CAM NC and its implementation 2019.12.05
PRISMA in a nutshell The PRISMA capacity platform offers easy access to infrastructure operators for the European energy community. 39 +640 Shippers TSOs +1700 4 Network points SSOs on the platform +7. +7.800 +8 +86.000 Secondary trades in 2018 Concluded contract in 2018 2
Agenda Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results 3
Agenda Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results 4
What is in the CAM NC 5
Most relevant obligations for capacity allocation • Standard capacity products (art. 9) • Publication and start of the auctions (from art. 11 to art. 15) • Allocation mechanisms: “Ascending clock auction” (art. 17) and “Uniform - price auction” (art. 18) • Bundled capacity products (art. 19) • Capacity booking platform and secondary Market (art.37) 6
Standard Capacity Products • Same products could be offered as “firm” or as “interruptible” capacity Balance Within-day of the day • All available capacity shall be offered bundled Daily Next day Monthly Next month Quarterly Max 12 months Yearly Min 5 years and max 15 years Ascending clock Uniform price 7
ENTSOG Auction calendar 8
Organization of WD products 1h 1h 2h 2h 3h 3h 4h 4h • Day-ahead auction for the product runtime of the 5h 5h next gas day takes place everyday at 16:30 6h 6h CE(S)T 7h 7h 8h 8h • The first within-day auction has the same 9h 9h 10h 10h product runtime (06:00-06:00) and it starts at 11h 11h 19:00 CE(S)T 12h 12h 13h 13h • Every consecutive within-day auctions starts at 14h 14h full hour and lasts for 30 minutes. 15h 15h 16h 16h • The last Within-day auction starts at 01:00 for 17h 17h the product runtime of 05:00 – 06:00 18h 18h (the same gas day) 19h 19h 20h 20h 21h 21h 22h 22h 23h 23h 24h 24h 24h 24h 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 Gas Day D-1 Gas Day D 9
Agenda Main elements of the regulation Auction Algorithms Secondary Market Auction results 10
Auction algorithms Ascending clock 11
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock • Demand and available Price capacity Available capacity 3 • Defined price steps 2 • Ascending price 1 Amount 1 2 3 0 12
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock • There are different possible behaviors • Example 1: Undersell in first bidding round • Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round • Example 3: Oversell • Example 4: Undersell 13
Ascending Clock Example 1: Undersell in 1st bidding round 14
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 1: Undersell in 1 st bidding round • Round 0.0, RT Price • Less demand than available avail. capacity capacity • Auction closes after Round 0.0 • Only RT will be charged P 0 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 round (0.0) Legend : Amount P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 15
Ascending Clock Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round 16
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 2: Clearance in first bidding round • Round 0.0, only Regulated Price Tariff (RT) applies avail. capacity • The available capacity is fully requested by the four participants • The auction closes after P 0 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 round 0.0 round (0.0) Legend : Amount • Only RT will be charged P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 17
Ascending Clock Example 3: Oversell 18
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 3: Oversell • Round 0.0, RT Price • More demand than available avail. capacity capacity (oversell) P 0 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 round (0.0) Legend : Amount P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 19
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 3: Oversell • Round 1.0, RT + 1 large price Price step (LPS) avail. capacity • B3 reduced bid • B5 dropped out P 1 • Still an oversell situation 2. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 round (1.0) P 0 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 round (0.0) Legend : Amount P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 20
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 3: Oversell • Round 2.0, RT + 2 LPSs Price • B4 reduces their bid avail. capacity • B6 drops out P 2 • Perfect sell-out 3. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 round (0.0) P 1 • The auction closes after B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 P 0 round 2.0 with RT + 2 LPSs 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 round (0.0) applied Legend : Amount P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 21
Ascending Clock Example 4: Undersell 22
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 4: Undersell • Round 0.0, RT Price • More demand than available avail. capacity capacity (oversell) P 0 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 round (0.0) Legend : Amount P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 23
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 4: Undersell • Round 1.0, RT + 1 large price Price step (LPS) avail. capacity • B3 reduced bid • B5 dropped out P 1 • Still an oversell situation 2. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 round (1.0) 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 round (0.0) Legend : Amount P 0 Regulated Tariff B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 24
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 4: Undersell • Round 2.0, RT + 2 LPSs Price • B4 and B6 drop out avail. capacity • This results in an undersell P 2 3. bidding B1 B2 B3 round (2.0) P 1 B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 P 0 1. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 round (0.0) Legend : Amount P 0 Price step (P 0 =Regulated Tariff) B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 25
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 4: Undersell • Previous LPS (2.0) is reversed Price • 1 st small price step (SMP) is avail. capacity added to RT + 1 LPS • This is now Round 1.1, RT + P 2 1LPS + 1SMP 3. bidding round (2.0) • B4 is back in P 1.1 3. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 round (1.1) P 1 2. bidding • B1, B2 & B3 have to bid min. P1 B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 round (1.0) P 0 amount B5 B1 B2 B4 B6 B3 • Oversell Amount Legend : P 0 Price step (P 0 =Regulated Tariff) B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 26
Auction algorithm – Ascending clock Example 4: Undersell • Round 1.2, RT + 1LPS + 2SMPs Price • B4 reduces their requested avail. capacity capacity • B1, B2 & B3 still have to stick to P 2 their capacity 3. bidding round (2.0) P 1.2 4. bidding B3 B4 B1 B2 round (1.2) • Auction closes with perfect P 1.1 B1 B2 B3 B4 P 1 sell-out 2. bidding B1 B2 B3 B4 B6 round (1.0) P 0 • RT + 1LPS + 2SMPs will be B1 B4 B5 B6 B2 B3 Amount charged Legend : P 0 Price step (P 0 =Regulated Tariff) B1 - Bn Bid 1 to Bid n 27
Bearing in mind • Participation in first bidding round • Ratio between the total demand and the available capacity • Amount of the bid 28
Auction algorithms Uniform price 29
Auction algorithm – Uniform price • There are different possible behaviors • Example 1: Fill procedure • Example 2: Kill procedure • Example 3: Pro-rata allocation • Example 4: Demand lower than available capacity 30
Auction algorithm – Uniform price Basics Surcharge • Uniform price auctions only avail. capacity have one bidding round Clearing Price • Bids contain a surcharge, a Surcharge minimum and a maximum A B capacity amount • Evaluation and allocation of Amount Amount capacity is done after the Legend : bidding round is closed Maximum amount Shipper A Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper B 31
Uniform Price Example 1: Fill Procedure 32
Auction algorithm – Uniform price Example 1: Fill procedure Surcharge • During evaluation, overdemand avail. capacity is detected • A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge A B C • C’s maximum exceeds available capacity Amount Legend : • C’s maximum is cut to fill the Maximum amount Shipper A Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper B remaining capacity Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C 33
Auction algorithm – Uniform price Example 1: Fill procedure Surcharge • During evaluation, overdemand avail. capacity is detected • A & B get full amounts because of the higher surcharge A B C C • C’s maximum exceeds available capacity Amount Legend : • C’s maximum is cut to fill the Maximum amount Shipper A Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper B remaining capacity Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C 34
Auction algorithm – Uniform price Example 1: Fill procedure Surcharge • Bid with minimum surcharge avail. capacity that gets capacity sets clearing price for the auction Clearing A Price B C Amount Legend : Maximum amount Shipper A Maximum amount Shipper B Minimum amount Shipper A Minimum amount Shipper B Maximum amount Shipper C Minimum amount Shipper C 35
Uniform Price Example 2: Kill Procedure 36
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