Why Some Like It Loud: Timing Power Attacks in Multi-tenant Data - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Why Some Like It Loud: Timing Power Attacks in Multi-tenant Data - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Why Some Like It Loud: Timing Power Attacks in Multi-tenant Data Centers Using an Acoustic Side Channel Mohammad A. Islam, Luting Yang, Kiran Ranganath, and Shaolei Ren Acknowledgement: This work was supported in part by NSF under grants


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Why Some Like It Loud:

Timing Power Attacks in Multi-tenant Data Centers Using an Acoustic Side Channel

Mohammad A. Islam, Luting Yang, Kiran Ranganath, and Shaolei Ren

Acknowledgement: This work was supported in part by NSF under grants CNS-1551661 and ECCS-1610471.

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This talk is NOT about multi-tenant clouds; it’s about multi-tenant data centers!

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This talk is NOT about multi-tenant clouds; it’s about multi-tenant data centers!

Tenant = virtual machines

UPS

P D U P D U

vs

Tenant = physical servers

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Multi-tenant data centers are everywhere…

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Apple houses 25% of its servers in multi-tenant data centers…

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Multi-tenant data centers are everywhere…

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Google, Amazon, MS, Fb… :7.8% Enterprise: 53% Multi-tenant: 37%

Percentage of electricity usage by data center type (source: NRDC 2015)

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

An overview of multi-tenant data center

Managed by operator

Utility

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4

Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

An overview of multi-tenant data center

Managed by operator Managed by tenants

Utility

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

Securing the cyberspace

  • DDoS attack, network intrusion, privacy

protection, etc.

[Mirkovic, Sigcomm’04][Zhang CCS’12][Moon CCS’15][Dong CCS’17]…

An overview of multi-tenant data center

Managed by operator Managed by tenants

Utility

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

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How to attack the physical infrastructure?

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

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How to attack the physical infrastructure?

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Hacking control systems Human intrusion

Power

Overload using server power

Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

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How to attack the physical infrastructure?

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Hacking control systems Human intrusion

Power

Overload using server power

Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

Our focus

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

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Generator UPS ATS P D U P D U

Power attack: Well-timed power injection to overload the shared data center capacity, subject to all applicable usage constraints set by the operator

Malicious Tenant

Malicious load

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Cost analysis

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15.6 8.7 3.5 5 10 15 20 25 Tier-II Tier-III Tier-IV

Million $/MW/year

Estimated cost based on 5% overloads and a data center of 1MW-10,00sqft

More likely to have an outage during overloads (e.g., risk increases by ~280 times for a Tier-IV data center )

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Cost analysis

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15.6 8.7 3.5 5 10 15 20 25 Tier-II Tier-III Tier-IV

Million $/MW/year

Estimated cost based on 5% overloads and a data center of 1MW-10,00sqft

Annual cost > $2 billion

(if only 10% of the U.S. data centers are affected)

More likely to have an outage during overloads (e.g., risk increases by ~280 times for a Tier-IV data center )

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How to precisely time power attacks?

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How to precisely time power attacks?

  • Random attacks are unlikely to be successful, while constant full power is prohibited

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How to precisely time power attacks?

  • Random attacks are unlikely to be successful, while constant full power is prohibited
  • Coarse timing (e.g., based on “peak” hours) is ineffective

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Server power  Heat  Cold Airflow  Fan Speed  Noise

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Dell PowerEdge servers

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Server power  Heat  Cold Airflow  Fan Speed  Noise

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Dell PowerEdge servers

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Server power  Heat  Cold Airflow  Fan Speed  Noise

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Dell PowerEdge servers

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There are challenges…!

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Suppressing the loud AC noise

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Serves in a data center Serves noise

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Suppressing the loud AC noise

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Serves in a data center Serves noise

A high-pass filter reveals the server noise pattern

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𝒀(𝑶×𝑳) 𝑩(𝑵×𝑶) 𝒁(𝑵×𝑳) 𝑭(𝑵×𝑳)

Observation Interest Unknown

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𝒀(𝑶×𝑳) 𝑩(𝑵×𝑶) 𝒁(𝑵×𝑳) 𝑭(𝑵×𝑳)

Observation Interest Unknown Solution: Blind source separation using non-negative matrix factorization (NMF)

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Experimental evaluation

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  • Experimental settings
  • Run real workload traces in a university data center
  • True positive: % of attack opportunities detected
  • Precision: % of an attack being successful
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Experimental evaluation

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  • Experimental settings
  • Run real workload traces in a university data center
  • True positive: % of attack opportunities detected
  • Precision: % of an attack being successful
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Physical co-residence and space sharing result in physical side channels Can be exploited to compromise data center physical security!

Thanks!