CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND IDEOLOGY IN REGARDS TO CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION Amy Mailo
Approval of Congress and levels of productivity (Dugan 2011) (Congress)
(Grandlund 2013)
Aftermath of Congressional Gridlock Government shutdown in 2013 ● ● Stalling of serious reforms Increase of fi filibusters used ● ● (Berman 2016) (Klein 2013)
Party Polarization → Congressional Gridlock Extremity of polarization results in worsened gridlock (Johnstone 2013, 218; La Raja 2016, 225; Mann ● 2003, 28; Pildes 2011, 293) Campaign Finance Statutes → Party Polarization Urgency of reducing levels of party polarization (Berman 2016) ● Possible cause ●
Project Goal To what extent, is the composite stringency of campaign fi finance laws correlated ● with the levels of party polarization in regard to Citizens United ? Hypothesis: lenient campaign fi finance laws → more party polarization. Strength of ● variables will increase after Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. Assumption about Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission ●
Roadmap Literature Review ● ● Methodology Findings and Discussion ● ● Limitations Conclusion ●
Literature Review
(Carrol and Lewis 2014)
Party Polarization and Campaign Finance Laws enable an idealist-centered political climate (Tarhan 2010, 10) ● ○ Ideological donors and campaign fi finance law (Corrado and Mann 2014, 22) Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission , 2010 ruling ● Unravelling of stricter legislation (Corrado and Mann 2014, 11; Fuller 2014; La Raja and Schafffner 2016, 103) ○ ■ Precedent?
Hole in the Body of Knowledge/Delimitations Campaign Finance Law and Party Polarization ● ○ Unexplored Importance of gap ● Should be clear what can reduce the severity of these problems ○ ● Delimitations What my research specifi fically set out to fi find ○
Methodology
Methodology Background Knowledge: EBSCOHost, SAGE Publications, etc. ● Why quantitative? ● Regression analysis: variables relationship before and after Citizens United ○ Summed dummy variable: stringency of laws (National Conference of State Legislatures 2012) ○ Christopher Witko’s study in 2005 “Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign ● Finance Regulation” Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty in 2015 “State Legislative Aggregate Ideology Data ● June 2015 Update.”
Table 1. Evaluation of Composite Stringency of Campaign Finance Laws Table, 2002 and 2012 Contribution Limits (7) Disclosure Requirements (8) Public Financing Provisions (7) i. Contribution limits on individuals i.Aggregate expenditure reporting i.Total expenditure limit ii.Prohibition of direct corporate contributions ii.Aggregate contributions reporting ii.Check-off on tax return form for contribution to public funding iii.Prohibition of direct labor union iii.Itemization (to list) of some categories of iii.Independent revenue source for public funding contributions expenditures iv.Limits on corporate contributions (direct or iv.Itemization of some categories of contributions iv.Public financing of statewide campaigns PACs) v.Limits on labor union contributions (direct or v.Itemization of expenditures over $50 v.Public financing of state legislative campaigns PACs) vi.Limits on candidate self-financing vi.Itemization of contributions over $50 vi.Public financing of political parties vii.Limits on candidate family contributions vii.Requirement of final report within one month of an vii.Equal distribution of public funds between candidates election and/or parties viii.Requirement of reports on at least a quarterly basis (Witko 2005, 298-301)
Findings and Discussion
Discussion of Results Hypothesis vs. Results ● ○ Positive, not negative correlation Strength of variables relationship ○ 2002-2004 value of R- 0.0697 ■ 2012-2014 value of R- 0.1187 ■ ● Unexpected Findings Little evidence ○ 75% of states tested retained same score ○
Figure 1. Figure 2.
Discussion cont. Role of Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission ● ○ Relationship grew stronger from Figure 1 to 2 by +0.049 Correlation does not mean causation ● Other factors/variables unaccounted for ○ ○ This study explored a causal relationship between two variables
Corresponds Challenges Campaign fi finance laws reform slowly Stricter campaign fi finance laws (Berman 2016; Corrado and Mann 2014; La Raja 2016, 225) equates to less party polarization, right (La Raja and Schafffner 2016) Campaign fi finance laws don’t infl fluence Stricter contribution limits lead to much. Example: corruption levels (Cordis more competition (Flavin 2015, 77; Hogan 2000, 941-946) and Milyo 2013, 13)
Limitations
Major Limitations Methodology ● Summed Dummy Variable Approach and its value of items ○ ■ Same evaluation table: new laws adapting to technology Mitigation: pragmatic choice among method options ■ Expertise ● ○ Lack of knowledge Mitigation: aid of consultants ■
Conclusion
Conclusion Implications ● ○ Refuted hypothesis Campaign fi finance laws are insignifi ficant in regards to polarization ○ Future Directions ● ○ Survey voting citizens and political scientist experts on major cause of party polarization
References Berman, Russell. 2016. “What’s the Solution to Political Polarization in the U.S.?” The Atlantic , (accessed December 23, 2016). Carrol, Royce and Jeff Lewis. In Congress as well as Public, the Center Increasingly Cannot Hold. 2014. Voteview.com Congress. Public laws passes per session of Congress, 1948-2012. n.d. http://www.gallup.com/poll/172859/congressional-approval-rating-languishes-low-level.aspx Cordis, Adriana and Jeff Milyo (2013). “Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?” Journal of Public Economics , no. 13-09. Research Papers in Economics (accessed November 12, 2016). Corrado, Anthony and Thomas E. Mann. 2014. “Party Polarization and Campaign Finance.” Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, no :01-23 (accessed October 4, 2016). Dugan, Andrew. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job? 2011. http://www.gallup.com/poll/172859/congressional-approval-rating-languishes-low-level.aspxCar Flavin, Patrick. 2015. "Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality in the American States." Political Research Quarterly 68, no. 1: 77-88. America: History & Life , EBSCO host (accessed October 11, 2016). Fuller, Jamie. 2014. “From George Washington to Shaun McCutcheon: A brief-ish history of campaign finance reform.” The Washington Post (accessed December 17, 2016). Grandlund, Dave. Congressional Gridlock . 2013. http://www.jenniferbraceras.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Color-Congress-gridlock.jpg
References cont. Hogan, Robert E. 2000. "The Costs of Representation in State Legislatures: Explaining Variations in Campaign Spending." Social Science Quarterly (University Of Texas Press) 81, no. 4: 941-956. America: History & Life , EBSCO host (accessed October 15, 2016). Johnstone, Anthony. 2013. "Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law." Yale Law & Policy Review 32, no. 1: 217-237. Academic Search Premier , EBSCO host (accessed October 15, 2016). Klein, Ezra. The rise of the filibuster . 2013. http://www.vox.com/cards/congressional-dysfunction/what-is-the-filibuster La Raja, Raymond J. 2014. "Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the United States Congress." Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 9, no.1: 224-258 . La Raja, Raymond J., and Brian F. Schaffner. 2016. Campaign Finance and Political Polarization : When Purists Prevail . Ann Arbor, US: University of Michigan Press. ProQuest ebrary . (accessed September 26, 2016). Mann, Thomas E. 2003. "The Battle Over Campaign Finance." Brookings Review 21, no. 4: 28-32. Business Source Elite , EBSCO host (accessed October 15, 2016). National Conference of State Legislatures. 2012. “Campaign Finance Legislation Database | 1999-2013.” (accessed January 2, 2016). Pildes, Richard H. 2011. "Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America." California Law Review 99, no. 2: 273-333. Business Source Elite , EBSCO host (accessed October 11, 2016).
References cont. Shor, Boris and Nolan McCarty. 2015. “State Legislative Aggregate Ideology Data June 2015 Update.” American Legislatures (accessed October 31, 2016). Tarhan, Simge. 2010. “Campaign Contributions and Political Polarization.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive , 1–24. (accessed August 21, 2016). Witko, Christopher. 2005. “Measuring the Stringency of State Campaign Finance Regulation.” SAGE Journals (University of Illinois) 5, no. 3: 295-310. State Politics and Policy Quarterly (accessed October 28, 2016).
Questions?
Recommend
More recommend
