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Berlin University of Technology Department of Energy Systems www.ensys.tu-berlin.de Electricity markets with a predominant share of renewable generation Can competition survive? Dipl.-Ing. Niels Ehlers Department of Energy Systems Technical


  1. Berlin University of Technology Department of Energy Systems www.ensys.tu-berlin.de Electricity markets with a predominant share of renewable generation Can competition survive? Dipl.-Ing. Niels Ehlers Department of Energy Systems Technical University of Berlin niels.ehlers@tu-berlin.de www.ensys.tu-berlin.de Dipl.-Ing. Niels Ehlers

  2. Two roads diverged… (Robert Frost 1875) 1996 2010 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament: 1. enable competitive electricity markets (2) www.epexspot.com 2. priority may be given to the production of electricity from renewable sources (28) www.n-pv.de Niels Ehlers- 2 -

  3. German National Renewable Energy Action Plan - Electricity Explicit promotion of specific technologies by means of feed-in tariffs Power [ GW] Energy [ TWh] 120 600 9 100 10 500 80 ? 36 400 60 300 40 200 49 52 32 20 100 73 41 4 20 0 0 Hydropower Geothermal Photovoltaics Wind Onshore Wind Offshore Biomass Demand Source: Nationaler Aktionsplan für erneuerbare Energie gemäß der Richtlinie 2009/28/EG zur Förderung der Nutzung von Energie aus erneuerbaren Quellen Niels Ehlers- 3 -

  4. Scenario 2030 - Residual load with growing shares of renewable generation 80 Little change Demand in peak W ind Onshore demand! 70 W ind Offshore Biomass PV How can this 60 Residual load capacity be Export/Storage financed? 50 Lost sales of fossile power plants Power 40 [GW ] 30 Powerplants need to be more flexible 20 10 0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Hours Niels Ehlers- 4 -

  5. The result: Grid situation Christmas 2009 Wind >20.000 MW ! 20 800 Load / Infeed Dispatch of 700 [GW] fossile powerplants (different scale) 15 600 500 Day-Ahead 10 400 Price [Euro/MWh] 300 5 200 Windpower Real 100 Windpower Prognosis 0 0 Vertical Gridload (East Germany) Even baseload plants EPEX Day Ahead -100 (Nuclear) Spotprice must reduce Spot Price: -5 -200 09/12/23 09/12/24 09/12/25 09/12/26 09/12/27 09/12/28 09/12/29 09/12/30 Minus 200 €/MWh Niels Ehlers- 5 -

  6. Back to the basics: market fundamentals • All markets are based on the trade of limited (constrained) goods or resources. • Each constrained resource can be assigned a shadow price of relaxing this constraint (i.e. expand production) by one unit. • The price should be made equal to marginal cost . • When average costs are decreasing, marginal costs are less than average costs, the total amount paid for the product will fall short of total costs See for example: R. H. COASE 1946: The Marginal Cost Controversy Niels Ehlers- 6 -

  7. A market perspective on electricity I Specifics of the electricity market: • Different technologies with highly varying cost factors • Short –run marginal costs (SRMC): – consumption of primary energy (coal, gas, U 3 O 8 ) or use of emission certificates – opportunity costs of (pumped-)storage power plants – near zero for most renewable generation units – negative for fossil units with binding technical constraints (must-run) • Long –run marginal costs: – capacity expansion (capital costs) / building new power plants – capacity maintenance and repair / maintaining existing power plants Niels Ehlers- 7 -

  8. A market perspective on electricity II Theory: • A cost-minimal and CO 2 -constrained system has a definite set of shadow-prices for electricity and CO 2 that leads to full cost-recovery of all market participants. (Holds only for the case of a linear cost function) • Additional min/max capacity constraints for certain technologies raise the total costs of the system and lead to shortfalls or windfall profits. Price components: • Case 1 (Germany): No capacity markets: – One price for short-run marginal costs – Long-term costs can only be recovered while the system is either • not cost-minimal (expansion restrictions for nuclear power plants, lack of new market entrants) or • in the event of scarcity (Value of Lost Load Pricing) • Case 2 (PJM): Capacity payments: – Long-term costs are recovered on the capacity market Niels Ehlers- 8 -

  9. Our market model • Linear Optimization Model – Target Function: Minimize Costs! • Construction Costs • Fuel Costs • Costs for load gradients (to represent startup costs) – Subject to constraints: • Load-Serving (Renewables allowed to be curtailed) • CO 2 -Emission Cap • Minimum uptime requirements (linear representation) • Simulation Period 10/2008 – 10/2009 • Input data for Germany – Weather data – Wind/Solar/Temperature (very low wind activity during this period – worst case) – Real electricity demand data – Averaged commodity prices 2008-2010 – Annualized capital costs for different technologies Niels Ehlers- 9 -

  10. Scenario Results: The way to carbon-free generation • Scenario including nuclear generation Third step: 300 Expansion of storage capacities Storage Second step: 250 Extension of offshore Peaking Unit wind backed up by CCGT Gas Turbine First step: 200 CCGT Installed Fuel switching from coal to gas Coal Capacity 150 [GW] Nuclear (max 20GW) Photovoltaic (min 30GW) 100 Wind offshore Wind onshore (min 30GW) 50 0 300 200 100 50 25 0 CO 2 -Emissions per year [Mio.t/a] Niels Ehlers- 10 -

  11. Scenario Results: Price Duration Curves - BAU 300 Mio.t CO2 (28 billion €/a) SRMC of fossile power plants 10000 Shadow Price of load constraint Price spike of shadow prices 1000 Price spike that that covers the fixed costs Price covers the fix costs [€/MWh] 100 10 1 Hours per year 1 8760 only generation costs Niels Ehlers- 11 -

  12. Scenario Results: Low Emission Scenario 25 Mio.t CO2 (34 billion €/a) SRMC of fossile power plants 10000 Shadow Price of load constraint 1000 Price [€/MWh] 100 Pumped-Storage plants set the price 10  Opportunity costs 1 Hours per year 1 8760 Niels Ehlers- 12 -

  13. Scenario Results: Zero Emission Szenario 0 Mio.t CO2 (42 billion €/a) SRMC of fossile power plants 10000 Shadow Price of load constraint 1000 Price Windfall Profits of nuclear [€/MWh] generation if deprecated 100 Ramping Costs of nuclear generation units 10 Including 20 GW nuclear generation 1 Hours per year 1 8760 Niels Ehlers- 13 -

  14. Scenario Results: Market results 50 Mio.t CO2/year (including 20 GW nuclear) [Mio. Euro] Total Marginal Costs Short-Term Marginal Explanation (Shadow prices) Costs (Spot-Market) Onshore Wind 164,8 160,1 Losses Offshore Wind 0,0 85,4 Losses Photvoltaics 1.185,8 1.164,0 Losses Nuclear Power -5.089,7 -4.484,6 Profits CCGT 0,0 1.205,9 Losses Gas Turbine 0,0 293,0 Losses Peaking Unit 0,0 49,7 Losses Pumped-Hydro 0,0 359,8 Losses -3.239,9 -3.239,9 Taxes CO 2 Market Customers 39.130,6 36.616,8 Sale revenues Market Results(Dual Solution) 32.151,6 32.210,0 Costs (Primal Solution) 32.151,6 32.151,6 System costs Difference 0,0 -58,4 No opportunity costs of storage Fixed costs covered by price spike: 775 Mio. Euro plants considered in spot prices! In sum, revenues cover the total costs, but while nuclear power plants generate huge profits , fossil power plants and especially renewables cannot recover their total costs with market prices based on SRMC. Niels Ehlers- 14 -

  15. Scenario Results: Market results 50 Mio.t CO2/year (nuclear phase out) [Mio. Euro] Total Marginal Costs Short-Term Marginal Explanation (Shadow prices) Costs (Spot-Market) Onshore Wind 212,7 755,0 Losses Offshore Wind 0,0 2.557,0 Losses Photvoltaics 1.045,1 1.180,5 Losses Nuclear Power CCGT 0,0 1.121,0 Losses Gas Turbine 0,0 275,1 Losses Peaking Unit 0,0 66,8 Losses Pumped-Hydro 0,0 168,2 Losses -4.289,5 -4.289,5 Taxes CO 2 Revenues Load Serving 40.553,1 35.839,7 Sale revenues Sum (Dual) 37.521,4 37.673,8 Costs (Primal) -37.521,4 -37.521,4 System costs Difference 0,0 152,3 Fixed costs covered by price spike: 735 Mio. Euro In this scenario, the revenues do not cover the total costs including CO 2 . Niels Ehlers- 15 -

  16. Conclusions I • Many market participants in Germany can incur losses in the future due to two effects: – Change of the merit-order by subsidized market entries • Not a problem of market design! • Just similar to changing demand. • Danger of sunk costs and stationary higher system costs. – Losses due to pure SRMC-pricing • Inherent to the market design • In the range of ~2-5% of the system costs • Can be reduced by the use of peak load DSM with low fixed costs • An enhanced operating reserves market might cover remaining costs • Capacity payments might become necessary but less of the fact of wrong market design but more because the pace of installation of renewable resources highly exceeds regular investment cycles of fossil generation. Niels Ehlers- 16 -

  17. Berlin University of Technology Department of Energy Systems www.ensys.tu-berlin.de Thank you for your attention! DI Niels Ehlers Department of Energy Systems Technical University of Berlin niels.ehlers@tu-berlin.de www.ensys.tu-berlin.de Dipl.-Ing. Niels Ehlers

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