The U.S.- -Russian Nuclear Arms Reduction Russian Nuclear Arms - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The U.S.- -Russian Nuclear Arms Reduction Russian Nuclear Arms Reduction The U.S. Dialog: Challenges And Opportunities. Dialog: Challenges And Opportunities. Anatoli S. S. Diakov Diakov Anatoli Presentation to the Berlin Article VI Forum Berlin Article VI Forum Presentation to the “New I mperatives and Openings for “New I mperatives and Openings for a Nuclear Weapons- -Free World” Free World” a Nuclear Weapons Berlin, January 28- -30 30 Berlin, January 28

Background Background The U.S.- The U.S. - Russian (Soviet) nuclear arms reduction dialog has always been Russian (Soviet) nuclear arms reduction dialog has always been very important for the security relations between them, as well as for the as for the very important for the security relations between them, as well stability in the world. It has the purpose of: It has the purpose of: stability in the world. creating channels of communication between the two governments creating channels of communication between the two governments � � and keeping them open; and keeping them open; helping limit their nuclear arms buildups, and make them partners in a s in a helping limit their nuclear arms buildups, and make them partner � � great project to reduce the danger of nuclear war; great project to reduce the danger of nuclear war; reassuring the public that something was being done about nuclear reassuring the public that something was being done about nuclea r � � threat. threat. This cooperation and the resulting shared understanding of the dangers of angers of This cooperation and the resulting shared understanding of the d nuclear weapons laid a foundation for the U.S.- nuclear weapons laid a foundation for the U.S. -Soviet partnership in building Soviet partnership in building the nuclear nonproliferation regime. the nuclear nonproliferation regime. After the end of the Cold War some in the United States started to argue that After the end of the Cold War some in the United States started to argue that because Russia and the United States are not rivals anymore, the arms because Russia and the United States are not rivals anymore, the arms control is simply a wrong paradigm for their modern relations and an d an control is simply a wrong paradigm for their modern relations an outmoded approach to the achievement of strategic stability. outmoded approach to the achievement of strategic stability. Based on such views the G.W. Bush administration decided to keep its own Based on such views the G.W. Bush administration decided to keep its own freedom of action in deploying and operating its nuclear forces rather than to rather than to freedom of action in deploying and operating its nuclear forces retain START and others arms control agreements. retain START and others arms control agreements.

As a result, the military security system based on treaties and agreements has agreements has As a result, the military security system based on treaties and been practically dismantled over the past decade and the bilate been practically dismantled over the past decade and the bilateral ral U.S.- -Russian dialog on arms control came to the impasse. Russian dialog on arms control came to the impasse. U.S. However, Russia and the United States have not become true allies. Indeed, s. Indeed, However, Russia and the United States have not become true allie each deploy today about 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads with more than each deploy today about 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads with mo re than 1000 warheads on each side on hair- -trigger alert. Thus, nuclear deterrence trigger alert. Thus, nuclear deterrence 1000 warheads on each side on hair continues to be a central part of their relationship. continues to be a central part of their relationship. As long as this state of mutual nuclear deterrence exists, it is As long as this state of mutual nuclear deterrence exists, it is impossible to impossible to consider the relations between Russia and the United States as “normal”. normal”. consider the relations between Russia and the United States as “ Currently US- -Russian nuclear relationship has four components: Russian nuclear relationship has four components: Currently US The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). � � The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). � � The 1991- -92 reciprocal unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), 92 reciprocal unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), that that The 1991 � � were related to non were related to non- -strategic nuclear weapons. strategic nuclear weapons. The 2002 Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). The 2002 Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). � �

The START and SORT Treaties The START and SORT Treaties The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the Soviet Union and the Union and the The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed by the Soviet United States in 1991 limits strategic delivery vehicles and warheads, and requires heads, and requires United States in 1991 limits strategic delivery vehicles and war the destruction of most excess delivery systems. the destruction of most excess delivery systems. Also, START established a comprehensive system of notifications and inspections that and inspections that Also, START established a comprehensive system of notifications provides to the both sides a detailed picture of each other’s strategic nuclear forces. rategic nuclear forces. provides to the both sides a detailed picture of each other’s st The SORT treaty sets limits on nuclear strategic warheads between 1700 and 2200 by The SORT treaty sets limits on nuclear strategic warheads betwee n 1700 and 2200 by 2012. But because sides failed to reach agreement on counting rules, reduction les, reduction 2012. But because sides failed to reach agreement on counting ru schedule and verifications this treaty can only be considered as a joint declaration. a joint declaration. schedule and verifications this treaty can only be considered as The START will expire this December and after that the US- The START will expire this December and after that the US -Russian strategic Russian strategic relationship will likely exist in a legal vacuum and the lack of verification will lead to verification will lead to relationship will likely exist in a legal vacuum and the lack of increasing uncertainty about each other’s strategic capabilities and intentions. and intentions. increasing uncertainty about each other’s strategic capabilities Russia and the U.S. possess more than 90% of the world’s nuclear warheads. warheads. Russia and the U.S. possess more than 90% of the world’s nuclear Without agreement between them on further nuclear weapons reductions it ions it Without agreement between them on further nuclear weapons reduct will be difficult to convince other nations that they pursue their NPT will be difficult to convince other nations that they pursue the ir NPT commitments and to consolidate efforts of international community for y for commitments and to consolidate efforts of international communit strengthening of the NPT regime. strengthening of the NPT regime.

The recent U.S.- -Russian discussions on strategic nuclear Russian discussions on strategic nuclear The recent U.S. weapons reduction weapons reduction Discussions among U.S. and Russian experts on the future of START, that began T, that began Discussions among U.S. and Russian experts on the future of STAR in the beginning 2007 made clear that neither Russia nor the United States wants in the beginning 2007 made clear that neither Russia nor the Uni ted States wants to extend the START Treaty. Mainly because it imposes problems for both sides in or both sides in to extend the START Treaty. Mainly because it imposes problems f their efforts to develop and modernize their strategic offensive forces. forces. their efforts to develop and modernize their strategic offensive Russia wants to deploy RS- -24 missile as a new type of missile equipped with three 24 missile as a new type of missile equipped with three Russia wants to deploy RS warheads having capability to penetrate ballistic missile defense. But RS e. But RS- -24 is most 24 is most warheads having capability to penetrate ballistic missile defens likely a version of single warhead SS- -27 missile. The START contains a strict 27 missile. The START contains a strict likely a version of single warhead SS definition of the changes needed to count a new missile as “a new type”. The w type”. The definition of the changes needed to count a new missile as “a ne RS- RS -24 likely does not satisfy this definition and therefore can not 24 likely does not satisfy this definition and therefore can not be deployed with be deployed with a three warheads under this START requirement. a three warheads under this START requirement. The United States placed a strong priority on converting excess U.S. strategic The United States placed a strong priority on converting excess U.S. strategic delivery systems for use as conventional- -weapon carriers. Some of this plans will weapon carriers. Some of this plans will delivery systems for use as conventional likely collide with START constraints. likely collide with START constraints.