Vertical Restraints Valrie Meunier Conseil de la Concurrence - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Vertical Restraints Valrie Meunier Conseil de la Concurrence - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints Valrie Meunier Conseil de la Concurrence November 7, 2008 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm 1 Bayesian Decision Theory Prior belief based on empirical literature Bayesian updating based on


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SLIDE 1

November 7, 2008 1

The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints

Valérie Meunier Conseil de la Concurrence

Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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SLIDE 2

Bayesian Decision Theory

  • Prior belief based on empirical literature
  • Bayesian updating based on evidence
  • Decision minimizing loss function
  • French laws regulating retailing sector

minimum RPM

  • Empirical studies on French data show prices have

increased and become more uniform in retailing sector. Support for a negative presumption.

November 7, 2008 2 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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SLIDE 3

Empirical Literature on French Data

  • Specificity of French regulation:
  • “General terms of sales” are observable;
  • Discrimination is prohibited;
  • Ban on below-cost pricing
  • Below-cost threshold = invoiced price; Only rebates obtained at

actual delivery can be subtracted from initial invoice

  • Planning regulations

Retailers bargaining power High concentration in many catchment areas

November 7, 2008 3 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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SLIDE 4

Effects of Regulation on Prices

  • Biscourp, Boutin, Vergé (2008)
  • Large data set (CPI) – Many items, many stores

Correlation between market concentration and price level almost disappeared after introduction of regulation. Prices have increased, especially in stores where they were initially lower.

November 7, 2008 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm 4

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Structural model of vertical relationships

  • Bonnet, Dubois (2008)
  • Data on bottled water, 1998-2000
  • 7 retailers (70% market)
  • 8 brands (71% of purchases)
  • Test between 12 alternative models

Best fit: Two-part tariffs with RPM Retailers variable margin = 0 Fixed transfers from M to R (“Backward margins”) Two-part tariffs without RPM would have increased consumer surplus by 0.8%.

5 November 7, 2008 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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School calculators (03-D-45, Sept. 25, 2003)

  • Theory of harm: Manufacturers’ cartel
  • 2 Manufacturers (TI, Casio), many retailers
  • Calculators for junior & senior high school students
  • Teachers are prescribers
  • RPM:
  • mails with resale prices
  • Price monitoring: Suppliers called deviating retailers to
  • rder
  • Evidence of significant application; Uniformity of prices

across retailers.

November 7, 2008 6 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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School Calculators (cont’d)

  • Information exchange between the two suppliers

Defendants did not provide evidence/arguments in favor of RPM (services, inventory,…) Two facilitating practices: RPM, information exchange Vertical price fixing agreements + horizontal manufacturers agreement Observed effects: prices of calculators increased, while prices of other electronic devices (PDAs) decreased.

November 7, 2008 7 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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SLIDE 8

Toys (07-D-50, Dec. 20, 2007)

  • Network of vertical agreements
  • “Regulation-induced” RPM:
  • All but one manufacturers set high wholesale prices
  • Retailers set retail price = below-cost threshold
  • No retail variable margins but fixed transfers from

manufacturers to retailers

  • Below-cost threshold: credible commitment to high

wholesale price, no upstream market power needed

  • One manufacturer did leave retail margins; Less

success in sustaining high prices

November 7, 2008 8 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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SLIDE 9

Toys (cont’d)

  • Underlying theory of harm: Strategic manipulation of

regulation; Antitrust liability?

  • Enforcement of agreement:
  • Retailers’ active monitoring; Price-beating guarantees;
  • Retailers informed manufacturers about price deviations and

demanded appropriate action;

  • Manufacturers as common agents: no market power but

commitment power thanks to regulation;

  • Retailers have effective and credible threat: they can

delist products for which undercutting occurred.

November 7, 2008 9 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm

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SLIDE 10

Leegin “Screening Factors”

  • Share of industry’s output covered by RPM
  • Source of the restraint
  • Greater suspicion if imposed by retailers

Monitoring activity is easier to observe; Maybe more relevant?

  • Entities with market power

Bargaining power may be more relevant?

10 November 7, 2008 Pros and Cons 2008, Stockholm