The perception of of Globalization: : From in inequalities to to - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The perception of of Globalization: : From in inequalities to to Trumpism Università La Sapienza, Roma Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Dottorato in Studi Politici PhD Program Seminar Roland Benedikter, R. Prof. Dott. Dr. Dr. Dr. Willy Brandt Centre, Wroclaw University / Center for Advanced Studies, Eurac Research Bolzano-Bozen May 7, 2018

Characteristics of the present: The fundamental paradox The perception of globalization has changed dramatically over the past few years, not only in the open societies of the West, but also in closed societies such as China (autocratic state capitalism), and in illiberal modern nations with a “steered democracy” (Charles A. Kupchan, Fareed Zakaria) such as Russia. Differences: in closed societies ( independent modern nations ) towards enthusiasm, in open societies ( interdependent post- modern post-nations ) towards skepticism. This is a great paradox since it was the open societies who decided to put their fundamental hopes on cosmopolitanism and a transnational global civil, economic, trade and security order, and to “invent” and to foster globalization - as both its driving forces, its designers (civil power) and its protectors and main beneficiaries (socio-economic internationalization, pacification, power politics and geostrategy, democratization, civic and legal transnationalization, cultural integration and soft power, military protection of global resource routes, elite liberalization and meta-civilizational opening). Growing inequality is perceived both as 1) a domestic effect of “wild” globalization (USA), and 2) equivalent to a new asymmetry between the advantages of globalization for participants and growing unfairness (USA and Europe) Independent of the facts, this perceptive dimension is becoming more important for the future of Western open societies as “Imaginal Politics” (Chiara Bottici , Manfred Steger) is becoming more influential as part of the global rise of “Contextual Politics” (Charles Tilly, Robert E. Goodin). At the same time it is increasingly subject to manipulation and growing VUCA (volatility, unpredictability, complexity, ambiguity) levels.

Three theses 1. Most recently, the perception of the populations of most Western democracies and open societies is that the current process of internationalization, including globalization, which started in the 1990s a) has become an asymmetric process to the disadvantage of the West (Penetrated democracy/Penetrated Liberal Order/ One-Way Globalization); b) needs fundamental reform, c) needs a “Redefinition of the West” (Trump agenda, “populism on the march” because of globalization: Fareed Zakaria, Thomas L. Friedman). 2. Inequality is perceived as a consequence of elite internationalization - and elite globalization. Elite internationalization – as connected with ”post - modern” post -national post-politics, bureaucracy (EU) and one-sided export economization (Germany) – is seen as a de-localization and de-nationalization without taking account of the will of the people, or even against the will of the people. As such it has played a role in the current crisis of liberal democracy because of the perception of fundamental powerlessness and helplessness of participatory and democratic decision-making in multi-level governmental arrangements leading to the wish for a “systemic break”, among other electoral shifts, as shown by the election of Donald Trump to 45 th U.S. president on 9 November 2016 and Brexit on 23 June 2016. 3. Trumpism can be interpreted, among other aspects, as the embodiment, the expression and the “serious” start of the historic symptomatology of the need for a reform of globalization felt in democratic open societies. It consists of de- internationalization externally (“Trumpism”, geopolitical nationalism based on “new neophytism ”) and in re -homogenization internally (“ Bannonism ”, American “national socialism” in the strict sense combined with a new cultural missionarism that mixes civil religion with traditional religion: “We are a nation with a purpose and a historical legitimation to exist”). Pro gram: “New Economic Nationalism” combined with the “Deconstruction of the Administrative State” thought to be in the service of elitist groups not connected with the nation, and a “New Liberal Global Order” (= Bilateralism. ”Liberal” here means: detached from international agreements, unpredictability and flexibility as core strategies, “emancipation” from internationa l legitimation mechanisms).

Three questions 1. Who is going to participate in the reform of globalization in a multipolar global order and in a “G - Zero world” (Ian Bremmer)? Only the West with its open society model is interested in protecting itself from increasing penetration by illiberal and closed models such as China, the Middle East, Turkey or Russia; the emerging illiberal powers prefer the status quo of “wild” globalization to continue since they are closed and not penetrable by open societies, having created a one -way process. Examples: China’s New Silk Road (Road and Belt Initiative), port of Piraeus, Daimler – China wants to become the new Germany, i.e. high quality manufacturing, while Germany and Europe lack a (joint) global strategy and foresight. Example: Official warning issued jointly by the 28 EU ambassadors in Beijing in April 2018 that the New Silk Road is an expansionary measure by China to undermine fair trade and the international order, an attempt to dominate Europe and to provide unfair advantages to Chinese state firms according to the authoritarian and expansive Xi Jinping Doctrine “The New Chinese Dream / China’s New Place in the World”. 2. Is Trumpism, as some U.S. and European theorists (Cato Institute, Fred Dallmayr, Peggy Noonan, Victor Davis Hanson, Ken Masugi, Hans Köchler ) and influential opinion makers (Sean Hannity, Newt Gingrich) put it, “the” expression that multipolarism is being taken seriously for the first time by the U.S. and the leading Western powers - contrary to Europe with its persistent “inverse imperialism” as “global civil power”? Is it “the” expression of the recognition of the new multipolar order by a new Western pragmatic realism that is at the forefront of defending the open societies from the grip of closed models such as China? Or is Trumpism, in contrast, just a symptom of decline? Example: Trump’s domestic versus foreign policies. Example: Surprisingly many in the U.S. support Trump’s trade war with China as well as his re -nationalization policy towards U.S. global corporations as “necessary before it is too late”. 3. Is Trumpism (i.e. re-nationalization and de-pluralization) just a temporary phenomenon, or is it here to stay? Does the answer to this question depend more on a) the progression of inequality or b) the reform of asymmetric elite internationalization, i.e. the perception of the citizen’s fundamental powerlessness and helplessness in Western democracies and open societies, in which everybody has a voice but nothing changes, with other social models becoming more successful? In this the driving force for the future of democracy lies in a great paradox. Example: The Western migration crisis - not a global crisis, but a specific crisis of open societies, since the vast majority move to the open (developed) societies and not vice versa, making it a unilateral shift on which, nevertheless, the West has only a minority say. (Example: Trump‘s USA withdrawal from negotiations on the new global migration agreement by the International Organization for Migration IOM in December 2017 for “Infringement of sovereignty”.)

Perspectives 1: The Embattled Future of Democracy / Open Society • State of the international order and the future of the West: Civil power against new “carnivores” ( Sigmar Gabriel)? • Rise of autocracies: In 2018, more than 4 billion people live in autocracies. Open society and democracy have become a minority model, just one model among others and not “the” model any more – thus needing to be defended. In turn, the West can no longer be in charge of everything (Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2018) • Crisis of (leftist) liberal democracy – “democracy on retreat”, theory of “shrinking civil spaces” (Ansgar Klein). Will democracy and/or open society survive under the pressure of rising competing models such as “state capitalism” (China), “steered democracy” (Russia) or the new “religious state” (Islam) (Claus Leggewie)? • New legal challenges for democracy: as a value system and in relation to decisional and participatory procedures. “Movement parties” replacing “people‘s parties” (Manfred Osten, Peter Sloterdijk ), “search formats of participation” rather than “passive formats” (Future of Democracy Commission of the German Bundestag). • The future of democracy will foremost depend a) on the perception of the citizens within democracies of its advantages and ability to take decisions and adapt within a suitable timeframe, b) on new protective mechanisms. • The future of Open Society: Open internally, closed to outsiders? • Europe in particular: “Democratization of representative democracy internally, accompanied by new power politics and integrated geopolitical strategy towards outsiders? Is thus a new differentiation between domestic and foreign needed?