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Negotiation and Conflict Management 612 Week 7: Multi-Party Negotiations Dr. Eric Gladstone Do Your Canvas Assignments Do Your Canvas Assignments Video Analysis Including todays class, there are 3 remaini ning ng opportuni unities to


  1. Negotiation and Conflict Management 612 Week 7: Multi-Party Negotiations Dr. Eric Gladstone

  2. Do Your Canvas Assignments Do Your Canvas Assignments

  3. Video Analysis Including today’s class, there are 3 remaini ning ng opportuni unities to record your negotiation. More specifically, the week eek b bef efore e Break eak is t the e las ast o opportunity Laptops are generally best due to memory issues

  4. Final Paper Begin thinking about your final paper Conceptual write up of a real world negotiation Due date to be assigned

  5. Today’s Simulation 3 Firms: Representing Stockman, Turbo, United Find new ew p par artner ers, p per er u usual al May caucus in dy dyads ds for or up p to o 5 minutes Must wal alk aw away ay to caucus Prep ~ 20 minutes Return to class by 7:15 Only sign the agreement form if you ar are e included ed in the e ag agreem eemen ent

  6. Multi -Party Negotiations Often or necessarily involve: A group Norms Power Objectives, goals, interests, timelines Coalitions Allocation of Resources

  7. How Do We Allocate Resources In the absence of formal procedures, what logics can be employed? Without foundational logic: No precedents No expectations Vicious Cycle 3 general models Core, Shapley, Raiffa

  8. The Vicious Cycle Defining the logic of the problem using simultaneous equations Determine quota values by solving the following: Stockman = 0, Turbo = 0, United = 0 Stockman + Turbo = 440 Stockman + United = 380 Turbo + United = 300 Results in quota values totalling more than 480

  9. Distribution Logic 1: Core Solution Set(s) of alternatives which are undominated (McKelvey & Ordeshock, 1980) Alternatives exist in the core if no party can/wants to overthrow Remove 80k/3 from unadjusted quotas Stockman = 233 Turbo = 153 United = 93 But this makes no sense...

  10. Distribution Logic 2: Proportional to Quota Remove 80k as a function of unadjusted quota The proportion of the total quota held by each member: (46.4% x 80,000) = 222, 880 for Stockman (32.2% x 80,000) = 154, 240 for Turbo (21.4% x 80,000) = 102, 880 for United Susceptible to gaming

  11. Distribution Logic 3: Shapley Model Consider a group negotiation beginning with one person (Shapley, 1953) J oined by second player, third player, ad infinitum Examine all permutations of players joining one at a time Determines allocation based on agent’s pivotal power Ability to change the coalition from losing to winning Marginal value added to group’s outcome is attributed to x member Shapley value is the total value added/permutations of sequences

  12. Distribution Logic 3: Shapley Model Ummmmmmm… .what?

  13. Distribution Logic 3: Shapley Model

  14. Distribution Logic 3: Shapley Model

  15. Distribution Logic 3: Shapley Model 3 unique properties: No money left on the table Who get’s what depends on the pie they help create If someone doesn’t assist anyone else in creating value, they get none of the pie I know this is a relatively obtuse idea, so I will post a very well-done video explanation of it. It is very important to understand

  16. Distribution Logic 3: Shapley Model Core solution hurts low power/low resource player Shapley model hurts high power/high resource player Middle power/player is just tired of the bickering A middle-ground between Core and Shapley Raiffa’s hybrid model (1982)

  17. Distribution Logic 4: Raiffa’s Hybrid Model Easy: Mean of Shapley and Core models

  18. Power What is power? How is power distinct from status? Generally, power is non-consensual while status is consensual Power defined (Willer, 2009): 1)Differential access to valued resources 2)Inequity of dependence--to the extent that A is more dependent on B than B is on A, B is said to be more powerful than A

  19. Multi -Party Negotiations Informational complexity Alternative to agreement is being excluded Procedural & distribution processes require a logic Who speaks? Majority rule? Consensus? Who get’s what?

  20. A Note on Groups Promote diversity of thought Reduce outlier effects via centering on the mean (wisdom of crowds) J elly bean counting, moral decision making Group think: Irrational decision making as a group due to concerns for harmony, conformity (J anis, 1972) Suppress dissenters, discard criticality, isolation Ash experiments (1951)

  21. A Note on Groups

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