Five years of the Right to be Forgotuen Kurt Thomas, with Theo Bertram, Elie Bursztein, Stephanie Caro, Hubert Chao, Rutledge Chin Feman, Peter Fleischer, Albin Gustafsson, Jess Hemerly, Chris Hibbert, Luca Invernizzi, Lanah Kammourieh Donnelly, Jason Ketover, Jay Laefer, Paul Nicholas, Yuan Niu, Harjinder Obhi, David Price, Andrew Strait, and Al Verney Security and Privacy Group
Right to be Forgotuen (RTBF) Delist “ inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive ” information surgaced by search queries containing the name of the requester. Security and Privacy Group
Balancing between individual privacy, public interest Security and Privacy Group
Balancing between individual privacy, public interest Decision made by search provider via manual review Security and Privacy Group
Example of balancing test Request A former politician requested to delist 3 URLs from Google Search reporuing on his recent deparuure from politics in connection with a drug scandal. Outcome Google delisted the 3 URLs as they disclosed the politician’s private home addresses, not just information about the scandal. Security and Privacy Group
Example of balancing test Request A former politician requested to delist 3 URLs from Google Search reporuing on his recent deparuure from politics in connection with a drug scandal. Outcome Google delisted the 3 URLs as they disclosed the politician’s private home addresses, not just information about the scandal. Security and Privacy Group
Over the last fjve years then... 3M 45% 502,000 Requested URLs URLs delisted Requesters Security and Privacy Group
Our measurement study Types of sites Information Entities creating requested present on site requests Security and Privacy Group
Provider greater transparency around how the RTBF is applied in practice Security and Privacy Group
Review process & dataset Security and Privacy Group
Data present in a request Email address URLs to delist Country Timestamp Security and Privacy Group
Manual annotations added during review Type of site Social, directory, news, government records Information on page Personal information, professional information, crime, political, self-authored ... Requesting entity Minor, government offjcial, corporate entity... Security and Privacy Group
Five years of data, since implementation 47,000 Average URLs per month Security and Privacy Group
Average time to arrive at a decision 85 days 6 days 2014 2019 Security and Privacy Group
Average time to arrive at a decision 85 days 6 days 2014 2019 Security and Privacy Group
Which sites are requested for delisting? Security and Privacy Group
Two dominant intents for delistings 16% 13% 19% 2% Directory Social media News Government Personal information Legal history Security and Privacy Group
Infmuenced by regional privacy atuitudes and local norms France Italy Spain 42% 33% 10% Directory, Social media News Government (vs. 29% across Europe) (vs. 19% across Europe) (vs. 2% across Europe) Security and Privacy Group
Delisting rates refmect public interest balancing 19% 35% 53% Government News Directory, Social media Security and Privacy Group
Increasing share of requests to news Examples include: dailymail.co.uk ouest-france.fr telegraph.co.uk repubblica.it Security and Privacy Group
Declining share of requests to social media Examples include: facebook.com twituer.com youtube.com plus.google.com instagram.com Security and Privacy Group
Infmuence of GDPR on directory requests Afuer GDPR, only 55% of the top 500 requested directory sites remain online. Examples include: 118712.fr societe.com 192.com Security and Privacy Group
What information is requested for delisting? Security and Privacy Group
Professional activities, contact Professional & personal information most common info, addresses, medical status, and more. Professional information Predominantly on directory sites. Personal information Sensitive personal information 2% 24% 8% Professional activities, contact information, 34% of all phone numbers, and mailing addresses. requested URLs Security and Privacy Group
Criminal records and negative reviews also common Crime Professional wrongdoing 9% 8% 24% Convictions, acquitals, 17% of all or negative reviews. requested URLs Security and Privacy Group
Remaining types of common information Political Self-authored Name not found 24% 20% 9% 4% 24% 33% of requested URLs Security and Privacy Group
Affjnity of types of information to difgerent sites News Professional information 18% Personal information 3% Crime 22% Professional wrongdoing 22% Self authored 5% Name not found 10% ... Security and Privacy Group
Affjnity of types of information to difgerent sites News Social Media Professional information 18% 8% Personal information 3% 5% Crime 22% 3% Professional wrongdoing 22% 2% Self authored 5% 33% Name not found 10% 29% ... Security and Privacy Group
Delisting rates refmect public interest Criticism of platgorm Personal addresses, or activities contact info, photos 3% 48% 97% Political Crime Personal information Security and Privacy Group
Who makes delisting requests? Security and Privacy Group
Majority of requested URLs come from private individuals 6% 4% 4% 2% 84% Minor Public fjgure Politician Corporate entity Private individual Security and Privacy Group
Small number of requesters make heavy use of RTBF 34% Requested URLs from just 10K requesters Security and Privacy Group
Long tail of hundreds of thousands of requesters 29% Requested URLs from 400K requesters 34% Requested URLs from just 10K requesters Security and Privacy Group
Requester activity varies by country URLs requested per 1000 Internet users 12 France 7 Italy 3 Greece Security and Privacy Group
Decreasing number of new requesters 6,800 Average new requesters per month Security and Privacy Group
Relationship between requester’s origin and audience Origin of requester, by volume of requested URLs News Site Belgium Germany Spain France UK hln.be 89% 0% 0% 1% 2% nieuwsblad.be 93% 0% 0% 0% 0% Over 89% of requests to top Belgian news sites come from local requesters Security and Privacy Group
Relationship between requester’s origin and audience Origin of requester, by volume of requested URLs News Site Belgium Germany Spain France UK hln.be 89% 0% 0% 1% 2% nieuwsblad.be 93% 0% 0% 0% 0% bild.de 0% 96% 0% 1% 2% elmundo.es 0% 1% 96% 1% 1% elpais.com 0% 0% 97% 1% 0% Security and Privacy Group
Relationship between requester’s origin and audience Origin of requester, by volume of requested URLs News Site Belgium Germany Spain France UK hln.be 89% 0% 0% 1% 2% nieuwsblad.be 93% 0% 0% 0% 0% bild.de 0% 96% 0% 1% 2% elmundo.es 0% 1% 96% 1% 1% elpais.com 0% 0% 97% 1% 0% ouest-france.fr 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% lefjgaro.fr 0% 0% 0% 99% 0% bbc.co.uk 0% 0% 0% 0% 97% dailymail.co.uk 0% 1% 0% 2% 92% Security and Privacy Group
Conclusion Nuanced, dynamic Challenge in providing usage of the RTBF transparency without over last fjve years. de-anonymizing specifjc requesters. Infmuenced in paru by local privacy concerns and media norms. Security and Privacy Group
Research now refmected in Transparency Reporu htup://transparencyreporu.google.com/eu-privacy/ Security and Privacy Group
Thanks! kuruthomas@google.com Security and Privacy Group
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