * * that a state may not lay a tax on the “privilege” of engaging in interstate commerce.’ ” Id. at 446, quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota , 358 U.S. 450, 458, 79 S.Ct. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421 (1959). But the court then distinguished the facts before it as involving taxation of the “in-state activities” performed by “out-of-state personnel”; though maintaining no office in the state, General Motors employees nonetheless regularly performed substantial services within the state to maintain dealer contacts. Id. at 447. {¶ 36} In Field Ents., Inc. v. Washington , 47 Wash.2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955), summarily aff’d, 352 U.S. 806, 77 S.Ct. 55, 1 L.Ed.2d 39 (1956), a Delaware corporation published World Book Encyclopedia and Childcraft ; it maintained a Seattle office, where its representative took orders that were then filled outside the state with books mailed directly to the customers. The case was decided on the Commerce Clause ground that the in-state activity was sufficient, 14

  31. January Term, 2016 so that Washington’s business tax was not being laid on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Although the interstate-commerce-immunity rationale does not appear on the face of the decision, it is manifest in its reliance on the earlier decision in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. State , 38 Wash.2d 663, 231 P.2d 325 (1951), which—although not itself explicitly mentioning interstate-commerce immunity—exhibits its adherence to the doctrine by its reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Norton . Quill Does Not Apply to Business-Privilege Taxes, Whether Measured by Income or by Receipts {¶ 37} The proper focal point of discussion of the physical-presence standard in the case law is Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992). That is so because Quill explicitly considers the substantial-nexus prong of the Commerce Clause test in light of the change in that test effected by Complete Auto and finds the need for a physical presence under the circumstances presented in Quill . {¶ 38} Quill involved a challenge to the typical state-law requirement that out-of-state sellers act as agents of the state by charging, collecting, and remitting sales or use taxes 3 incurred by in-state buyers when they ordered items for delivery into the state. In Quill , North Dakota imposed the administrative obligation to charge, collect, and remit taxes on persons who “ ‘engage[ ] in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.’ ” Id. at 302-303, quoting N.D.Century Code 57-40.2-01(6). The law thereby swept within its ambit mail-order firms that solicited business through advertising within the state. Id . at 303. When Quill resisted, a trial court upheld its position against 3 “As a corollary to its sales tax, North Dakota imposes a use tax upon property purchased for storage, use, or consumption within the State.” Quill at 302; accord Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Lindley , 17 Ohio St.3d 71, 73, 477 N.E.2d 1109 (1985) (“R.C. 5739.02 imposes an excise tax on each retail sale made in Ohio, with R.C. 5741.02 imposing a complementary excise tax on the use of tangible personal property in Ohio”). 15

  32. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO the state on the authority of Natl. Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue of State of Illinois , 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967), which had held that requiring a Missouri mail-order business to collect the Illinois use tax violated due-process and Commerce Clause standards. The state supreme court reversed, allowing imposition of the collection responsibility on Quill. {¶ 39} On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. First, the high court rejected the due-process ground of the Bellas Hess holding, concluding that the activity by which North Dakota sought to impose the obligation constituted purposeful availment of the state’s benefits and protections. Quill at 307-308. As for the Commerce Clause ground, however, the Quill court reaffirmed the holding of Bellas Hess and prohibited North Dakota’s imposition of the collection responsibility. Quill at 310-318. {¶ 40} With respect to Commerce Clause case law, the court in Quill discerned that the substantial-nexus test carried forward the limitation, set forth in Bellas Hess , that out-of-state sellers could incur use-tax compliance obligations based only on physical presence in the state, Bellas Hess at 758 (distinguishing “between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business”). Quill at 311- 313. {¶ 41} The Supreme Court had concluded in Bellas Hess that this continued limitation was justified by the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by multiple jurisdictions imposing use taxes with differing rates, exemptions, and record-keeping requirements . Bellas Hess at 759-760. In Quill , the court noted that the “settled expectations” of mail-order sellers arising from Bellas Hess may have facilitated such interstate business and that the physical-presence rule was therefore worth preserving. 504 U.S. at 316, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91. 16

  33. January Term, 2016 {¶ 42} We hold today that although a physical presence in the state may furnish a sufficient basis for finding a substantial nexus, Quill ’s holding that physical presence is a necessary condition for imposing the tax obligation does not apply to a business-privilege tax such as the CAT, as long as the privilege tax is imposed with an adequate quantitative standard that ensures that the taxpayer’s nexus with the state is substantial. Here, that quantitative standard is the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold. {¶ 43} We discern the basis for our holding in Quill itself and the related United States Supreme Court precedents. First, Quill contains two passages that indicate that the physical-presence standard has not been articulated as a nexus requirement in the business-privilege-tax situation. In rejecting North Dakota’s argument that the court had eschewed such a “bright-line test” as physical presence, the Supreme Court conceded that “we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes”; the court then stated that “that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule.” Quill at 314. The contrast was drawn even more trenchantly in the concluding passage of the opinion, in which the court noted that “our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes” did not “adopt[ ] a similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement”; the court then observed that “our reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes .” (Emphasis added.) Quill at 317. {¶ 44} Second, the case law post- Complete Auto establishes that for purposes of applying the four-prong Commerce Clause test, business-privilege taxes should be distinguished from transaction taxes such as the sales and use tax. In Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. , 514 U.S. 175, 115 S.Ct. 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995), a Minnesota bus company had collected and remitted the Oklahoma sales tax on transportation services for trips within Oklahoma but not 17

  34. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO for trips originating in Oklahoma and terminating outside the state. In bankruptcy proceedings, the state attempted to collect the unremitted tax through a vendor assessment; there, the state confronted a Commerce Clause defense. One aspect of that defense was that the Commerce Clause required the sales tax to be apportioned to apply only to mileage within Oklahoma itself, see Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey , 334 U.S. 653, 68 S.Ct. 1260, 92 L.Ed. 1633 (1948) (holding unconstitutional an unapportioned tax on gross receipts of company that sold tickets for interstate bus travel). {¶ 45} The United States Supreme Court rejected that position, relying principally on the different identities of the taxpayer: the interstate seller of the bus ticket, on whom a gross-receipts tax is imposed, and the in-state purchaser of the ticket, on whom a sales tax is imposed. The high court stated: [ Central Greyhound and Jefferson Lines ] involve the identical services, and apportionment by mileage per State is equally feasible in each. But the two diverge crucially in the identity of the taxpayers and the consequent opportunities that are understood to exist for multiple taxation of the same taxpayer. Central Greyhound did not rest simply on the mathematical and administrative feasibility of a mileage apportionment, but on the Court’s express understanding that the seller-taxpayer was exposed to taxation by New Jersey and Pennsylvania on portions of the same receipts that New York was taxing in their entirety. The Court thus understood the gross receipts tax to be simply a variety of tax on income , which was required to be apportioned to reflect the location of the various interstate activities by which it was earned. 18

  35. January Term, 2016 (Emphasis added.) Jefferson Lines at 190. Accord Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne , ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 1795, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015) (seeing “no reason why the distinction between gross receipts and net income should matter” in evaluating Commerce Clause challenge to imposition of a state tax). {¶ 46} Thus, Jefferson Lines puts the United States Supreme Court on record that for purposes of applying the Complete Auto test, a gross-receipts tax on the interstate seller should be viewed as occupying the same constitutional category as an income tax on that same seller—whereas the sales tax on the in- state purchaser occupies a different category. That reasoning tracks the background and purpose of Ohio’s CAT, which, enacted to replace the former corporate-franchise tax, is imposed on the privilege of engaging in income- producing activity but is measured by gross receipts instead of income. See Navistar, Inc. v. Testa , 143 Ohio St.3d 460, 2015-Ohio-3283, 39 N.E.3d 509, ¶ 1, 8; Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa , 134 Ohio St.3d 565, 2012-Ohio-5776, 983 N.E.2d 1317, ¶ 23-24. {¶ 47} Under these precepts, we follow our own lead along with that of most state courts that, post- Quill , have explicitly rejected the extension of the Quill physical-presence standard to taxes on, or measured by, income. See Couchot v. State Lottery Comm ., 74 Ohio St.3d 417, 425, 659 N.E.2d 1225 (1996) (“There is no indication in Quill that the Supreme Court will extend the physical- presence requirement to cases involving taxation measured by income derived from the state”); Capital One Bank v. Commr. of Revenue , 453 Mass. 1, 13, 899 N.E.2d 76 (2009) (declining to “expand the [United States Supreme] Court’s reasoning [in Quill ] beyond its articulated boundaries” and upholding imposition of tax on out-of-state banks in relation to in-state servicing of credit cards based on the volume of business conducted and profits realized); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue , 895 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind.Tax 2008) (“Based 19

  36. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO on [ Quill ] and a thorough review of relevant case law, this Court finds that the Supreme Court has not extended the physical presence requirement beyond the realm of sales and use taxes”); KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue , 792 N.W.2d 308, 328 (Iowa 2010) (“We * * * doubt that the United States Supreme Court would extend the ‘physical presence’ rule outside the sales and use context of Quill ”). But see J.C. Penney Natl. Bank v. Johnson , 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn.App.1999), in which an intermediate appellate court, rejecting the state’s argument that Quill did not apply, overruled the imposition of the state’s franchise and excise taxes on a bank in relation to the servicing of credit cards issued to Tennessee residents, on the ground that the bank had no offices or agents in the state. 4 {¶ 48} We recognize that Crutchfield seeks to take refuge in a handful of state court decisions addressing gross-receipts taxes, but we find that those decisions are unavailing for reasons we discuss in the next section. Under Tyler Pipe , Physical Presence Is a Sufficient but not Necessary Condition for Imposing a Business-Privilege Tax {¶ 49} We are now in a position to fully address Crutchfield’s argument that “[f]or more than 50 years, in a series of cases decided both before and after Complete Auto , the Supreme Court has made clear that a state’s authority to impose a tax measured by gross receipts depends upon the taxpayer conducting business activities within the state that assist the company to develop and maintain a market there.” At oral argument, although Crutchfield stated that it was not arguing that the Quill standard per se applies to a privilege tax, it nonetheless invited us to read Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue , 483 U.S. 232, 107 S.Ct. 2810, 97 L.Ed.2d 199 (1987), as 4 Crutchfield characterizes the Tennessee tax as a gross-receipts tax, but at least one commentator has noted that the case involves a net-income tax, Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical “Physical Presence” Constitutional Standard , 54 Tax Lawyer 105, 139 (Fall 2000). 20

  37. January Term, 2016 recognizing a “very similar” type of physical-presence standard in the privilege- tax context. {¶ 50} We disagree. The most accurate characterization of Tyler Pipe , and one that is fully consistent with Complete Auto and with the Quill court’s own reading of the case law, is that a taxpayer’s physical presence in a state constitutes a sufficient basis for the state to impose a business-privilege tax. We conclude that in construing Tyler Pipe , it is unwarranted to leap from the principle that physical presence is a sufficient condition for imposing a tax to the logically distinct proposition that physical presence is a necessary condition to impose the tax. 5 And as discussed, although Quill recognized physical presence as a necessary condition for imposing the obligation to collect use taxes, that requirement does not extend to business-privilege taxes as a general matter. {¶ 51} This conclusion derives from not just Tyler Pipe but also the state court decisions addressing gross-receipts taxes: in each case, a physical presence was found that in turn furnished a sufficient condition for upholding the imposition of the state tax. Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Clark , 676 A.2d 330, 334 (R.I. 1996) (noting that the taxpayer “shipped approximately 25.6 million gallons of oil into Rhode Island” over which it “retained title, possession and risk of loss * * * up until the point it reached the flange in Providence”); Saudi Refining, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue , 715 A.2d 89, 96 (Del.Super. 1998) (noting that the taxpayer had “a significantly greater presence in Delaware than [the taxpayer in Koch Fuels ] 5 Crutchfield seizes upon a passage that the United States Supreme Court quoted from the state supreme court decision to bolster its claim: “ ‘[T]he crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the sales.’ ” Tyler Pipe at 250, quoting Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. State Dept. of Revenue , 105 Wash.2d 318, 323, 715 P.2d 123 (1986). But this passage does not, contrary to Crutchfield’s suggestion, articulate a constitutional standard for nexus; instead, it states the state-law standard embodied in the pertinent state nexus regulation. See Tyler Pipe , 105 Wash.2d at 233, 715 P.2d 123, citing Wash.Adm.Code 458-20-193B. The constitutional holding is simply that such a connection is sufficient under the Commerce Clause. 21

  38. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO did in Rhode Island”); Ariz. Dept. of Revenue v. O’Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Killingsworth & Beshears, P.A ., 192 Ariz. 200, 206, 963 P.2d 279 (App.1997) (detailing Arizona contacts of Indiana seller, including installation activity of its agents in the state, that would permit imposition of Arizona gross-receipts tax on that seller); Short Bros. (USA), Inc. v. Arlington Cty. , 244 Va. 520, 526, 423 S.E.2d 172 (1992) (taxpayer chose the taxing jurisdiction as its place of business and conducted all its revenue-generating operations from that office). Given our reading of the United States Supreme Court cases, there is no reason for us to view those decisions as authority for the proposition that physical presence would have been a necessary condition as well. The $500,000 Sales-Receipts Threshold Adequately Ensures Substantial Nexus for Purposes of Imposing the CAT {¶ 52} The final point of our analysis has been implicit in some of our earlier discussion, but we make it explicit here. We hold that the $500,000 sales- receipts threshold complies with the substantial-nexus requirement of the Complete Auto test. {¶ 53} In so holding, we express our view that the quantitative standard is necessary to make the CAT applicable to a remote seller such as Crutchfield, because the Commerce Clause standard does require the nexus to be “substantial.” This means that in order to render receipts susceptible to taxation by Ohio, the Commerce Clause requires more than the “ ‘definite link’ ” to this state, or the “ ‘purpose[ful] avail[ment]’ ” of Ohio’s protections, that would satisfy due process, Corrigan v. Testa , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-2805, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 30, 32, quoting Quill , 504 U.S. at 306, 307, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91. The United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated: By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional 22

  39. January Term, 2016 approval, [the dormant Commerce Clause] strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce. (Emphasis added.) Wynne , ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. at 1794, 191 L.Ed.3d 813. {¶ 54} In applying the substantial-nexus standard without Quill ’s physical- presence requirement, we take recourse to more general principles for applying the Commerce Clause limitation. As a general matter, when a state statute “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church , 397 U.S. 137, 145-146, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). Obviously the imposition of the CAT on remote sellers has an effect on interstate commerce, and Ohio must assure that the adverse impact does not become “clearly excessive” in relation to the legitimate exercise of its taxing authority. Were the state to tax all receipts without any regard for the volume of Ohio sales, the CAT could become clearly excessive as to a business with a very small amount of such receipts. The General Assembly has sensibly attempted to foreclose that possibility by setting a minimum sales-receipts threshold. {¶ 55} Crutchfield points out that the number chosen by the General Assembly, $500,000, can be seen as arbitrary to some degree, but no reason is advanced why a higher number ought to have been selected. 6 Instead, Crutchfield relies on the physical-presence requirement, which we have determined is not a 6 The $150,000 threshold, which under R.C. 5751.04(B) is the usual amount that triggers the CAT registration requirement, is not at issue in this appeal. Crutchfield has not raised the point, and even assuming that the $150,000 threshold might apply to an out-of-state retailer like Crutchfield, Crutchfield would have no standing to advance such a claim because it accepts the premise that it had receipts in excess of the $500,000 threshold. 23

  40. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO necessary condition here. Although any threshold amount, whether selected by the legislature or the courts, may “seem to reasonable and intelligent persons to represent the drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries or lines,” we have recognized that the drawing of such lines is justified for the purpose of defining the legal obligations of the taxpaying public. Powhatan Mining Co. v. Peck , 160 Ohio St. 389, 394, 116 N.E.2d 426 (1953); In re Sears’ Estate , 172 Ohio St. 443, 448, 178 N.E.2d 240 (1961). {¶ 56} We hold that given the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold, the burdens imposed by the CAT on interstate commerce are not “clearly excessive” in relation to the legitimate interest of the state of Ohio in imposing the tax evenhandedly on the sales receipts of in-state and out-of-state sellers. As a result, the tax satisfies the substantial-nexus standard under the dormant Commerce Clause, and we decline to address the tax commissioner’s alternative argument that the physical-presence standard has been satisfied. Conclusion {¶ 57} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA and uphold the CAT assessments against Crutchfield. Decision affirmed. O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , O’D ONNELL , and F RENCH , JJ., concur. K ENNEDY , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by L ANZINGER , J. _________________ K ENNEDY , J., dissenting. {¶ 58} This case is not about the wisdom of imposing a business-privilege tax on Ohio corporations or the constitutionality of the commercial-activity tax (“CAT”) in general. This case is about whether online purchases made by Ohio residents—or even a single Ohio resident—from an out-of-state business create a substantial nexus between that business and Ohio for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause if the transactions meet the statutory threshold of $500,000 in 24

  41. January Term, 2016 Ohio sales. While I am sympathetic to all Ohio-based businesses that must pay a business-privilege tax such as the CAT, this court nevertheless should follow the law as it exists today. Therefore, I must dissent. {¶ 59} The power to regulate interstate commerce is given to Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. If Congress is silent—neither preempting nor consenting to state regulation—and a state attempts to regulate in the face of that silence, the United States Supreme Court, going back to Gibbons v. Ogden , 22 U.S. 1, 231-32, 238-39, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring), has interpreted the Commerce Clause to limit state regulation of interstate commerce through what has come to be known as the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the Commerce Clause is both an express grant of power to Congress and an implicit limit on the power of state and local government. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne , __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 1794, 191 L.Ed.2d 813 (2015). {¶ 60} The majority interprets Congress’s silence as authorizing Ohio to tax a corporation based solely on its Internet sales in Ohio when it has no physical presence in the state and the only connection it has with Ohio is Ohioans’ purchases of its products. This reasoning runs counter to the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , which is the last word from that court on this issue. 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992). {¶ 61} While the shifting seats on the high court might present the possibility the court will overturn its past precedents on the dormant Commerce Clause and hold that a business-privilege tax does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, until that day, we are bound by the court’s prior holdings and by Congress’s inaction on this issue, given its power to regulate interstate commerce. See Quill at 298; see also Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue , 483 U.S. 232, 107 S.Ct. 2810, 97 L.Ed.2d 199 (1987). 25

  42. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO Therefore, I would remand this matter to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) for a determination of whether appellant, Crutchfield Corporation, has a physical presence in Ohio under Quill . I. Analysis {¶ 62} Before delving into the specifics of this case, it is worth summarizing the constitutional framework at issue. Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the states; this includes the power to authorize the states to place burdens on interstate commerce. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin , 328 U.S. 408, 434, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 90 L.Ed. 1342 (1946). Absent such congressional approval, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause if it imposes an undue burden on both out-of-state and local producers engaged in interstate activities or if it treats out-of-state producers less favorably than their local competitors. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. , 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970); Philadelphia v. New Jersey , 437 U.S. 617, 624, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978); Granholm v. Heald , 544 U.S. 460, 472, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 161 L.Ed.2d 796 (2005). As we noted earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court has described the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause as follows: “By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the dormant Commerce Clause] strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce.” (Brackets sic.) Corrigan v. Testa , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-2805, __ N.E.3d __ ¶ 16, quoting Wynne , __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. at 1794, 191 L.Ed.2d 813. {¶ 63} The Commerce Clause grants Congress the authority to regulate (1) 26

  43. January Term, 2016 “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,” and (3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, * * * i.e. , those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, 558-559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Federal circuit courts that have examined the issue agree that the Internet is a “channel” or “instrumentality” of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Panfil , 338 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir.2003); United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc. , 431 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir.2005). {¶ 64} The majority relies on the absence of United States Supreme Court decisions directly on point and treats this case as though it exists in a vacuum. It does not. And the majority’s approach ignores the clues that we do have—all of which point to a business’s physical presence in the state as the lynchpin of a substantial nexus between the business and the state. The most relevant cases are those dealing with sales and use taxes— Quill , 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91, is the latest—and a case evaluating a similar gross-receipts tax, Tyler Pipe , 483 U.S. 232, 107 S.Ct. 2810, 97 L.Ed.2d 199. In all those cases, the businesses subject to the taxes had a physical presence in the taxing jurisdictions, and the majority should not ignore these cases. {¶ 65} In Quill , the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bellas Hess rule that the physical presence of the business established the necessary substantial nexus with the state when a state sought to impose use-tax-collection duties on mail-order sellers. Quill at 311, citing Natl. Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue , 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967). The companies in Quill and Bellas Hess were solely mail-order companies that had no in-state physical locations and made contact with the states only by delivering goods through the mail and other common carriers. Quill at 302; Bellas Hess at 27

  44. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO 753-754. The Bellas Hess court created a bright-line rule that a state can require an out-of-state mail-order retailer to collect use taxes only when the retailer has a physical presence in the state. Bellas Hess at 757-758. The court noted, however, that the physical presence could be satisfied by local agents, who need not even be regular employees. Id ., citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson , 362 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 619, 4 L.Ed.2d 660 (1960) (ten independent brokers sufficient for state to mandate use-tax collection). Nevertheless, those agents must be physically in the state to provide the substantial nexus necessary to defeat a taxpayer’s Commerce Clause challenge. {¶ 66} In the years after Quill , this court applied Quill , holding that an out-of-state company selling merchandise by direct mail to Ohioans did not establish a substantial nexus with the state because the company did not have a physical presence in Ohio and, therefore, Ohio could not force the out-of-state company to collect use taxes. SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy , 73 Ohio St.3d 119, 123, 652 N.E.2d 693 (1995). {¶ 67} I see no evidence that gross-receipts taxes are meaningfully different from use taxes for substantial-nexus purposes, and I view Tyler Pipe ’s reliance on physical presence as more indicative of a requirement than an option. That opinion suggests as much by its lack of other nexus-producing details. There, the Supreme Court evaluated a gross-receipts tax (which I view as similar to business-privilege taxes like the CAT—both are measured by gross receipts), specifically concerning the sufficiency of Tyler Pipe’s connection with the state to justify its imposition of the tax on the company’s sales. 483 U.S. at 249-250, 107 S.Ct. 2810, 97 L.Ed.2d 199. The company had no office, property, or employees residing in the state. Id . at 249. Moreover, it manufactured all its pipe products out of state. Id . As the court noted, however, Tyler Pipe had an independent sales representative located in the state. Id . That independent contractor (and its salespeople) did enough local work to maintain Tyler Pipe’s market and protect 28

  45. January Term, 2016 its interests that it constituted a sufficient nexus with the state and justified the state’s gross-receipts tax. Id . at 250, citing Scripto at 211. {¶ 68} Nowhere in Tyler Pipe did the Supreme Court indicate that anything less than a third-party contractor operating within a taxing state on a taxpayer’s behalf would satisfy the substantial-nexus requirement established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). Yet the majority brushes Tyler Pipe aside, concluding that “it is unwarranted to leap from the principle that physical presence is a sufficient condition for imposing a tax to the logically distinct proposition that physical presence is a necessary condition to impose the tax.” (Emphasis sic.) Majority opinion at ¶ __. It is the majority that takes an unwarranted leap in concluding that physical presence is merely sufficient, not necessary. Absent evidence that an expansion is warranted—and we have none—I will not ignore the mandates of federal constitutional law. {¶ 69} The majority’s reliance on state-court decisions that speculate as to the unlikelihood of the Supreme Court expanding Quill ’s physical-presence requirement beyond sales and use taxes is unwarranted. Half of those cases involved physical presence, and the other half fell under a different type of tax that the Supreme Court has not held to require physical presence. To be sure, even this court has speculated about the physical-presence requirement. See Couchot v. State Lottery Comm. , 74 Ohio St.3d 417, 425, 659 N.E.2d 1225 (1996). Couchot , however, involved an out-of-state resident who bought an Ohio lottery ticket in Ohio and redeemed it in Columbus. That is quintessential physical-presence-based substantial nexus. In KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue , a corporation licensed intangible intellectual property for use by its in- state franchisees. 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010). Although the corporation lacked property or employees in the state, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the franchisees’ physical presence in the state coupled with the value of the 29

  46. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO intangibles sufficiently localized KFC’s income from the franchisees’ transactions in the state such that Iowa could tax it. Id . at 323. In support of this conclusion, the KFC court cited Internatl. Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation , 322 U.S. 435, 441-442, 64 S.Ct. 1060, 88 L.Ed. 1373 (1944) (“A state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly attributable * * * to events or transactions which, occurring there, are subject to state regulation and which are within the protection of the state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it confers”). It is true that Internatl. Harvester was a due-process case, but the Supreme Court rendered that decision at a time when due process and the Commerce Clause were considered coextensive. See id . at 444; Quill , 504 U.S. at 305, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91. {¶ 70} The other two decisions upon which the majority relies in questioning the physical-presence requirement are inapplicable here because they deal with a type of tax specific to banks—financial-institution excise taxes. See Capital One Bank v. Commr. of Revenue , 453 Mass. 1, 899 N.E.2d 76 (2009); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue , 895 N.E.2d 140 (Ind.Tax 2008). The Supreme Court has never addressed, much less stated, a physical-presence requirement for financial-institution excise taxes. Therefore, the state courts’ reasoning in these financial-institution-tax cases is not applicable to the case at bar. {¶ 71} Because half of them involve sufficient physical presence and the other half involve an irrelevant tax on financial institutions, these opinions of other state courts criticizing the physical-presence rule as constitutionally outmoded for substantial-nexus purposes are not persuasive. {¶ 72} The majority’s citations to state-court decisions addressing gross- receipts taxes are a step in the right direction but provide no sounder a foundation for its decision today. Interestingly, the majority places great weight on the fact that each case involved a physical presence in the state sufficient to uphold 30

  47. January Term, 2016 imposition of the tax. It then somehow reads all these state-court physical- presence cases to mean that “there is no reason for us to view those decisions as authority for the proposition that physical presence would have been a necessary condition as well.” Majority opinion at ¶ 51. That extrapolation is not well founded. {¶ 73} The physical-presence requirement is grounded in the reasoning that the dormant Commerce Clause is designed to prevent regulation and taxation from being an undue burden on interstate commerce. Undue burdens on interstate commerce may be avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation. Quill , 504 U.S. at 314-315, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91. This reasoning is not limited to sales and use taxes, and the language of Quill should be applied as written—applying to the “discrete realm of commercial activity” at issue in the case, which was commercial activity involving companies without a physical presence in the taxing state. Id . This reasoning is in line with common sense because these companies should not be forced to comply with Ohio’s CAT based solely on the fact that Ohioans choose to buy products from them. Under the CAT as construed by the majority, a business could be forced to pay Ohio taxes if just one Ohioan spent more than $500,000 on its products. It is easy to imagine an Ohio manufacturing business ordering one machine from an out-of-state business, and that would trigger a requirement for that business to comply with the CAT. The business could have no other connection with the state, but Ohio could drag it into Ohio’s taxing scheme based on one act of interstate commerce. 31

  48. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO This is an undue burden on interstate commerce of the sort that the Quill court was attempting to avoid. {¶ 74} I recognize that Quill might be overturned by the Supreme Court or abrogated by an act of Congress. Only two members of the Quill court remain on the bench—Justices Kennedy and Thomas—and Justice Kennedy has expressed his opinion that the case should be revisited in light of the technological changes caused by the proliferation of online retailers. Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl , __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 1135, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Given these changes in technology and consumer sophistication, it is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court’s holding in Quill ”). Nevertheless, Quill is the law of the land, and it must be followed. {¶ 75} Congress could also authorize the states to impose taxes on out-of- state retailers like Crutchfield. In his concurring opinion in Quill , which was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, Justice Scalia wisely remarked that whatever constitutional rule the court fashioned based on the dormant Commerce Clause was subject to revision by Congress: “Congress has the final say over regulation of interstate commerce * * *. We have long recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis has ‘special force’ where ‘Congress remains free to alter what we have done.’ ” Quill at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring), quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 172-173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). Proposed legislation is pending in Congress that would abrogate the Quill rule and permit states to require online retailers to collect sales taxes. See Marketplace Fairness Act of 2015 , S.698, 114th Congress (introduced in Senate Mar. 10, 2015). Congress has the power and authority to regulate interstate commerce to ensure that there is an equal playing field between in-state and out- of-state companies. {¶ 76} Currently, Ohio responds to this gap in taxation by imposing the use tax on purchases that are not subject to sales tax. See R.C. 5741.12(B). 32

  49. January Term, 2016 Ohioans are asked to voluntarily report on line 12 of the personal-income-tax Form 1040 the amount of out-of-state purchases made over the Internet that are not subject to sales tax. Ohio Department of Taxation, 2015 Universal IT 1040 Individual Income Tax Return, http://www.tax.ohio.gov/Portals/0/forms /ohio_individual/individual/2015/PIT_IT1040.pdf (accessed Oct. 21, 2016). If Ohioans report out-of-state purchases, they must pay a use tax at a rate equal to the sales-tax rate in their county. Ohio Department of Taxation, Ohio 2015 Instructions for Filing Personal Income Tax 17, http://www.tax.ohio.gov/portals/0/forms/ohio_individual/individual/2015/PIT_IT 1040_Booklet.pdf (accessed Oct. 21, 2016). Just as it would require an act of Congress to require out-of-state retailers to collect sales taxes, federal legislation is necessary before Ohio can impose the CAT on out-of-state businesses. It is not the role of this court to bless a state’s attempt to regulate interstate commerce through a taxing scheme just because Congress has been silent. {¶ 77} I understand and am sympathetic to the arguments made by amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Ohio State Medical Association, Ohio Dental Association, and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council because “they have a critical and substantial interest in ensuring that this tax is applied fairly and equitably.” However, the desire to “fairly” apply the CAT to out-of-state companies cannot supersede binding United States Supreme Court precedent, see Complete Auto Transit , 430 U.S. at 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326, and Quill , 504 U.S. at 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91. I disagree with amici curiae when they state that none of the Supreme Court’s decisions “state that a physical presence was the sine qua none [sic] for finding that a substantial nexus existed.” As stated above, the reasoning that the Supreme Court used in Quill and Tyler Pipe to determine whether a substantial nexus exists between an out-of-state business and a taxing state turns on whether or not the out-of-state business has a physical presence in the taxing state. 33

  50. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO {¶ 78} As for the BTA’s assertion that Crutchfield’s computerized connections with Ohio consumers constitutes physical presence in this state, the BTA never made a factual determination that Crutchfield has a physical presence in Ohio. On the contrary, the BTA concluded that “under the plain language set forth therein, the pertinent CAT statutes do not impose such an in-state presence requirement.” Since it did not believe that in-state physical presence was a requirement, the BTA did not make a finding as to Crutchfield’s in-state presence. “The BTA is responsible for determining factual issues * * *.” Vandalia-Butler City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision , 130 Ohio St.3d 291, 2011-Ohio-5078, 958 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 12. In my view, it is the BTA’s responsibility to evaluate the evidence and make a factual determination whether Crutchfield has a physical presence in Ohio. II. Conclusion {¶ 79} While I am sympathetic to Ohio-based businesses that are forced to pay a business-privilege tax such as the CAT, I nevertheless must follow the law as it is exists today. The power to regulate interstate commerce rests exclusively with Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. Because the last word from the United States Supreme Court is that a state’s ability to tax an out-of-state business depends on a substantial nexus created by a physical presence, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91; see also Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue , 483 U.S. 232, 107 S.Ct. 2810, 97 L.Ed.2d 199, I must dissent. I would remand the matter to the BTA for a determination of physical presence under Quill . L ANZINGER , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. _________________ 34

  51. January Term, 2016 Brann & Isaacson, Martin I. Eisenstein, David W. Bertoni, and Matthew P. Schaefer; and Baker Hostetler and Edward J. Bernert, for appellant and cross- appellee. Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel W. Fausey and Christine Mesirow, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee and cross-appellant. Macey, Wilenski & Hennings, L.L.C., and Peter G. Stathopoulos; and Robert Alt, urging reversal for amici curiae Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, NetChoice, and American Catalog Mailers Association, Inc. Fredrick Nicely and Nikki Dobay, urging reversal for amicus curiae Council on State Taxation. Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Eric F. Citron, and Thomas C. Goldstein, urging affirmance for amici curiae National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, International City/County Management Association, International Municipal Lawyers Association, and Government Finance Officers Association. Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Mark A. Engel, and Anne Marie Sferra, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Ohio State Medical Association, Ohio Dental Association, and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. Bruce Fort, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Multistate Tax Commission. _________________ 35

  52. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Mason Cos., Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7768.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. S LIP O PINION N O . 2016-O HIO -7768 M ASON C OMPANIES , I NC ., A PPELLANT AND C ROSS -A PPELLEE , v. T ESTA , T AX C OMMR ., A PPELLEE AND C ROSS -A PPELLANT . [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Mason Cos., Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7768.] Commercial-activity tax—Commerce Clause—Physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the commercial-activity tax. (No. 2015-0794—Submitted May 3, 2016—Decided November 17, 2016.) A PPEAL and C ROSS -A PPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2012-1169 and 2012-2806. ____________________ O’N EILL , J. {¶ 1} We decide this case as a companion case to Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-7760, __ N.E.3d __, with which this case was consolidated for purposes of oral argument. Appellant and cross-appellee, Mason Companies, Inc., is based in Wisconsin, and it appeals from the imposition of

  53. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (“CAT”) on revenue it has earned from its sales of goods through orders received via telephone, mail, and the Internet. Like Crutchfield, Mason Companies contests its CAT assessments because it operates outside Ohio, employs no personnel in Ohio, and maintains no facilities in Ohio. {¶ 2} The 24 assessments at issue here cover the period from July 1, 2005, through September 30, 2011. In determining that our holding in Crutchfield requires us to affirm these assessments, we rely on Mason Companies’ decision to restrict its protest to the imposition of the tax, while not contesting the amounts of tax assessed, to conclude that Mason Companies satisfied the $500,000 sales- receipts threshold, triggering its CAT liability during that period. See R.C. 5751.01(H)(3) and (I)(3). Mason Companies, however, asserts that Ohio’s CAT violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and that therefore Ohio had no authority to tax any of those receipts. {¶ 3} Just as in Crutchfield , we first confront a cross-appeal by the tax commissioner concerning whether Mason Companies properly raised and preserved its constitutional challenge. The circumstances of the present case being no different from those in Crutchfield , we resolve the cross-appeal against the tax commissioner’s position on the authority of Crutchfield . Similarly, we rely on Crutchfield to reject Mason Companies’ contentions that the CAT statutes should be construed to preclude the assessments at issue in this appeal. {¶ 4} In Crutchfield , we held that under the Commerce Clause, the physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio was not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law, given that the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold adequately assured that the taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio was substantial pursuant to R.C. 5751.01(H)(3) and (I)(3). Crutchfield Corp. , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-7760, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 3, 5. Applying that holding here resolves Mason Companies’ constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause. It also makes 2

  54. January Term, 2016 unnecessary consideration of whether Mason Companies’ Internet contacts with its Ohio customers constituted a physical presence for Commerce Clause purposes. {¶ 5} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA and uphold the CAT assessments against Mason Companies. Decision affirmed. O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , O’D ONNELL , and F RENCH , JJ., concur. L ANZINGER and K ENNEDY , JJ., dissent and would reverse the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in 2015- 0386, Crutchfield v. Testa . _________________ Brann & Isaacson, Martin I. Eisenstein, and David W. Berton; and Baker Hostetler and Edward J. Bernert, for appellant and cross-appellee. Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel W. Fausey and Christine Mesirow, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee and cross-appellant. Macey, Wilenski & Hennings, L.L.C., and Peter G. Stathopoulos; and Robert Alt, urging reversal for amici curiae Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, NetChoice, and American Catalog Mailers Association, Inc. Fredrick Nicely and Nikki Dobay, urging reversal for amicus curiae Council on State Taxation. Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Eric F. Citron, and Thomas C. Goldstein, urging affirmance for amici curiae National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, International City/County Management Association, International Municipal Lawyers Association, and Government Finance Officers Association. 3

  55. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Mark A. Engel, and Anne Marie Sferra, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Ohio State Medical Association, Ohio Dental Association, and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. Bruce Fort, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Multistate Tax Commission. _________________ 4

  56. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Newegg, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7762.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. S LIP O PINION N O . 2016-O HIO -7762 N EWEGG , I NC ., A PPELLANT AND C ROSS -A PPELLEE , v. T ESTA , T AX C OMMR ., A PPELLEE AND C ROSS -A PPELLANT . [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Newegg, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7762.] Commercial-activity tax—Commerce Clause—Physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the commercial-activity tax. (No. 2015-0483—Submitted May 3, 2016—Decided November 17, 2016.) A PPEAL and C ROSS -A PPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2012-0234. ____________________ O’N EILL , J. {¶ 1} We decide this case as a companion case to Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-7760, __ N.E.3d __, with which this case was consolidated for purposes of oral argument. According to the tax commissioner’s final determination, appellant and cross-appellee, Newegg, Inc., is “the second largest on-line only retailer in the United States selling information technology and

  57. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO computer electronics products.” Orders are filled from processing centers in California and New Jersey. Newegg appeals from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (“CAT”) on revenue it has earned from sales of computer- related products that it ships into the state of Ohio. Like Crutchfield, Newegg contests its CAT assessments based on Newegg’s being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. {¶ 2} The six assessments at issue here cover the period from July 1, 2005, through a first-quarter 2011 estimate. In determining that our holding in Crutchfield requires us to affirm the assessments at issue here, we rely on the stipulation that “Newegg does not contest the amounts of actual and estimated Ohio gross receipts” on which the assessments are based. For tax years 2005 through 2009, Newegg stipulated to receipts of $272,289,269, which formed the basis for CAT assessments totaling $447,580 for that period. The receipts for 2010 through March 2011 were estimated at nearly $20 million per quarter, and Newegg stipulated to those amounts also. Consequently, Newegg satisfied the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold, triggering its CAT liability during that period. See R.C. 5751.01(H)(3) and (I)(3). Newegg, however, asserts that Ohio’s CAT violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and that therefore Ohio had no authority to tax any of those receipts. {¶ 3} Just as in Crutchfield , we first confront a cross-appeal by the tax commissioner concerning whether Newegg properly raised and preserved its constitutional challenge. The circumstances of the present case being no different from those in Crutchfield , we resolve the cross-appeal against the tax commissioner’s position on the authority of Crutchfield . Similarly, we rely on Crutchfield to reject Newegg’s contentions that the CAT statutes should be construed to preclude the assessments at issue in this appeal. {¶ 4} In Crutchfield , we held that under the Commerce Clause, the physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for 2

  58. January Term, 2016 imposing the obligations of the CAT law, given that the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold adequately assures that the taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio is substantial pursuant to R.C. 5751.01(H)(3) and (I)(3). Crutchfield Corp. , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-7760, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 3, 5. Applying that holding here resolves Newegg’s constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause. It also makes unnecessary consideration of whether Newegg’s Internet contacts with its Ohio customers constituted a physical presence for Commerce Clause purposes. {¶ 5} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the BTA and uphold the CAT assessments against Newegg. Decision affirmed. O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , O’D ONNELL , and F RENCH , JJ., concur. L ANZINGER and K ENNEDY , JJ., dissent and would reverse the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in 2015- 0386, Crutchfield v. Testa . _________________ Brann & Isaacson, Martin I. Eisenstein, David W. Bertoni, and Matthew P. Schaefer; and Baker Hostetler and Edward J. Bernert, for appellant and cross- appellee. Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel W. Fausey and Christine Mesirow, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee and cross-appellant. Macey, Wilenski & Hennings, L.L.C., and Peter G. Stathopoulos; and Robert Alt, urging reversal for amici curiae Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, NetChoice, and American Catalog Mailers Association, Inc. Fredrick Nicely and Nikki Dobay, urging reversal for amicus curiae Council on State Taxation. Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Eric F. Citron, and Thomas C. Goldstein, urging affirmance for amici curiae National Governors Association, National Conference 3

  59. S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, International City/County Management Association, International Municipal Lawyers Association, and Government Finance Officers Association. Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Mark A. Engel, and Anne Marie Sferra, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association, Ohio State Medical Association, Ohio Dental Association, and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. Bruce Fort, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Multistate Tax Commission. _________________ 4

  60. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH February 22, 2016 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, The Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 12-1175 BARBARA BROHL, in her capacity as Executive Director, Colorado Department of Revenue, Defendant - Appellant, and MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION; INTERESTED LAW PROFESSORS; THE RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASSOCIATION; RETAIL LITIGATION CENTER, INC.; COLORADO RETAIL COUNCIL; NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS; INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION; TAX FOUNDATION, Amicus Curiae.

  61. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 2 _________________________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO (D.C. NO. 1:10-CV-01546-REB-CBS) _________________________________ Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General (Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Stephanie Lindquist Scoville, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Grant T. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitor General, Claudia Brett Goldin, First Assistant Attorney General, Daniel D. Domenico, Solicitor General, and Melanie J. Snyder, Chief of Staff, with him on the briefs), Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Defendant-Appellant. George S. Isaacson (Matthew P. Schaefer, with him on the briefs), Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, Maine, appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee. Darien Shanske, University of California, Davis School of Law, Davis, California, Kirk J. Stark, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law, Los Angeles, California, and Alan B. Morrison, George Washington University School of Law, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Interested Law Professors. Lisa Soronen, Executive Director, State & Local Legal Center, Washington, DC, and Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Johnson, Abdallah, Bollweg & Parsons, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for Amicus Curiae National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, United States Conference of Mayors, International City/County Management Association, International Municipal Lawyers Association, and Government Finance Officers Association. Helen Hecht, Lila Disque, and Sheldon Laskin, Multistate Tax Commission, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission. Deborah White, Retail Industry Leaders Association and Retail Litigation Center, Arlington, Virginia; Tom Goldstein and Eric Citron, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Bethesda Maryland, for Amicus Curiae Retail Industry Leaders Association, Retail Litigation Center, Inc. and Colorado Retail Council. Joseph D. Henchman, Tax Foundation, Washington, DC, and Joseph P. Kennedy, Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, LLC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Amicus Curiae Tax Foundation. _________________________________ - 2 -

  62. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 3 Before BRISCOE , GORSUCH , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges. _________________________________ MATHESON , Circuit Judge. _________________________________ I. INTRODUCTION When a neighborhood bookstore in Denver sells a book, it must collect sales tax from the buyer and remit that payment to the Colorado Department of Revenue (“Department”). When Barnes & Noble sells a book over the Internet to a Colorado buyer, it must collect sales tax from the buyer and remit. But when Amazon sells a book over the Internet to a Colorado buyer, it has no obligation to collect sales tax. This situation is largely the product of the Supreme Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298 (1992), which held that, under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, a state may not require a retailer having no physical presence in that state—e.g., Amazon as opposed to Barnes & Noble—to collect and remit sales tax on the sales it makes there. Faced with Quill , many states, including Colorado, rely on purchasers themselves to calculate and pay a use tax on their purchases from out-of-state retailers that do not collect sales tax. But few in Colorado or elsewhere pay the use tax despite their legal obligation to do so. 1 With the explosive growth of e-commerce, the states’ inability to 1 The parties dispute the precise rate of non-compliance. As the Department points out, the 75% compliance rate that DMA cites encompasses both sales and use taxes on all Internet sales, including those by retailers with a physical presence that must collect taxes. It reports the compliance rate on remote retail sales with no collection Continued . . . - 3 -

  63. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 4 compel out-of-state retailers to collect sales tax has cost state and local governments significant revenue and disadvantaged in-state retailers, who must collect sales tax at the point of sale. Justice Kennedy recently said this “may well be a serious, continuing injustice faced by Colorado and many other States.” Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl (“ Brohl II ”), 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In 2010, Colorado attempted to address use tax non-compliance by enacting a law (“Colorado Law”) that imposes notice and reporting obligations on retailers that do not collect sales tax. Plaintiff-Appellee Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”)—a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet—has challenged this law as violating the dormant Commerce Clause. DMA argues the Colorado Law unconstitutionally discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce. The district court agreed with both arguments, granted summary judgment to DMA, and permanently enjoined the Department from enforcing the Colorado Law. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Huber , No. 10-cv-01546-REB- obligation is, as Justice Kennedy recently pointed out, only 4%. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl (“ Brohl II ”), 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Brief of National Governors Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant- Appellant Supporting Reversal at 10, Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl , No. 12-1175 (10th Cir. argued Sept. 29, 2015) (estimating household use-tax compliance at 0-5%, excluding motor vehicle purchases). As the Department notes, any figure in the record would be significantly lower than the 98.3% compliance rate for sales taxes. - 4 -

  64. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 5 CBS, 2012 WL 1079175, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012). Defendant-Appellant Barbara Brohl, Executive Director of the Department, appeals. 2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse because the Colorado Law does not discriminate against nor does it unduly burden interstate commerce. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual History Colorado has imposed a sales tax since 1935 and a use tax since 1937. The taxes are complementary. The sales tax is paid at the point of sale and the use tax is paid when property is stored, used, or consumed within Colorado but sales tax was not paid to a retailer. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-26-104, -202, -204(1). In approving the sales-use tax system under the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court described it as follows: The practical effect of a system thus conditioned is readily perceived. One of its effects must be that retail sellers in Washington will be helped to compete upon terms of equality with retail dealers in other states who are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding burden. Another effect, or at least another tendency, must be to avoid the likelihood of a drain upon the revenues of the state, buyers being no longer tempted to place their orders in other states in the effort to escape payment of the tax on local sales. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. , 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937). The methods for collecting sales and use taxes vary. In-state retailers subject to sales tax collection are tasked with assorted requirements—for example, obtaining a 2 When this lawsuit was filed in district court, the executive director was Roxy Huber. Ms. Brohl was later substituted as the defendant. - 5 -

  65. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 6 license, calculating state and local taxes, accounting for exemptions, collecting the tax, filing a return, remitting the tax to the state, and keeping certain records. In-state retailers are also liable for any sales taxes they do not collect and may be subject to fines or criminal penalties for non-compliance. Because Colorado cannot compel out-of-state retailers without a physical presence in the state to collect taxes, the state requires purchasers themselves to calculate and remit use taxes on their purchases from out-of-state retailers. The regimes differ greatly in effectiveness—compliance with the sales tax is extremely high, and compliance with the use tax is extremely low. To assist the state in collecting use tax from in-state purchasers, most seemingly unaware of their tax responsibility, 3 the Colorado legislature passed a law in 2010 that imposes three obligations on retailers that do not collect sales taxes—“non-collecting retailers” 4 : (1) to send a “transactional notice” to purchasers informing them that they may be subject to Colorado’s use tax, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I); 1 Colo. 3 See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce , 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483, 489 (2012). 4 A “non-collecting retailer” is defined as “a retailer that sells goods to Colorado purchasers and that does not collect Colorado sales or use tax.” 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(i). Retailers who made less than $100,000 in total gross sales in Colorado in the previous calendar year, and who reasonably expect gross sales in the current calendar year to be less than $100,000, are exempt from the notice and reporting obligations. Id. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(iii). - 6 -

  66. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 7 Code Regs. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(2); 5 (2) to send Colorado purchasers who buy goods from the retailer totaling more than $500 an “annual purchase summary” with the dates, categories, and amounts of purchases, reminding them of their obligation to pay use taxes on those purchases, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I); 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 201- 1:39-21-112.3.5(3); and (3) to send the Department an annual “customer information report” listing their customers’ names, addresses, and total amounts spent, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II); 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(4). DMA objected to these requirements and brought suit against the Executive Director of the Department. B. Procedural History DMA filed a facial challenge to the Colorado Law in federal district court in 2010. Among other claims, 6 it contended that the Colorado Law violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce. On March 30, 2012, the district court granted summary judgment to DMA on both grounds. Huber , 2012 WL 1079175, at *10-11. The court permanently enjoined the Department from enforcing the Colorado Law. Id . 5 The transactional notice requirement can be satisfied in various ways, including an online pop-up window, a packing slip, or other methods. 6 DMA originally brought eight claims for relief, including First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, but its motion for summary judgment included only the two dormant Commerce Clause challenges. We are presented only with those challenges on this appeal. - 7 -

  67. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 8 On August 20, 2013, this panel held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear DMA’s challenge under the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”). See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl (“ Brohl I ”), 735 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1341. We remanded the case to the district court to dismiss DMA’s claims and dissolve the permanent injunction. Brohl I , 735 F.3d at 921. The Tenth Circuit rejected a request for en banc review. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl , No. 12-1175 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished). On December 10, 2013, the district court dismissed DMA’s claims and dissolved the permanent injunction. Shortly thereafter, it dismissed the remainder of DMA’s eight claims without prejudice. DMA then sued the Department in state court. It also petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, seeking review of the Tenth Circuit’s dismissal of its claims based on the TIA. On February 18, 2014, the state district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the Colorado Law based on DMA’s argument that it facially discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue , No. 13CV34855, at 1, 22-23 (Dist. Ct. Colo. Feb. 18, 2014) (unpublished). It rejected DMA’s argument that the Colorado Law placed an undue burden on interstate commerce, declining to extend Quill ’s holding regarding tax collection to regulatory measures. Id. at 24-30. On July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court granted DMA’s petition for certiorari. In response to this development, the Colorado state court stayed its proceedings and did not resolve the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. On March 3, 2015, the - 8 -

  68. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 9 Supreme Court held the TIA did not strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear DMA’s challenge and reversed Brohl I . Brohl II , 135 S. Ct. at 1131. It remanded the case for further proceedings. In the wake of Brohl II ’s determination that the TIA’s jurisdictional bar is inapplicable, we are now squarely presented with the two dormant Commerce Clause challenges decided by the federal district court before our decision in Brohl I . The parties have submitted supplemental briefs, and we heard oral argument on September 29, 2015. III. DISCUSSION Our discussion proceeds in three parts. First, we present an overview of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Second, we analyze the bright-line rule recognized in Quill and determine it is limited to tax collection. Third, we review DMA’s dormant Commerce Clause claims and conclude the Colorado Law does not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. 7 7 In Brohl II , the Supreme Court noted this court’s discussion of the “comity doctrine” in Brohl I and left “it to the Tenth Circuit to decide on remand whether the comity argument remains available to Colorado.” 135 S. Ct. at 1134. The Department argues “this Court should not dismiss this case based on comity. Consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Department has affirmatively waived reliance on the comity doctrine.” Aplt. Supp. Br. at 23. DMA agrees. Aplee. Supp. Br. at 59. On this non-jurisdictional prudential matter, we do not dismiss this case on comity grounds. - 9 -

  69. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 10 A. Dormant Commerce Clause The Constitution does not contain a provision called the dormant Commerce Clause. 8 The doctrine derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 3—the Commerce Clause itself—which provides that “Congress shall have [the] power . . . [t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States.” As to matters within the scope of the Commerce Clause power, Congress may choose to regulate, thereby preempting the states from doing so, see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n , 505 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1992); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), or to authorize the states to regulate, see In re Raher , 140 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1891); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin , 328 U.S. 408, 429- 31 (1946) . If Congress is silent—neither preempting nor consenting to state regulation—and a state attempts to regulate in the face of that silence, the Supreme Court, going back to Gibbons v. Ogden , 22 (9 Wheat) U.S. 1, 231-32, 238-39 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring), and Cooley v. Bd. of Port Wardens , 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1851), has interpreted the Commerce Clause to limit state regulation of interstate commerce by applying the negative implications of the Commerce Clause—“these great silences of the Constitution,” H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond , 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949); see White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc. , 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983). Accordingly, the Commerce Clause is both an express grant of power to Congress and an implicit limit on 8 Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly limit state interference with interstate commerce except very specific limitations in Article I, Section 10, which prevent states from coining money or imposing duties on exports and imports. - 10 -

  70. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 11 the power of state and local government. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne , 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff , 571 F.3d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir. 2009). The focus of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge is whether a state law improperly interferes with interstate commerce. The primary concern is economic protectionism. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy , 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (quotations omitted) (“Th[e] ‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey , 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“The crucial inquiry, therefore, must be directed to determining whether [a state law] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental.”); Kleinsmith , 571 F.3d at 1039 (“The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the dormant Commerce Clause ‘is driven by concern about economic protectionism.’” (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis , 553 U.S. 328, 337-38 (2008)). As to the state regulation at issue in this case, up to now Congress has been silent—it has not preempted or consented to the Colorado Law. 9 The question then is 9 As DMA has noted in its supplemental brief, “since the parties first filed their briefs in this case in 2012, Congress has increased its already active scrutiny of the issue.” Aplee. Supp. Br. at 50. - 11 -

  71. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 12 whether the Constitution’s affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress should be interpreted to circumscribe the Colorado Law. The judiciary’s answer to this question need not be final. If we uphold the law, Congress can pass its own law and preempt the Colorado Law. Or if we decide the law is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, Congress can enact legislation authorizing Colorado to do what we have struck down. In that sense, the judicial decision determines which party would need to go to Congress to seek a different result. The Supreme Court has produced an extensive body of dormant Commerce Clause case law. 10 As a general matter, state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce will survive constitutional challenge only if the state shows “it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison , 520 U.S. 564, 581 (1997) (quotations omitted). The Court has “required that justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce pass the ‘strictest scrutiny.’” Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality , 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma , 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)). Nondiscriminatory state laws also can be invalidated when they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. , 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959). “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 10 A WestLawNext search of “Dormant Commerce Clause” on February 9, 2016, produced a list of 56 United States Supreme Court decisions. - 12 -

  72. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 13 public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. , 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). “State laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny . . . .” Davis , 553 U.S. at 339. 11 Finally, the Supreme Court has adapted its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to review state taxes on interstate commerce. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady , 430 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court stated that a tax on interstate commercial activity is constitutional if it “[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Id. at 279. As discussed more fully below, Complete Auto does not apply here because this case involves a reporting requirement and not a tax. B. Scope of Quill The outcome of this case turns largely on the scope of Quill . We conclude it applies narrowly to sales and use tax collection. The following discussion explains how we arrive at this conclusion, which affects both DMA’s claim for discrimination and for undue burden. 11 In Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel , 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied , 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015), this court recently acknowledged a third type of dormant Commerce Clause cases: those involving “certain price control and price affirmation laws that control ‘extraterritorial’ conduct.” This category does not apply to this appeal. - 13 -

  73. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 14 In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue , 386 U.S. 753 (1967), the Supreme Court addressed whether Illinois could require a Delaware-based mail-order business with no physical presence in Illinois to pay use taxes on sales to Illinois customers. Id. at 753-54. The seller’s only connection with Illinois was through common carrier and U.S. mail. Id. at 754. The Court concluded that such a requirement violated the Commerce Clause. In Quill , the Supreme Court revisited the holding of Bellas Hess . The Court addressed whether North Dakota could “require an out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representatives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the State.” 504 U.S. at 301. Quill sold office supplies “through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls.” Id. at 302. The Supreme Court of North Dakota had determined that this requirement was constitutional because “the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations of the past quarter-century have rendered” the holding of Bellas Hess “obsolete.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court disagreed. 12 In Quill , the Supreme Court applied the four-part test from Complete Auto Transit , 430 U.S. at 279. The test focuses on a statute’s “practical effect” rather than its “formal 12 The Court did overrule Bellas Hess on a separate issue. Bellas Hess had held that the Illinois use tax requirement had violated due process principles. The Quill court held that, “to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.” 504 U.S. at 308. - 14 -

  74. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 15 language,” and, as noted above, sustains a tax under the dormant Commerce Clause when the tax: (1) “is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,” (2) “is fairly apportioned,” (3) “does not discriminate against interstate commerce,” and (4) “is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Id . The Court decided Quill based on the first step of the Complete Auto test. 504 U.S. at 311-15. 13 It determined the dormant Commerce Clause and Bellas Hess create a safe harbor wherein “vendors whose only connection with customers in the taxing State is by common carrier or the United States mail . . . are free from state-imposed duties to collect sales and use taxes.” Id. at 315 (quotations and brackets omitted). The Quill Court relied on Bellas Hess to make a stare decisis decision that recognized the physical presence rule as a “bright-line” test. Id. at 314-18. In Brohl II , the Supreme Court characterized Quill as establishing the principle that a state “may not require retailers who lack a physical presence in the State to collect these taxes on behalf of the [state].” 135 S. Ct. at 1127 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Brohl II , 135 S. Ct. at 1135, echoed the numerous commentators who have criticized Quill ’s bright-line physical presence test. 14 Even 13 The Court did not address whether the North Dakota use tax violated the third step of the Complete Auto test, which asks whether a state tax discriminates against interstate commerce. 14 See, e.g. , H. Beau Baez III, The Rush to the Goblin Market: The Blurring of Quill ’s Two Nexus Tests , 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 581, 581-82 (2006); Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce , 13 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 549, 549-50 (2000). - 15 -

  75. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 16 though the Supreme Court has not overruled Quill , it has not extended the physical presence rule beyond the realm of sales and use tax collection. This court’s discussion in American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani is instructive on this point: Both Bellas Hess and Quill concern the levy of taxes upon out-of-state entities. The Supreme Court in Quill repeatedly stressed that it was preserving Bellas Hess ’ bright-line rule ‘in the area of sales and use taxes.’ The Utah Act imposes licensing and registration requirements, not tax burdens. The Bellas Hess/Quill bright-line rule is therefore inapposite. 199 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Quill , 504 U.S. at 316) (citations omitted). 15 15 Other circuits have recognized that Quill is limited to state taxes. See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc. , 784 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 2015); Ferndale Labs., Inc. v. Cavendish , 79 F.3d 488, 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the weight of state authority limits Quill ’s physical presence requirement to sales and use taxes, as opposed to other kinds of taxes. See, e.g. , Lamtec Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue , 246 P.3d 788, 794 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (stating in dicta “[t]here is also extensive language in Quill that suggests the physical presence requirement should be restricted to sales and use taxes” as opposed to business and occupation taxes); KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue , 792 N.W.2d 308, 328 (Iowa 2010) (“[W]e hold that a physical presence is not required under the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in order for the Iowa legislature to impose an income tax on revenue earned by an out-of-state corporation arising from the use of its intangibles by franchisees located within the State of Iowa.”); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue , 899 N.E.2d 87, 94-95 (Mass. 2009) (explaining “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Quill discussed a ‘physical-presence’ requirement under the commerce clause only in the context of sales and use taxes,” not taxes on royalty income); Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. , 640 S.E.2d 226, 232 (W. Va. 2006) (“[W]e conclude that Quill ’s physical-presence requirement for showing a substantial Commerce Clause nexus applies only to use and sales taxes and not to business franchise and corporation net income taxes.”); Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation , 908 A.2d 176, 176-77 (N.J. 2006) (concluding Quill does not prohibit a state from imposing a corporation business tax on physically non-present businesses); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n , 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 Continued . . . - 16 -

  76. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 17 DMA argues the Supreme Court has cited Quill in three cases reviewing state laws that did not impose a tax collection obligation, but these decisions merely describe points of law in Quill and do not actually extend its holding to other contexts. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez , 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009) (invoking Quill ’s due process analysis in a Tonnage Clause case to support the assertion that “a nondomiciliary jurisdiction may constitutionally tax property when that property has a substantial nexus with that jurisdiction, and such a nexus is established when the taxpayer avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in that jurisdiction” (quotations omitted)); MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue , 553 U.S. 16, 24-25 (2008) (invoking Quill to support the proposition that “[t]he Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause impose distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-of- state activities,” then relying on Quill ’s due process holding); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. , 520 U.S. at 572 n.8 (citing Quill in a string-cite for the & n.4 (S.C. 1993) (concluding the physical-presence requirement of Bellas Hess and Quill applies only to sales and use taxes). But see J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson , 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“Any constitutional distinctions between the franchise and excise taxes presented here and the use taxes contemplated in Bellas Hess and Quill are not within the purview of this court to discern.”). These cases generally interpret Quill to apply exclusively to sales and use taxes for two reasons relevant here. First, they emphasize the language in Quill itself, which stated “we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical- presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes.” 504 U.S. at 314. Second, they highlight Quill ’s stare decisis rationale rooted in the mail order industry’s reliance on Bellas Hess —a reliance interest absent in the context of other taxes. See KFC Corp. , 792 N.W.2d at 324. - 17 -

  77. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 18 proposition that Congress may “repudiate or substantially modify” Commerce Clause jurisprudence). None of the foregoing cases actually invokes Quill ’s dormant Commerce Clause analysis—only its due process analysis and discussion of congressional authority—and they do not demonstrate that Quill extends beyond the actual collection of taxes by out- of-state retailers. Indeed, the cases cited by DMA suggest that Quill has not been extended beyond that context. In sum, we conclude Quill applies narrowly to and has not been extended beyond tax collection. The district court erred in holding otherwise. In the following section, we address how this conclusion affects DMA’s claims. C. DMA’s Claims The district court granted summary judgment on two grounds: the Colorado Law (1) impermissibly discriminates against and (2) unduly burdens interstate commerce. As to both grounds, we review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, evaluating the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Sabourin v. Univ. of Utah , 676 F.3d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). We also review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah , 428 F.3d 966, 972 (10th Cir. 2005). When, as here, the target of state regulation alleges discrimination and undue burden, the analysis proceeds as follows: When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without - 18 -

  78. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 19 further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. . . . In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth. , 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (citations omitted). 1. Discrimination We turn first to DMA’s discrimination claim. A state law generally violates the dormant Commerce Clause if it discriminates—either on its face or in its practical effects—against interstate commerce. Hughes , 441 U.S. at 336. a. District court order The district court determined the Colorado Law discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. It determined that “the Act and the Regulations directly regulate and discriminate against out-of-state retailers and, therefore, interstate commerce.” Huber , 2012 WL 1079175, at *4. 16 It noted that under state law, 16 The district court stopped short of saying the law was facially discriminatory, noting: On their face the Act and the Regulations do not distinguish between in- state retailers (those with a physical presence—a brick and mortar presence—in the state) and out-of-state retailers (those with no physical presence in the state who make sales to customers in the state). Rather, the Act focuses on the distinction between retailers who collect Colorado sales tax and those who do not collect Colorado sales tax. Id. - 19 -

  79. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 20 “all retailers doing business in Colorado and selling to Colorado purchasers must obtain a sales tax license and must collect and remit the sales tax applicable to each sale,” id. (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-26-103, -104, -106, -204), and face civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance, id. (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-21-118(2), 39-26- 103(1)(a), (4)). It further noted that Quill precludes the state from imposing these requirements and penalties on out-of-state retailers without a physical presence in Colorado. Id. (citing Quill , 504 U.S. at 315). The district court recognized that, although the Colorado Law refers only to “any retailer that does not collect Colorado sales tax,” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112, the combination of state law and Quill guarantees that this provision applies only to out-of- state retailers. Huber , 2012 WL 1079175, at *4-5. The court concluded, “the veil provided by the words of the Act and the Regulations is too thin to support the conclusion that the Act and the Regulations regulate in-state and out-of-state retailers even- handedly.” Id. at *4. Although the Department pointed out that some out-of-state retailers voluntarily collect and remit Colorado sales tax and therefore are not subject to the Colorado Law, the district court determined the Department “may not condition an out-of-state retailer’s reliance on its rights on a requirement that the retailer accept a different burden, particularly when that burden is unique to out-of-state retailers.” Id. (citing Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc. , 486 U.S. 888, 893 (1988)). The district court therefore subjected the law to strict scrutiny, at which stage “the burden falls on the State to justify [the statute] both in terms of the local benefits flowing - 20 -

  80. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 21 from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.” Id. at *6 (quoting Hughes , 441 U.S. at 336). The court briefly canvassed the interests identified by the Department and the proposed non- discriminatory alternatives identified by DMA, and ultimately concluded “[t]he record contains essentially no evidence to show that the legitimate interests advanced by the defendant cannot be served adequately by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” Id. The court concluded the Department failed to carry its burden on the discrimination analysis and granted summary judgment to DMA. Id. at *7. b. Analysis A statute may discriminate against interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown , 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994). “The burden to show discrimination rests on the party challenging the validity of the statute . . . .” Hughes , 441 U.S. at 336. If the party challenging the state law meets its burden to show that the statute is discriminatory, the law “is virtually per se invalid.” Or. Waste , 511 U.S. at 99. When the Colorado Law is properly viewed in its factual and legal context, DMA has not carried its burden of showing discrimination against interstate commerce. We consider: (1) whether the Colorado Law facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) whether the Colorado Law’s direct effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests. - 21 -

  81. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 22 i. The Colorado Law Does Not Facially Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce The Colorado Law is not facially discriminatory. It applies to certain retailers that sell goods to Colorado purchasers but do not collect Colorado sales or use taxes. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I); 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5(1)(a)(i). On its face, the law does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state economic interests. It instead imposes differential treatment based on whether the retailer collects Colorado sales or use taxes. Some out-of-state retailers are collecting retailers, some are not. Although the title of the statute—An Act Concerning the Collection of Sales and Use Taxes on Sales Made by Out-Of-State Retailers—mentions out-of-state retailers, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For interpretive purposes, it is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase.” Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey , 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (quotations and alterations omitted). Here, the words of the statute are not ambiguous. The text refers to “[e]ach retailer that does not collect Colorado sales tax,” which distinguishes between those entities that collect Colorado sales tax and those that do not. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-21-112(c)(I), (d)(I)(A), (II)(A). We will not rely on the statute’s title to limit the plain meaning of the text. Moreover, when the Supreme Court has concluded a law facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it has done so based on statutory language explicitly identifying geographical distinctions. See, e.g. , General Motors Corp. v. Tracy , 519 U.S. 278, 307 n.15 (1997) (“[I]f a State discriminates against out-of-state interests by drawing - 22 -

  82. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 23 geographical distinctions between entities that are otherwise similarly situated, such facial discrimination will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny even if it is directed toward a legitimate health and safety goal.”). For example, the Court said the statute at issue in Oregon Waste was facially discriminatory because it imposed a higher surcharge on disposal of solid waste “generated out-of-state” than solid waste generated in-state. 511 U.S. at 96, 99-100. The Colorado Law makes no such geographic distinction. See, e.g. , Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md. , 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (concluding a statute did not facially discriminate by prohibiting producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations in Maryland, even though no producers or refiners were located in the state); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 352 (1977) (finding facially neutral a law requiring “all closed containers of apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the State bear no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard” (quotations omitted)). As explained above, the Colorado Law distinguishes between those retailers that collect Colorado sales and use tax and those that do not. 17 17 DMA contends the Colorado Law fails the internal consistency test. The test “looks to the structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate.” Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne , 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802 (2015) (quotations omitted). The test has been confined to dormant Commerce Clause review of state taxes. It is therefore inapplicable here because, again, the Colorado Law imposes a reporting requirement, not a tax. - 23 -

  83. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 24 In the absence of facial discrimination, a state law may nonetheless discriminate against interstate commerce in its direct effects. See Kleinsmith , 571 F.3d at 1040 (noting a law “may be neutral in its terms and still discriminate against interstate commerce”); Hunt , 432 U.S. at 350-52. We therefore next consider the direct effects of the Colorado Law. ii. The Colorado Law Is Not Discriminatory In Its Direct Effects A state law may violate the dormant Commerce Clause “when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests.” Brown-Forman , 476 U.S. at 579. In this inquiry, “the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.” Id. We conclude the Colorado Law does not favor in-state economic interests and is not discriminatory in its effects. We have previously said, “‘The Supreme Court has not directly spoken to the question of what showing is required to prove discriminatory effect where, as here, a statute is evenhanded on its face,” Kleinsmith , 571 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci , 505 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2007)). But we have held “the party claiming discrimination has the burden to put on evidence of a discriminatory effect on commerce that is ‘significantly probative, not merely colorable.’” Id. at 1040-41 (quoting All. of Auto Mfrs. v. Gwadosky , 430 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2005)). The party claiming discrimination must show that the state law benefits local actors and burdens - 24 -

  84. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 25 out-of-state actors, and the result must “alter[] the competitive balance between in-state and out-of-state firms.” Id. at 1041 (quotations omitted). 18 1) DMA’s arguments on differential treatment As a preliminary matter, DMA is incorrect that (a) “any differential treatment” between in-state and out-of-state entities establishes a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and (b) the Colorado Law should be viewed in isolation. Three principles are instructive. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that differential treatment must adversely affect interstate commerce to the benefit of intrastate commerce to trigger dormant Commerce Clause concerns. In that regard, “‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Or. Waste , 511 U.S. at 99; Kleinsmith , 571 F.3d at 1040 (“Discriminatory laws are those that ‘mandate differential treatment of in-state and out- of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.’” (quoting Granholm v. Heald , 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005)). For that reason, differential treatment that benefits or does not affect out-of-state interests is not a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. North Dakota v. United States , 495 U.S. 423, 439 (1990) (“A 18 In Kleinsmith , we determined the plaintiff had not presented evidence sufficient to establish a discriminatory effect because he had failed to show how the state law at issue “alters the competitive balance between resident and nonresident attorneys.” Id. at 1042. “In light of Exxon , Mr. Kleinsmith should at least have produced evidence that the work he had performed was now being done by attorneys who are residents of Utah.” Id. at 1043. DMA bears a similar burden here. - 25 -

  85. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 26 regulatory regime which so favors the Federal Government cannot be considered to discriminate against it.”). In light of the Colorado consumers’ preexisting obligations to pay sales or use taxes whether they purchase goods from a collecting or non-collecting retailer, the reporting obligation itself does not give in-state retailers a competitive advantage. We further note the Supreme Court has upheld differential tax reporting obligations and apportionment formulas for non-resident corporations, see, e.g. , Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain , 254 U.S. 113, 118-20 (1920); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd. , 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983), and administrative mechanisms to facilitate tax collection, see, e.g. , Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. , 252 U.S. 60 (1920). 19 Second, equal treatment requires that those similarly situated be treated alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. , 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that under the Equal Protection Clause, “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”). Conversely, disparate treatment is not unequal treatment or discrimination if the subjects of the treatment are not similarly situated. This basic principle of equal protection law applies to whether a state law discriminates against out-of-state actors relative to in-state actors. In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy , 519 U.S. 278 (1997), the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio statute that exempted local natural gas distribution companies (“LDCs”) 19 Although Travis involved a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supreme Court in Wynne recently relied on Travis to resolve a claim under the Commerce Clause. See Wynne , 135 S. Ct. at 1799-1800 (citing Travis , 252 U.S. at 75, 79-80). - 26 -

  86. Appellate Case: 12-1175 Document: 01019574558 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 Page: 27 from sales and use tax while out-of-state producers and marketers had to collect it. Id. at 281-82. The Court said the in-state and out-of-state companies were not similarly situated and did not have to be treated the same. Id. at 298-99, 310. Here, the non- collecting out-of-state retailers are not similarly situated to the in-state retailers, who must comply with tax collection and reporting requirements that are not imposed on the out-of-state non-collecting retailers. Third, despite DMA’s myopic view to the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that laws are not to be understood in isolation, but in their broader context. In West Lynn Creamery , the Court expressly declined to “analyze separately two parts of an integrated regulation,” and said it is “the entire program . . . that simultaneously burdens interstate commerce and discriminates in favor of local producers.” 512 U.S. at 201; see also Ala. Dep’t of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc. (“ CSX II ”), 135 S. Ct. 1136, 1143 (2015) (“It is undoubtedly correct that the ‘tax’ (singular) must discriminate—but it does not discriminate unless it treats railroads differently from other similarly situated taxpayers without sufficient justification .”); 20 North Dakota , 495 U.S. at 435 (“[T]he question whether a state regulation discriminates against the Federal Government cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, the entire regulatory system should be analyzed to determine whether it is discriminatory with regard to the economic 20 CSX II was not a dormant Commerce Clause case, but in analyzing the 4-R Act, the Court borrowed from dormant Commerce Clause precedent to explain a law should be assessed in context to determine whether it discriminates. Id. at 1143 (citing Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query , 286 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1932)). - 27 -

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