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THE STATE OF AUTHENTICATION Chad Spensky Allthenticate OUTLINE - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

THE STATE OF AUTHENTICATION Chad Spensky Allthenticate OUTLINE Who am I? Authentication overview Current state of Authentication The future of authentication MY JOURNEY 2012-2015 2004-2011 2015-Present 1998-2004 Staff at MIT


  1. THE STATE OF AUTHENTICATION Chad Spensky Allthenticate

  2. OUTLINE • Who am I? • Authentication overview • Current state of Authentication • The future of authentication

  3. MY JOURNEY 2012-2015 2004-2011 2015-Present 1998-2004 Staff at MIT LL Internet Pirate Offensive Security Console Modder B.S. in CS & Math Ph.D. CS (Security) M.S. in CS (Authentication) Founder of Allthenticate

  4. THE PROBLEM Everyone should not have access to everything.

  5. AUTHENTICATION Only permitting authorized users to access a resource Chad

  6. AUTHENTICATION Real World Digital World

  7. AUTHENTICATION • What you know • What you have • What you are

  8. PASSWORDS More than 15 usernames More than 150 saved passwords cspensky@ucsb.edu ******* Dedicated apps ******* ******* ******* cspensky@gmail.com ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* cspensky@mit.edu ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* chad@allthenticate.net ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* cspensky@cs.ucsb.edu ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* chad@cspensky.info ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* cspensky@unc.edu ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* cspensky@alumni.pitt.edu ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* chad.spensky@ll.mit.edu ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* cspensky@comcast.net ******* ******* ******* ******* ******* cspensky@alumni.unc.edu ******* ******* Today

  9. HARDWARE TOKENS Smartphone Second Factor Hardware Credential Portable Computer Employee

  10. BIOMETRICS Fingerprint Voice Recognition FaceID

  11. AUTHENTICATION IMPLEMENTATIONS

  12. HOW PASSWORDS WORK Chad1 Chad1 Secure Hash Function Chad1 ac18753fe31 Encrypted Tunnel Keyboard Entry Hash saved

  13. HOW PASSWORDS FAIL Chad1 Chad1 Secure Hash Function Chad1 ac18753fe31 Encrypted Tunnel Keyboard Entry Hash saved

  14. https://xkcd.com/538/

  15. HOW 2FA WORKS Chad1 Chad1 Secure Hash Function 1234 Chad1 ac18753fe31 1234 1234

  16. HOW 2FA FAILS Chad1 Chad1 Secure Hash Function 1234 Chad1 ac18753fe31 1234 1234

  17. HOW 2FA WORKS (BETTER SOLUTION) Chad1 Secure Hash Function Chad1 ac18753fe31 Challenge Response

  18. https://www.techspot.com/news/78292-new-reverse-proxy-tool-posted-github-can-easily.html

  19. HOW TOKENS WORK Request Token Required Challenge Response

  20. HOW TOKENS FAIL Request Token Required Challenge Response

  21. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/06/17/yubico-recalls-fips-yubikey-tokens-after-flaw-found/

  22. HOW BIOMETRICS WORK Request Biometric Required Challenge Do X? Signed Response Yes

  23. HOW BIOMETRICS WORK Request Biometric Required Challenge Do X? Signed Response Yes

  24. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4396831.stm

  25. SECURITY VS USABILITY VS COST

  26. FINDING THE RIGHT FIT Value of Asset Security

  27. FINDING THE RIGHT FIT User Burden Security

  28. FINDING THE RIGHT FIT ******* User Burden Security

  29. FINDING THE RIGHT FIT Implementation Cost Security

  30. FINDING THE RIGHT FIT Implementation Cost ******* Security

  31. THE PROBLEM There are too many options

  32. WE NEED FLEXIBILITY

  33. WE NEED FLEXIBILITY *******

  34. MORE SECURITY. LESS BURDEN. chad@allthenticate.net www.allthenticate.net

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