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Can Separation reduce Non-Price Discrimination and increase Welfare? Duarte Brito Pedro Pereira Joo Vareda Background 2 vertically integrated firm wholesale monopolist incentives discriminate retail rivals Background 3 non-price


  1. Can Separation reduce Non-Price Discrimination and increase Welfare? Duarte Brito Pedro Pereira João Vareda

  2. Background 2 vertically integrated firm wholesale monopolist incentives discriminate retail rivals

  3. Background 3 non-price discrimination harder to detect/prosecute than price discrimination

  4. Background 4 various types of vertical separation proposed in different contexts e.g., Regulation of NGN

  5. Background 5 Reasoning : 1) vertically integrated firm discriminates 2) separation eliminates discrimination 3) no-discrimination increases welfare

  6. Plan 6 (1) Model (2) Discrimination (3) Separation (4) Conclusion

  7. Part 1 of 4 7 Model

  8. Industry 8 Two Overlapping Markets wholesale market retail market

  9. Wholesale Market 9 wholesale market produces input indispensable for retail market a – access price regulated monopolist wholesaler

  10. Retail Market 10 incumbent’s retailer entrant D – relative quality horizontal and vertical differentiated

  11. Vertical Integration and Separation 11 incumbent = wholesaler + incumbent’s retailer incumbent may be separated

  12. Quality Degradation 12 wholesaler can degrade quality of input demand-reducing/cost-increasing

  13. Pricing 13 retail: two-part tariffs wholesale: linear tariff, a only wholesale regulated

  14. Timing 14 (1) regulator decides separation (2) wholesaler decides degradation (3) retail competition

  15. Comments 15 no vertical-integration economies same access price

  16. 16 Part 2 of 4 Discrimination

  17. Discrimination: Vertical Integration 17 against entrant a low & D low no discrimination a high D high

  18. Discrimination: Vertical Separation 18 against entrant a low & D low against incumbent’s retailer a low & D high no discrimination a high & D intermediate

  19. Comparison 19 set of parameter values for which there is degradation against entrant is smaller under separation discrimination against entrant may increase with separation incumbent’s retailer may be discriminated against no discrimination under integration and separation, if a high entrant always discriminated if ( a , D ) low

  20. Comparison 20

  21. Comparison 21

  22. Comparison 22 almost anything goes!

  23. Welfare 23 discrimination can  welfare if D low: entrant if D high: incumbent’s retailer discriminate low quality

  24. 24 Part 3 of 4 Separation

  25. Welfare 25 Effects : (1) double-marginalization: - (2) discrimination: + / -

  26. Integration Socially Optimal 26 Integration Separation no discrimination  no discrimination no discrimination  discriminate inc. discriminate ent.  no discrimination discriminate ent.  discriminate ent. D low

  27. Vertical Structure 27 otherwise socially optimal decision potentially ambiguous

  28. Part 4 of 4 28 Conclusion

  29. Conclusions 29 (1) separation can, but need not eliminate discrimination (2) sometimes discrimination is good (3) use vertical separation with care!

  30. 30 thank you pedro.br.pereira@gmail.com

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