3 rd National Dam Safety Conference IIT Roorkee 18-19 February 2017 WARNING & NOTIFICATION SYSTEM PANKAJ AGRAWAL Director Stalworth S ystems Pvt Ltd, Gurgaon E: pankaj@stalworth.co.in M : 9716299102
Background : Larji Dam Incident, HP (J une 2014) • 24 Engg students from Hydb washed away in Beas river • Students picknicking in the river on their way back from M anali. • While cooling their heels in the knee deep water and clicking photographs, they missed the rising level of water that engulfed them in minutes. • The sudden rise in the river level happened because the upstream Larji dam opened its gates to release water. • Survivors said no sirens were sounded before releasing the water, the authorities claimed they had sounded the siren.
Larji Dam Incident
Larji Dam Incident : Shimla High Court • The HC took suo-moto cognizance of the tragedy • Treated media report as a public interest litigation • Ordered the police to file FIR’s against staff members of Larji project • Court took upon themselves to monitor the criminal cases. • All staff members of the Larji dam were suspended for negligence. • Top officials of HPSEB and Govt were repeatedly summoned for hearings by the court.
Larji Dam: HC questioned the Dam M gmt practices • Why was the water released all of a sudden? • Any pre-warning issued to vulnerable citizens downstream? • What is the evidence that operator actually activated the hooter switch (industrial siren)? • If at all the hooter at the dam was activated, did the sound reach accident site ~2.8 Km downstream? • How would a tourist / vulnerable citizen interpret the sound of Industrial Siren and instantly react? • Regular testing procedure of Hooter’s working condition? • If the 3-ph AC power to hooter fails?
Larji: Enquiry by Div Commissioner; HC J udgement • In an inquiry report, Divisional Commissioner M andi, held that the Larji project authorities had acted in most irresponsible manner to release the water from the reservoir upstream without any prior warning. • "The warning system … constitutes a systemic failure … “ • 19 months after the tragedy (Jan 2016),HC ordered a compensation of Rs 20 lakh to each parent of victim. And major share was slapped on HPSEB being the owner and operator of the Larji Dam.
Decoding the tragedy
Typical Hazards; Need for Emergency Action Planning • Floods, mainly caused by rain storms, cloud bursts, melting snow or long-term rainy weather, have represented a serious hazard for ages • Though meteorologists forecast such events with reasonable preciseness, it is difficult to forecast intensive local rainfall • Expensive technical equipment required to monitor weather conditions, and monitor water levels of various, otherwise inconspicuous, creeks and potential waterways. • Storm water can represent very sudden danger- it is necessary to warn people in danger very fast and efficiently
CWC Guidelines for EAP (Feb 2016) • M ore than 80% of ~4,900 large dams in India are >25 years old and their health and safety are of paramount importance • It is also necessary that we are prepared to face any emergencies caused by a dam failure. • Need for a foolproof warning system to alert downstream habitats before release of water from the dam spillways. • The warning system must be backed up by alternate power sources to work in case of power failure. • Regular testing process to ensure all time functioning of system.
The Solution – Warning & Notification System (WNS) • WNS solution devised and designed as an integrated monitoring, warning dissemination and notification system • Warn riparian communities of an imminent release of water when significant increase in water level and/or flow rate • The system comprises of :- – M ultiple Electronic Sirens (e.g. 2, or 20, or 2000) – Each mounted on standalone T owers or Poles erected on roof-tops – Control Centre (also called “ Dispatching Centre” ) – Small S ystem of 2-3 Sirens covering a small dam – 200 Sirens covering the coast line of an Indian state – 2,000 Sirens for a National Warning system in Europe
The Solution – Warning & Notification System (WNS) • Siren has 3 options:- hooting / play pre-recorded messages / relay live voice announcements • Comprises of Horn array • Each Siren power rating selected to cover audio distance based on different vulnerable locations to be covered, e.g., one Siren could cover 500 m and another 2 Km audio distance • Vulnerable points where people are fishing, collecting water, washing clothes or bathing along the margins of the river, or where there are settlements / villages close to the river banks which could be exposed to the risk of water surge
WNS - Reliability of utmost importance • Features like auto-testing functionality, in Silent M ode • Generate warning from internal Battery during power failure • Solar Panels to recharge internal batteries • multiple wireless communication channels like GSM / GPRS VHF (Radio), VSAT (Satellite), TCP/ IP (Ethernet / Optic Fibre), RDS, Wi-Fi, Blue Tooth, Zig Bee etc, • Authorized User selectively activate Sirens from control centre • Send out SM S & Email notifications to designated authorities, • Store operator logs of various commands given to ensure accountability, and legal evidence
WNS - Reliability of utmost importance • The authorised operator will login to computer and give command by selecting Sirens on GIS M ap. • The system can integrate with various sensors and data loggers so water level and water flow thresholds from upstream dams or river can automatically trigger the Sirens. • False alarm elimination is important • IDEAL SYSTEM - small and mid-size Dams - 2 to 10 Sirens • Large Dams - 15 to 30 Sirens • Pr. Channel through GPRS and Sec through VHF Radio / OFC • Time taken to receive acknow of activated Siren <30 Seconds • VSAT for remote locations / high altitudes
Dam WNS – Solution Schematic
WNS – System for extreme weather conditions • The Electronic Sirens should work in extreme weather conditions like temperature range of -10 o to +50 o C, • IP65 / 66 box caging of Controller to protect from dust and rain • Coastal Tsunami Warning System for ODISHA – SEOC – BEOC -122 Sirens and for AP – SEOC -BEOC -160 Sirens • Communication Channels – Siren - VHF Radio and GSM / GPRS, – TEOC/ BEOC - VHF and Ethernet – SEOC - Ethernet (State wide area network “ S WAN” ) and GSM / GPRS
Water Surge Incidents in the last 10 years • une 2014 , Larji hydropower on Beas river - 24 students swept away J • Two weeks later, 10 men marooned for >12 hours in Damodar river in Jharkhand, from the T enughat dam 55km upstream • 18 April 2011, three girls in T eesta river at Bardang in Sikkim • 27 M arch 2013 , five members of a family drowned in Bhavani river in T amil Nadu, from the Pilloor dam, 20km upstream. • an 2012 , nine people drowned in the Cauvery river in Erode, T amil 8 J Nadu, from the Vendipalayam Bhavani Kattalai hydro project barrage • 6 Dec 2011 Three men drowned in Netravati river from the Shambhoor hydropower project in Karnataka. Eight others have been killed since 2009 • The M aneri Bhali hydel project on Uttarakhand's Bhagirathi river has been blamed for > 5 deaths , in 2006, 2007 and 2011 • 1 October 2006 , at least 57 pilgrims were washed away while walking across the Sind River in M P , from the M anikheda dam • 7 April 2005 , >70 pilgrims drowned at Dharaji in M P when the Narmada swelled from the Indira Sagar power project.
Don’t use Electro-mechanical Hooters !! Electronic Siren (WNS) Electro-mechanical Hooter Three Siren Options – Only option is hooter - • Hooter • Does not convey the “what to do” • Live voice message message to vulnerable tourists / outsiders • Pre-recorded audio messages in (Larji Dam legal case) multiple languages • Requires extensive training to villagers / vulnerable population to interpret various long or short hoots ( operational overhead & cost) Testing of Siren in Silent mode, Can be tested only by hooting:- All Operator logs available in the Control • disturbs all nearby population room • prone to be interpreted as “false” alarm Pre-configured durations for each beep / Needs to be manually switched off by tone/ hoot or message operator (operational overhead) Two-way communication between control No confirmation of hooter activation room and towers, along with confirmation which may be several Km away from of activation from each tower operator (Larji Dam legal case)
Don’t use Electro-mechanical Hooters !! Electronic Siren (WNS) Electro-mechanical Hooter Control Room maintains logs of all the No evidence available – whether the operator activity, various commands given hooter was activated at a particular time and Time stamp of each siren activation (Larji Dam legal case) (for legal evidence) Strong security in software at control room accessible to authorised users and No Audit Trail complete audit trail – ensuring No Acountability of Operator accountability of operator (for legal evidence) Dual feature of control –remotely from control room and also locally at the Siren Not Possible controller box for authorised user SM S notification to all the designated Not Possible officials / authorities (internal or external)
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