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Trade liberalisation, institutions and persistent habits a CGE model analysis for developing countries Nordic conference on development economics Helsinki, 11-12 June 2018 VATT INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH Janne Niemi Contents 1.


  1. Trade liberalisation, institutions and persistent habits – a CGE model analysis for developing countries Nordic conference on development economics Helsinki, 11-12 June 2018 VATT INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH Janne Niemi

  2. Contents 1. Research questions / Motivation 2. Building blocks (models and theories) 3. Model and data 4. Illustrative simulation results 2

  3. 1. Research questions / Motivation • Questions: – Imperfect substitution between goods from different sources (domestic, imported from different countries) – If the Armington elasticities change in time, what are the effects on expected outcomes? – International trade CGE modelling: Generalise taste change in long-run (recursive dynamic) simulations? • Underlying motivation: – Implications to welfare gains from trade? – Food, trade and development 3

  4. 2. Building blocks (models and theories) • Armington model of international trade • Habit persistence / habit formation • Interdepended preferences • Linear Expenditure System (LES) 4

  5. 2. Building blocks (models and theories) “Armington” model of trade total demand • Imperfect substitution in international trade (Armington 1969) – Real or perceived heterogeneity (especially in aggregate data) – Consumer behaviour (individual) imported domestic – Trading practises, institutions (especially NTMs) • Two-level nested structure common in CGE trade models: (1) domestic/imported; (2) imported/imported origins 1, 2, … , n • This study concerned with (2) 5

  6. 2. Building blocks (models and theories) Habit persistence • Current consumption depends on past consumption: “The more the consumer eats today, the hungrier he wakes up tomorrow.” • First suggested by Duesenberry (1949): Savings data inconsistent with standard theory. • “Gap” in the literature 1985-2010 6

  7. 2. Building blocks (models and theories) Habit persistence • Pollak (1976, 1978): habit formation system incorporating interdependent preferences into the model. – Future consumption depends on the “habit stock” of not only the individual, but of all other individuals as well. – Habits treated as external to the consumer. • Trade context: – Consider broader definition of ‘habits’: Institutional constranits, Non-tariff barriers, long-term contracts, delivery reliability etc. 7

  8. 3. Implementing the model: expenditure system • Expenditure shares in an AIDS • (Re)pecify α to reflect habit persistence •  Expenditure system where 8

  9. 3. Implementing the model: code • !The long ‐ run import demand qxs_lr is identical to the standard GTAP model import demand qxs! Equation LR_IMPORTDEMAND # regional long ‐ run demand for disaggregated imported commodities by source (HT 29) # ( all ,i,TRAD_COMM)( all ,r,REG)( all ,s,REG) qxs_lr(i,r,s) = qim(i,s) ‐ ESUBML(i,s) * [ pms(i,r,s) ‐ pim(i,s) ] ; !The short ‐ run import demand qxs is now dependent on parameter LAMBDAM, which defines the "base demand" and adjustment speed towards the long ‐ run demand ! Equation IMPORTDEMAND # regional short ‐ run demand for disaggregated imported commodities by source # ( all ,i,TRAD_COMM)( all ,r,REG)( all ,s,REG) VIMS(i,r,s) * [ p100 + qxs(i,r,s) + pms(i,r,s) ] = LAMBDAM(i,s) * VIMS_B(i,r,s) * [ p100 + pms(i,r,s) ] + [ 1 ‐ LAMBDAM(i,s) ] * VIMS_LR(i,r,s) * [ p100 + pms(i,r,s) +qxs_lr(i,r,s) ] ; 9

  10. 4. Data and Scenarios • GTAP 9a database • Rice, wheat, coarse grains • Large trade volumes • Somewhat (but not entirely) homogeneous • Relevant for trade and development considerations • Stylised trade policy scenario simulated with (modified) dynamic GTAP model with different elasticity and habit persistence options. 10

  11. 4. Data and Scenarios: Regional aggregation 1 China 13 Rest of Europe and Centaral Asia 2 Indonesia 14 North Africa 3 Thailand 15 Ghana 4 Viet Nam 16 Nigeria 5 Bangladesh 17 Ethiopia 6 India 18 Kenya 7 Rest of Asia (excl high inc) 19 Mozambique 8 High income Asia and Oceania 20 Tanzania 9 North America 21 South Africa Latin America (excl NAFTA) 22 Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 10 European Union 28 23 Rest of the World 11 Black Sea Producers 12 11

  12. 4. Data and Scenarios: Commodity / sector aggregation Aggregated sectors Included sectors and com m odities 1 Rice Paddy rice, Processed rice 2 Wheat Wheat 3 Other grains Cereal grains nec 4 Other food Other primary agriculture, and processed food 5 Manufacture All manufactured products, excl. food 6 Services All services 12

  13. Policy scenarios 33% Reduction in “hidden” trading costs (e.g. NTMs) for rice, wheat and coarse grains. Multilateral Unilateral Unilateral & Capital Treated Rice, Wheat, Other grains commodities Treated All EU28 importing regions Treated Low-income Sub-Saharan All exporting regions Africa Capital No Yes accumulation 13

  14. 4. Data and Scenarios: Scenario options Scenario options Substitution between Base M D M+D D2 M+D2 different sources of im ports Habit persistence λ M 0 .5 0 .5 0 .5 Long-run elasticity σ M 2s 2s 2s 2s 2s 2s Short-run elasticity γ M 2s s 2s s 2s s dom estic and im ported goods Habit persistence λ D 0 0 .5 .5 .75 .75 Long-run elasticity σ D s s s s 2s 2s Short-run elasticity γ D s s .5 s .5 s .5 s .5 s s = GTAP 9 database substitution elasticity betw een dom estic and im ported (ESUBD); elasticity betw een sources of im ports ESUBM = 2 × ESUBD for all com m odities. 14

  15. 5. Simulation results Trade 15

  16. Multilateral (base): world trade volume index Base 0.25 0.2 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.15 Base 0.1 0.05 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Everything happens in t=1 16

  17. Multilateral (M): world trade volume index 0.25 0.2 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.15 Base M 0.1 0.05 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Smaller initial response, converges to base as expected… 17

  18. Unilateral (M): world trade volume index 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.0005 0.0004 Base M 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year … but exceeds base in the Unilateral scenario 18

  19. Multilateral (D): world trade volume index 0.25 0.2 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.15 Base M 0.1 D 0.05 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year In Multilateral, this happens with domestic-imported HP 19

  20. Multilateral (M+D): world trade volume index 0.25 0.2 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.15 Base M D 0.1 M+D 0.05 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Impacts of the 2 nests HP are not separable / additive! 20

  21. Unilateral (D): world trade volume index 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.0005 0.0004 Base D 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year D option converges in Unilateral 21

  22. Unilateral (M+D): world trade volume index 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.0005 Base 0.0004 M D 0.0003 M+D 0.0002 0.0001 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Combined effect moves from D to M 22

  23. 5. Simulation results Other macro variables 23

  24. Multilateral: world aggregate GDP 0.14 0.12 0.1 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.08 Base M 0.06 D M+D 0.04 0.02 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Differences to both directions. 24

  25. Multilateral: private consumption 0.01 0.005 0 % ‐ change (cumulative) Base ‐ 0.005 M D M+D ‐ 0.01 ‐ 0.015 ‐ 0.02 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Mirror image of the GDP? 25

  26. Multilateral: global investments 0.3 0.2 0.1 % ‐ change (cumulative) Base 0 M D M+D ‐ 0.1 ‐ 0.2 ‐ 0.3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Drive the GDP 26

  27. 5. Simulation results Changing the domestic-imported long-run elasticity 27

  28. Multilateral (base): world trade volume index 0.8 0.7 0.6 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.5 D 0.4 D2 0.3 M+D2 0.2 0.1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Impact on trade already in t=1, and increases 28

  29. Unilateral (base): world trade volume index 0.001 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 % ‐ change (cumulative) 0.0006 D 0.0005 M+D D2 0.0004 M+D2 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year In unilateral case impact more as expected 29

  30. Unilateral (base): world aggregate GDP 0 ‐ 0.00005 ‐ 0.0001 % ‐ change (cumulative) ‐ 0.00015 D ‐ 0.0002 M+D D2 ‐ 0.00025 M+D2 ‐ 0.0003 ‐ 0.00035 ‐ 0.0004 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year Makes little difference for other macros in unilateral 30

  31. 5. Simulation results Regional effects 31

  32. Multilateral: Exports (difference to base) M D M+D D2 M+D2 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 ‐ 0.2 ‐ 0.4 ‐ 0.6 ‐ 0.8 Ethiopia Kenya Mozambique Tanzania Foreign-foreign has zero impact alone. Country differences 32

  33. Multilateral: Consumption (difference to base) M D M+D D2 M+D2 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 ‐ 0.2 Ethiopia Kenya Mozambique Tanzania Foreign-foreign has zero impact alone. Country differences 33

  34. Unilateral: Exports (difference to base) M D M+D D2 M+D2 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 ‐ 0.05 ‐ 0.10 ‐ 0.15 Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Changes to same direction in different countries, domestic- 34 imported has little effect alone

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