Can Separation reduce Non-Price Discrimination and increase Welfare? Duarte Brito Pedro Pereira João Vareda
Background 2 vertically integrated firm wholesale monopolist incentives discriminate retail rivals
Background 3 non-price discrimination harder to detect/prosecute than price discrimination
Background 4 various types of vertical separation proposed in different contexts e.g., Regulation of NGN
Background 5 Reasoning : 1) vertically integrated firm discriminates 2) separation eliminates discrimination 3) no-discrimination increases welfare
Plan 6 (1) Model (2) Discrimination (3) Separation (4) Conclusion
Part 1 of 4 7 Model
Industry 8 Two Overlapping Markets wholesale market retail market
Wholesale Market 9 wholesale market produces input indispensable for retail market a – access price regulated monopolist wholesaler
Retail Market 10 incumbent’s retailer entrant D – relative quality horizontal and vertical differentiated
Vertical Integration and Separation 11 incumbent = wholesaler + incumbent’s retailer incumbent may be separated
Quality Degradation 12 wholesaler can degrade quality of input demand-reducing/cost-increasing
Pricing 13 retail: two-part tariffs wholesale: linear tariff, a only wholesale regulated
Timing 14 (1) regulator decides separation (2) wholesaler decides degradation (3) retail competition
Comments 15 no vertical-integration economies same access price
16 Part 2 of 4 Discrimination
Discrimination: Vertical Integration 17 against entrant a low & D low no discrimination a high D high
Discrimination: Vertical Separation 18 against entrant a low & D low against incumbent’s retailer a low & D high no discrimination a high & D intermediate
Comparison 19 set of parameter values for which there is degradation against entrant is smaller under separation discrimination against entrant may increase with separation incumbent’s retailer may be discriminated against no discrimination under integration and separation, if a high entrant always discriminated if ( a , D ) low
Comparison 20
Comparison 21
Comparison 22 almost anything goes!
Welfare 23 discrimination can welfare if D low: entrant if D high: incumbent’s retailer discriminate low quality
24 Part 3 of 4 Separation
Welfare 25 Effects : (1) double-marginalization: - (2) discrimination: + / -
Integration Socially Optimal 26 Integration Separation no discrimination no discrimination no discrimination discriminate inc. discriminate ent. no discrimination discriminate ent. discriminate ent. D low
Vertical Structure 27 otherwise socially optimal decision potentially ambiguous
Part 4 of 4 28 Conclusion
Conclusions 29 (1) separation can, but need not eliminate discrimination (2) sometimes discrimination is good (3) use vertical separation with care!
30 thank you pedro.br.pereira@gmail.com
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