Naval Postgraduate School C4I Architecture Supporting Conduct of - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Naval Postgraduate School C4I Architecture Supporting Conduct of Defensive and Offensive Joint ASW Presented By: Gregory Miller Bill Traganza Matthew Letourneau Baasit Saijid 28 Oct 2009 (based on report # NPS-00-001) 1

Team Members Michael Clendening Alejandro Cuevas Amritpal Dhindsa Dennis Hopkins Matthew Letourneau Justin Loy James New Van Ngo Amrish Patel Baasit Saijid Bill Traganza • Commands represented by team – Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command -- Systems Center San Diego and Charleston – Naval Surface Warfare Center – Corona Division – Program Executive Office Littoral and Mine Warfare – Maritime Surveillance Systems Program Office – Program Executive Office C4I – Joint Tactical Radio System – Joint Program Executive Office – East Coast Electronic Warfare Systems – Communications-Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center • Project advisors: Gregory A. Miller & John M. Green 2

Project Purpose • Create a new standardized joint ASW-specific C4I architecture – To enhance the commander’s ability to execute the joint ASW mission in support of a combatant commander’s campaign objectives [NCOE JIC, 2005]. – To meet key ASW stakeholder requirements, addressing current capability gaps and responding to changing threats – To guide development, force composition, and acquisition decisions • Constrained to: – Target time frame: 2020 – Needs to use • Open standards • Common waveforms • Common data schema – Interoperable with existing & evolving systems – Vertically integrated with other DoD C4I systems 3

SE Process 4

Needs Analysis • Capability Gaps Analysis (Situation Today) • Stakeholders Analysis • Future Analysis • Functional Analysis

Situation Today • The submarine continues to be viewed by the United States as a threat - Growth of terror groups, rogue nations and the emergence of credible economic and political competitors - More capable, quieter, & affordable submarines • Platform-centric ASW C4I systems are not used in a networked fashion to share data - Limited situational awareness - Limited mission effectiveness 6

Summary of Stakeholder Input • Legacy & Evolved Systems – Platform-centric C4I systems – Platform-centric sensors – Platform-centric weapons – Limited interoperability • Future Systems – Networking to connect sensors & platforms – Information sharing – Improved information quality – Viewing through a COTP – fused, appropriate data – Conducting ASW as a Team 7

Draft Futures OV-1 ISR Assets ISR Assets FUTURE C4I (Manned, Unmanned, Space-based, National and - - - -based, National and Processing/Dissemination Centers) 2020 Maritime Forces Maritime Forces (Airborne and Sea (Airborne and Sea -Based -Based FORCE FORCE SUW and USW Forces) SUW and USW Forces) US Air Force B-52 NETWORKS NETWORKS Canadian Coast Guard Enemy Shipyard Shore Based Enemy Defense Forces ASW Net-Centric Sub Base (Sea, Air, Land Enemy Enemy Sub C4I System Air and Missile Sub Strike Force ASW Net-Centric C4I System Land Attack Forces Land Attack Forces US Coast Guard (including Strike Forces, (including Strike Forces, Coalition Forces Expeditionary Forces, Expeditionary Forces, Sustainment Forces Land Forces, and SOF) Land Forces, and SOF) (Sea and Shore-based) Free Space Optics FSO Sub to Sub Comms Enemy Sub Extended network infrastructure unmanned vehicle Sub 8

C2 System Functional Analysis 9 9

Value System ASW Net Centric C4I System A.0 Operational Effectiveness Operational Suitability Optimize Provide ASW Provide Provide Provide Provide Network Data/Information Connectivity Reliability Availability Maintainability Functions and Management Resources A.1 A.5 A.3 Interface with ASW Connect and Interconnect Maximize Achieved Minimize Maintenance Sensor and ASW Interface with Maximize Reliability Communication Availability hours Weapon Systems External Networks Nodes Identify, Store, Share Data Streams Manage and Manage and Exchange ASW Provide ASW A.1.1 A.1.2 A.1.3 Fuse ASW Data Control Network Spectrum COTP Data and Information M A.3.1 A.3.2 Maximize A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.3 A a MTBF (Mean Active Minimize Interfaces to Maximize GIG Network Join hours Maintenance) % connectivity external data Time Maximize the Maximize Maximize Maximize hours Streams Delivery of High Spectrum accuracy of availability of Priority Traffic COTP Availability Fused Data Net Ready # provided / Seconds # available Compliance # users with Spectrum (%) (%) Figure of Merit access / BW Required / Required / (FOM) # users BW Available Spectrum (%) (%) Available (%) Transfer ASW Provide ASW Manage ASW Enable Smart Information Data/Information Data from Pull/Push of Perform Transport ASW Publish/ Life Cycle and Machine to ASW Information Subscribe Optimize ASW Information from Machine Information Operations End 2 End Services Data/Info Handling A.2 A.4 A.5.3.1 A.5.3.1 A.5.3.2 A.5.3.4 A.5.3.3 Provide efficient Provide Provide Minimize Human Maximize use of data Minimize pull/ Provide Transmit ASW Deliver ASW Receive ASW Provide Physical Computer Electronic Information in the loop pub/sub services management push times Information Information Information Security Protection services Network Defense Assurance (IA) A.2.1 A.2.2 A.4.2 A.2.3 A.2.4 A.4.3 A.4.1 Percent of Response time #of systems Percent of time information Data /Information to User M2M enabled / Requests or posted and available #of systems published ≥ 99% Demands M2M capable Maximize Minimize Maximize Maximize Minimize Minimize 95%/99% < 1 sec (%) (%) Reception Maximize IA opportunity for Transmission Computer Delivery Time susceptibility to (%) (seconds) Protection physical Efficiency Efficiency Network Electronic Attack intrusion / attack Protection network nodes Compliance Latency Latency Throughput Information Throughput Protected comm protected by With ( milliseconds) (milliseconds) (Mbps) Delivered (Mbps) systems / IDSs, FWs DoD 5200.08-R, (< 1min / < 10 (%) Total # of comm # of systems have April 9, 2007 sec) systems ATO / total (%) (%) number of systems (%) 10 10 10

Top Six Evaluation Measures – # Users w/ access to COTP – Time Required to Push/Pull – Time Required to Fuse Data – Time to Interconnect Nodes – Transmit Latency – Transmit Throughput 11 11 11

Alternatives Generation • Baseline Architecture • Feasible Alternatives 12 12 12

Programs of Record & C4I Functionality DoD Teleport SINGLE INTEGRATION POINT FOR DISN (TERRESTRIAL & TACSAT COMMS); TELECOM COLLECTION & DISTRIBUTION POINT; MULTI-BAND, MULTIMEDIA, & WORLDWIDE REACH-BACK; STANDARDIZED TACTICAL ENTRY POINT EXTENTION; MULTIPLE MILCOMM & COMMSAT SYSTEMS; SEAMLESS DISN INTERFACE; INTER & INTRA-THEATER COMMUNICATIONS; INCREASED DISN ACCESS Transformational Satellite System Net-Centric Enterprise Services GLOBAL NET-CENTRIC OPERATIONS; UBIQUITOUS ACCESS; RELIABILITY; ORBIT-TO-GROUND LASER & RF COMMS; DECISION QUALITY INFORMATION; HI DATA RATE MILSAT COMMS & EMPOWER “EDGE” USER; INTERNET-LIKE SVCS; TASK, POST, PROCESS, USE, & STORE, MANAGE IMPROVED CONNECTIVITY/DATA TRANSFER; & PROTECT INFORMATION RESOURCES IMPROVED SATCOMMS ON DEMAND Global Information Grid Next Generation Enterprise Network COLLECTING, PROCESSING, STORING, OPEN ARCHITECTURE DISSEMINATING, & MANAGING INFO ON SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE DEMAND; OWNED & LEASED COMMS Joint Tactical Radio System Net-enabled Command Capability LOS / BLOS; MULTI-BAND, MULTI-MODE, MULTI-CHANNEL; NARROWBAND & JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL WIDEBAND WAVEFORMS; VOICE, VIDEO AND HIGH-SPEED DATA 13 13

FY2020 Baseline ASW C4I Architecture Alternative 0 14 14 14

Alternative Solutions Alternative 0 – FY2020 ASW C4I Baseline Architecture • Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) • Satellite communications link (SATCOM) • Surveillance and control datalink (SCDL) • Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) • RC-135: The Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) • Interface to the Tactical Control System (TCS) • Link-16 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 FY2020 ASW C4I Baseline Architecture plus: FY2020 ASW C4I Baseline Architecture plus: • JTRS improvements • JTRS improvements + • NECC improvements • CANES improvements • CANES improvements • Joint Track Manager Alternative 3 FY2020 ASW C4I Baseline Architecture plus: • Modulated X-ray source communications system • Autonomous C4ISR UUVs • Military High Altitude Airship (HAA) • Tropospheric or space-based distribution & COTP fusion • Wireless info push/pull directly to satellite or HAA based network. 15 15 15

Modeling and Simulation Results • Model Overview • Data Inputs • Comparison of Alternatives 16 16 16

Model Overview Published/Subscribed Information Users User Commands/Requests ASW Weapon Data ENGAGE – ASW DETECT - ASW ASW Sensor Data CONTROL – C4I ASW Weapon Tasking Sensor Systems Weapon Systems PA/CA/EA METOC Data ASW Threat METOC Used the EXTEND modeling and simulation tool ASW Sensor Tasking 17 17 17