The inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 2 The inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) Daniel J. Bernstein eliminates some types of leakage. University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

1 2 The inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) Daniel J. Bernstein eliminates some types of leakage. University of Illinois at Chicago & Fact for each m : Technische Universiteit Eindhoven All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away.

1 2 The inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) Daniel J. Bernstein eliminates some types of leakage. University of Illinois at Chicago & Fact for each m : Technische Universiteit Eindhoven All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism.

1 2 The inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage (grounded or ungrounded) Daniel J. Bernstein eliminates some types of leakage. University of Illinois at Chicago & Fact for each m : Technische Universiteit Eindhoven All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case of the “holographic principle”.

1 2 inverse Faraday challenge Myth: Faraday cage Typical EM (grounded or ungrounded) Use sens J. Bernstein eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. University of Illinois at Chicago & Fact for each m : echnische Universiteit Eindhoven All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case of the “holographic principle”.

1 2 raday challenge Myth: Faraday cage Typical EM attack: (grounded or ungrounded) Use sensors to extract Bernstein eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. Compute Illinois at Chicago & Fact for each m : Universiteit Eindhoven All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case of the “holographic principle”.

1 2 nge Myth: Faraday cage Typical EM attack: (grounded or ungrounded) Use sensors to extract EM data eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. Compute secret k Chicago & Fact for each m : Eindhoven All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case of the “holographic principle”.

2 3 Myth: Faraday cage Typical EM attack: (grounded or ungrounded) Use sensors to extract EM data eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. Compute secret key. Fact for each m : All information inside Faraday cage is visible m meters away. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case of the “holographic principle”.

2 3 Myth: Faraday cage Typical EM attack: (grounded or ungrounded) Use sensors to extract EM data eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. Compute secret key. Fact for each m : Countermeasure: All information inside Faraday Put Faraday cage around chip. cage is visible m meters away. Sensors fail. Hard proof: Messy calculations using laws of electromagnetism. Easy proof: This is a special case of the “holographic principle”.

2 3 Myth: Faraday cage Typical EM attack: (grounded or ungrounded) Use sensors to extract EM data eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. Compute secret key. Fact for each m : Countermeasure: All information inside Faraday Put Faraday cage around chip. cage is visible m meters away. Sensors fail. Hard proof: Messy calculations Challenge: using laws of electromagnetism. Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that Easy proof: This is a special case rebuilds the original EM data. of the “holographic principle”. Sensors work again.

2 3 Faraday cage Typical EM attack: Should b (grounded or ungrounded) Use sensors to extract EM data inverse F eliminates some types of leakage. from chip. Compute secret key. • many EM • the mess for each m : Countermeasure: • many EM information inside Faraday Put Faraday cage around chip. is visible m meters away. Sensors fail. roof: Messy calculations Challenge: laws of electromagnetism. Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that roof: This is a special case rebuilds the original EM data. “holographic principle”. Sensors work again.

2 3 cage Typical EM attack: Should be able to ungrounded) Use sensors to extract EM data inverse Faraday cage types of leakage. from chip. Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; • the messy calculations; : Countermeasure: • many EM generato inside Faraday Put Faraday cage around chip. meters away. Sensors fail. Messy calculations Challenge: electromagnetism. Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that This is a special case rebuilds the original EM data. hic principle”. Sensors work again.

2 3 Typical EM attack: Should be able to build Use sensors to extract EM data inverse Faraday cage from leakage. from chip. Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; • the messy calculations; Countermeasure: • many EM generators. raday Put Faraday cage around chip. ay. Sensors fail. calculations Challenge: electromagnetism. Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that ecial case rebuilds the original EM data. rinciple”. Sensors work again.

3 4 Typical EM attack: Should be able to build Use sensors to extract EM data inverse Faraday cage from from chip. Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; • the messy calculations; Countermeasure: • many EM generators. Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Challenge: Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again.

3 4 Typical EM attack: Should be able to build Use sensors to extract EM data inverse Faraday cage from from chip. Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; • the messy calculations; Countermeasure: • many EM generators. Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against Challenge: a chip inside a Faraday cage. Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that rebuilds the original EM data. Sensors work again.

3 4 Typical EM attack: Should be able to build Use sensors to extract EM data inverse Faraday cage from from chip. Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; • the messy calculations; Countermeasure: • many EM generators. Put Faraday cage around chip. Sensors fail. Probably easier: Directly build a many-sensor EM attack against Challenge: a chip inside a Faraday cage. Surround Faraday cage with an inverse Faraday cage that Maybe harder, maybe impossible: rebuilds the original EM data. Build inverse Faraday cage as a Sensors work again. simple physical device.

3 4 ypical EM attack: Should be able to build Technical note the talk: My nsors to extract EM data inverse Faraday cage from primary Fa chip. Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; inside the into movements • the messy calculations; Countermeasure: cage, creating • many EM generators. the cage, which raday cage around chip. cage should rs fail. Probably easier: Directly build Faraday cages a many-sensor EM attack against tap the ground. Challenge: can also b a chip inside a Faraday cage. Surround Faraday cage with of information, sensors might inverse Faraday cage that Maybe harder, maybe impossible: rebuilds the original EM data. Build inverse Faraday cage as a rs work again. simple physical device.

3 4 attack: Should be able to build Technical note added to the talk: My understanding extract EM data inverse Faraday cage from primary Faraday effect Compute secret key. • many EM sensors; inside the Faraday cage into movements of electrons • the messy calculations; Countermeasure: cage, creating magnetic • many EM generators. the cage, which EM senso cage around chip. cage should be able to Probably easier: Directly build Faraday cages it should a many-sensor EM attack against tap the ground. Electromagnetic can also be converted a chip inside a Faraday cage. y cage with of information, so using sensors might also be raday cage that Maybe harder, maybe impossible: riginal EM data. Build inverse Faraday cage as a again. simple physical device.

3 4 Should be able to build Technical note added to slides after the talk: My understanding of the data inverse Faraday cage from primary Faraday effect is that waves secret key. • many EM sensors; inside the Faraday cage are converted into movements of electrons on the • the messy calculations; cage, creating magnetic fields outside • many EM generators. the cage, which EM sensors outside chip. cage should be able to see. For grounded Probably easier: Directly build Faraday cages it should also be helpful a many-sensor EM attack against tap the ground. Electromagnetic w can also be converted into other fo a chip inside a Faraday cage. with of information, so using other types sensors might also be helpful. that Maybe harder, maybe impossible: data. Build inverse Faraday cage as a simple physical device.