Understanding SSH: Large-scale measurements and notary-based authentication Final Presentation Oliver Gasser Master Thesis Advisor: Ralph Holz Chair for Network Architectures and Services Faculty of Computer Science Technische Universit¨ at M¨ unchen March 19, 2013 Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 1
Outline SSH Basics 1 Goals 2 3 Related Work SSH Scanning 4 Evaluation 5 6 Notary-based Authentication Summary 7 Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 2
Outline SSH Basics 1 Goals 2 3 Related Work SSH Scanning 4 Evaluation 5 6 Notary-based Authentication Summary 7 Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 3
SSH Basics SSH Protocol Client–server protocol Secure replacement for rsh , rlogin , telnet Two major protocol versions SSH-1.x SSH-2.0 Use: Server administration, tunneling Not utilized by everyday Internet user Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 4
SSH Connection Establishment SSH Client SSH Server Establish TCP connection (client connects to server on port 22) Exchange SSH identification string: "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1" Exchange supported algorithms: kex algorithms server host key algorithms enc algorithms client server enc algorithms server client mac algorithms client server mac algorithms server client compression algorithms client server compression algorithms server client languages client server languages server client Diffie Hellman key exchange Trust-On-First-Use principle with server authentication Client authentication (e.g. by password or public key) Service communication (e.g. terminal login session) Protected Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 5
SSH Connection Establishment SSH Client SSH Server Establish TCP connection (client connects to server on port 22) Exchange SSH identification string: "SSH-2.0-OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1" Exchange supported algorithms: kex algorithms server host key algorithms enc algorithms client server enc algorithms server client mac algorithms client server mac algorithms server client compression algorithms client server compression algorithms server client languages client server languages server client Diffie Hellman key exchange Trust-On-First-Use principle with server authentication Client authentication (e.g. by password or public key) Service communication (e.g. terminal login session) Protected Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 5
Outline SSH Basics 1 Goals 2 3 Related Work SSH Scanning 4 Evaluation 5 6 Notary-based Authentication Summary 7 Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 6
Problem statement Insufficient data about the SSH landscape available Perform IPv4-wide scans for SSH servers Trust-On-First-Use is strong assumption Provide notary-based authentication for SSH servers Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 7
Problem statement Insufficient data about the SSH landscape available Perform IPv4-wide scans for SSH servers Trust-On-First-Use is strong assumption Provide notary-based authentication for SSH servers Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 7
Problem statement Insufficient data about the SSH landscape available Perform IPv4-wide scans for SSH servers Trust-On-First-Use is strong assumption Provide notary-based authentication for SSH servers Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 7
Problem statement Insufficient data about the SSH landscape available Perform IPv4-wide scans for SSH servers Trust-On-First-Use is strong assumption Provide notary-based authentication for SSH servers Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 7
Outline SSH Basics 1 Goals 2 3 Related Work SSH Scanning 4 Evaluation 5 6 Notary-based Authentication Summary 7 Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 8
Related Work: Protocol Scanning Provos and Honeyman (2001) Scanned 2 million IP addresses for SSH servers Analyzed only SSH version and server’s identification string Yilek et al. (2009) Debian OpenSSL vulnerability Analyzed X.509 certificate churn No SSH scans Holz et al. (2011) Active scans for Alexa Top 1 Million Hosts Passive monitoring of MWN traffic No SSH scans Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 9
Related Work: Protocol Scanning Provos and Honeyman (2001) Scanned 2 million IP addresses for SSH servers Analyzed only SSH version and server’s identification string Yilek et al. (2009) Debian OpenSSL vulnerability Analyzed X.509 certificate churn No SSH scans Holz et al. (2011) Active scans for Alexa Top 1 Million Hosts Passive monitoring of MWN traffic No SSH scans Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 9
Related Work: Protocol Scanning Provos and Honeyman (2001) Scanned 2 million IP addresses for SSH servers Analyzed only SSH version and server’s identification string Yilek et al. (2009) Debian OpenSSL vulnerability Analyzed X.509 certificate churn No SSH scans Holz et al. (2011) Active scans for Alexa Top 1 Million Hosts Passive monitoring of MWN traffic No SSH scans Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 9
Related Work: Key Security Lenstra et al. (2012) No active scanning, EFF SSL observatory and other sources 6.2 million X.509 certs and 5.5 million PGP keys 4 % of RSA keys shared modulus, 0.18 % shared one prime Conclusion: RSA keys less secure than DSA keys Heninger et al. (2012) Active scanning for TLS and SSH servers 5.8 million unique X.509 certs and 6.2 million unique SSH host keys Recovered private keys for RSA (0.03 %) and DSA keys (1 %) Conclusion: Embedded devices do not have enough entropy DSA mode more vulnerable than RSA Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 10
Related Work: Notary-based Authentication Wendlandt et al. (2008) Perspectives Improve SSH authentication mechanism Crypto flaws Implementation not available Holz et al. (2012) Crossbear Detect Man-in-the-Middle attacks on SSL Localize the MitM using traceroutes No support for SSH Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 11
Related Work: Notary-based Authentication Wendlandt et al. (2008) Perspectives Improve SSH authentication mechanism Crypto flaws Implementation not available Holz et al. (2012) Crossbear Detect Man-in-the-Middle attacks on SSL Localize the MitM using traceroutes No support for SSH Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 11
Outline SSH Basics 1 Goals 2 3 Related Work SSH Scanning 4 Evaluation 5 6 Notary-based Authentication Summary 7 Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 12
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
SSH Scanning Internet-wide scanning for SSH protocol Parallel scanning to improve performance Collect information and fetch SSH host key Full SSH handshake with OpenSSH Different scanning scenarios Modularity in software design Minimize intrusiveness Pseudorandom IP address generation Blacklist Oliver Gasser (TU M¨ unchen) Understanding SSH 13
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