a content aware kernel ipc firewall for android
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A Content-Aware Kernel IPC Firewall for Android David Wu Sergey Bratus Overview Understanding Binder and how its used Intercepting and modifying data with BinderFilter Demos! @davidwuuuuuuuu @sergeybratus Undergraduate at


  1. A Content-Aware Kernel IPC Firewall for Android David Wu Sergey Bratus

  2. Overview Understanding Binder and how it’s used ● Intercepting and modifying data with BinderFilter ● ● Demos!

  3. @davidwuuuuuuuu @sergeybratus Undergraduate at Dartmouth Research Associate Professor at ● ● Software Engineer in Boston Dartmouth ● ● Network and Linux ● LangSec for Penetration Testing instrumentation research with Weird machines in ELF and ● Sergey Bratus DWARF formats Web analysis automation and Hacking 802.15.4/ZigBee digital ● ● Android security research at Ionic radio hacking Security

  4. BinderFilter ● Run-time blocking and modification of all inter-app communication ● Context informed policy decisions ● Binder message parser and filter

  5. B i n d e r

  6. Man in the Binder 2014 Blackhat Europe - ● Nitay Artenstein, Idan Revivo Keylogger, SMS message ● interceptor “Most secure apps protect ● their data, but don’t bother with data moving between in-app Activities... this data goes through Binder” https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-14/materials/eu-14-Artenstein-Man-In-The-Binder-He-Who-Controls-IPC-Controls-The-Droid.pdf

  7. Android Security Concepts Built on Linux ● SELinux, file permissions, system calls ○ ○ Sandboxing enforced by UID (each application is a different Linux user) ○ Permissions ● Android 6.0 introduced dynamic permissions for ○ certain messages 30% of users have Android 6.0+ [1] ■

  8. Application Layer Application Framework Layer Core Libraries Layer Kernel Layer developer.android.com/guide/platform/index.html

  9. Binder Android’s IPC system ● Implemented as a Linux kernel driver ● ○ /dev/binder /drivers/staging/android/binder.{c,h} ○ Every IPC message goes through Binder driver ● Supports: ● ○ Security tokens Death notifications ○ (local) RPC ○ Intents ○ ○ ContentProviders

  10. Separate process address spaces enforced by kernel Process A Process B data data readFromParcel() writeToParcel() userland kernel copy_from_user() copy_to_user() Binder Driver data

  11. Demo binderfilter -s -m "android.permission.CAMERA" -u 10078 -a 3 --modify-data="cat.jpg"

  12. Separate process address spaces enforced by kernel Process A (Camera) Process B (Facebook) sergey cat readFromParcel() writeToParcel() userland kernel copy_from_user() copy_to_user() Binder Driver sergey cat

  13. myCustomCameraApp.java getSystemService() Camera.java native takePicture() JNI android_hardware_Camera.cpp takePicture() Camera.cpp takePicture() ICamera.cpp transact(TAKE_PICTURE, …) syscall binder.c

  14. Visualizations

  15. Linux process (UID 10098) Linux process (UID 10099) Client Application Service Binder Proxy Binder Stub Android Binder IPC IBinder: IBinder : onTransact() { transact() ... } Linux driver (/dev/binder) Android Security Internals, Nikolay Elenkov, No Starch Press

  16. Service Binder Client

  17. Service Binder Client Await requests (BC_REGISTER_LOOPER) Service thread sleeps

  18. Service Binder Client Await requests (BC_REGISTER_LOOPER) Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Service thread sleeps Wait for response callback

  19. Service Binder Client Await requests (BC_REGISTER_LOOPER) Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Service thread sleeps Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Wait for response callback

  20. Service Binder Client Await requests (BC_REGISTER_LOOPER) Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Service thread sleeps Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Wait for response callback Reply to client (BC_REPLY)

  21. Service Binder Client Await requests (BC_REGISTER_LOOPER) Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Service thread sleeps Request from client (BC_TRANSACTION) Wait for response callback Reply to client (BC_REPLY) Reply to client (BC_REPLY) Aleksandar Gargenta. Deep Dive into Android IPC/Binder Framework. 2013.

  22. Application Layer MyApp.java Intent batteryStatus = Context. registerReceiver (null, new IntentFilter( Intent.ACTION_BATTERY_CHANGED);

  23. Application Framework Layer ContextImpl.java registerReceiver() -> registerReceiverInternal()-> ActivityManagerNative.registerReceiver() ActivityManagerNative.java Parcel data = Parcel.obtain() data.writeString(packageName) filter.writeToParcel(data) IBinder.transact(data, reply) BinderProxy.java (implements IBinder) transact() -> native transactNative() // JNI

  24. Core Libraries android_util_Binder.cpp android_os_BinderProxy_transact() -> IBinder.transact() BpBinder : IBinder IPCThreadState::self()->transact()

  25. Core Libraries IPCThreadState.cpp open(“/dev/binder”) ProcessState.cpp transact() -> Parcel.cpp waitForResponse() -> mParcel.write(data) talkWithDriver() // writes Java parcel data to this process’ address space ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, mParcel) Linux Kernel binder.c

  26. IPC “Packets” struct binder_transaction_data { /* The first two identify struct binder_write_read { the target and contents of signed long write_size; the transaction. signed long write_consumed; */ unsigned long write_buffer; union { signed long read_size; size_thandle; signed long read_consumed; void *ptr; unsigned long read_buffer; } target; }; void *cookie; struct flat_binder_object { unsigned intcode; /* 8 bytes for large_flat_header. */ unsigned intflags; unsigned long type; unsigned long flags; /* General information about the transaction.*/ pid_t sender_pid; /* 8 bytes of data. */ uid_t sender_euid; union { size_t data_size; void *binder; // local obj size_t offsets_size; signed long handle; // remote obj }; union { struct { /* extra data associated with local object */ /* transaction data */ void *cookie; const void *buffer; }; const void *offsets; } ptr; uint8_t buf[8]; } data; };

  27. IPC “Scheduler” Blocking ioctl syscall copy_from_user(data) wake_up_interruptable(service) binder_thread_write() client binder_transaction() list_add_tail(data, service) binder_ioctl() loop until list not empty copy_to_user(data) service binder_thread_read() data = list_first_entry() time

  28. Separate process address spaces enforced by kernel Process A Process B data data readFromParcel() writeToParcel() userland kernel copy_from_user() copy_to_user() Binder Driver data

  29. Separate process address spaces enforced by kernel Process A Process B data data readFromParcel() writeToParcel() userland kernel copy_from_user() copy_to_user() Binder Driver data data

  30. Blocking ioctl syscall copy_from_user(data) wake_up_interruptable(service) binder_thread_write() client binder_transaction() list_add_tail(data, service) binder_ioctl() loop until list not empty copy_to_user(data) service binder_thread_read() data = list_first_entry() time

  31. BinderFilter

  32. Enhanced logs Existing binder.c logs ● printk(), TRACE_EVENT(), seq_printf() ○ Existing: [49431.544219] binder: 9916:9916 BC_TRANSACTION 683674 -> 198 ● - node 289403, data 8dc12180 (null) size 80-0 ● Enhanced: [14:33:56.084452] binder_command BC_TRANSACTION: process pid 9916 (android.picky), thread pid 9916 -> process pid 198 (/system/bin/surfaceflinger), node id 289403, transaction id 683674, data address 8dc12180, data size 80, offsets address null, offsets size 0

  33. Parsing message contents (Man in the Binder) Binder buffer contents in memory {(0)(64)(24)(0)android.os.IPowerManager(0)(0)(1)(0)(0)(0)} Fields are Each Strings are Classes are Chars are Integers aligned on character or prepended passed as 2 bytes are 4 bytes 4 byte (p) value is by their string literals intervals a byte length Sender of the intent

  34. Modifying Saved Pictures {(4)H(28)(0)android.app.IActivityManager(0)(0)(133)*bs(127)( 1)(0)P(196)(180)(174)(224)(145)(181)(172)(19)(0)com.facebook .katana(0)"(0)android.media.action.IMAGE_CAPTURE(0)(0)(0)(0) (255)(255)(255)(255)(3)(0)(255)(255)(255)(255)(255)(255)(255 )(255)(0)(0)(0)(0)(0)(0)(1)(0)(1)(0)(0)(0)(0)(0)(1)(0)(13)(0 )text/uri-list(0)(0)(0)(1)(0)(1)(0)(255)(255)(255)(255)(255) (255)(255)(255)(0)(0)(1)(0)(3)(0)(4)(0)file(0)(0)(0)(0)(0)(0 )(0)(0)(0)(0)(0)(0)(2)(0)(62)(0)/storage/emulated/0/Pictures /Facebook/FB_IMG_1464314001208.jpg}

  35. Demo # Evernote: microphone binderfilter -s -m "android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO" -u 10092 -a 1 # Google Maps: location binderfilter -s -m "android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" -u 10056 -a 1 # Photos: read storage binderfilter -s -m "android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" -u 1000 -a 1 # Camera: ContentProvider (service for saving pictures) binderfilter -s -m "android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" -u 1000 -a 2 binderfilter -s -m "ContentProvider" -u 10044 -a 1

  36. Blocking messages ● Blocking generic strings in Binder messages is dangerously powerful Permissions are passed as string literals in IPC messages ● Check uid, context ● Check binder message content for message with strstr ● ● Clear out the entire message with memset

  37. Blocking Permissions {(0)@(28)(0)android.app.IActivityManager(0)(0))(0)android.pe rmission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION(0)(155)(9)(0))'(0)}

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